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I. INTRODUCTION

Vacationing in Victoria, British Columbia, I stepped into the province's
Parliament Building expecting to encounter debates pertaining to land use,
economic policy, and other territorially-relevant issues. Upon entering the
legislative chamber, however, I found myself immersed in a detailed
discussion of e-commerce and information privacy as the Members of
Parliament questioned proposed privacy-based regulations regarding the
electronic collection and transfer of medical records.' Meanwhile, the U.S.
Congress continues to debate e-consumer privacy and identity theft
legislation,2 while the European Union gradually builds upon its
comprehensive privacy protection regime.' This global focus on
1. See Health Statutes Amendment Act, 2004, Bill [29] 2006 (amending, inter alia, the
Health Act (1996)), availableat http://www.leg.bc.ca/38th2nd/1st-read/gov29-1 .htm (last visited
July 25, 2007).
2. See, e.g., the Consumer Privacy Protection Act, H.R. 1263, 109th Cong. (2005)
(requiring, among other things, most companies collecting, disclosing, selling, or utilizing PII for
commercial purposes to create and post an electronic privacy policy describing the company's
privacy practices and also require the FTC to put procedures in place that are designed to lighten
the effects of identity theft on consumers) and the Safeguarding Americans from Exporting
Identification Data Act, S. 810, 109th Cong. (2005) (protecting the privacy of an individual's PII
by requiring certain privacy-enhancing protections to be put in place before PII is transmitted to
foreign affiliates and foreign subcontractors).
3. Working Party 29 Opinion 2/2006 on Privacy Issues Related to the Provision of Email
Screening Services (Feb. 21,2006) (ruling in favor of individual privacy in e-mail communications
and stating that it is unlawful for e-mail service providers to screen individual e-mails (even for
evidence of unlawful activities), or to implement software monitoring the opening, forwarding or
sending of e-mail, without prior consent or a "specific legal basis" such as public security),
availableat http://ec.europa.eu/justice home/fsj/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2006/ wp 1 18_en.pdf (last
visited July 25, 2007). The Article 29 Working Party is not a legislative body, rather, it is made up
of the:
Data Protection Commissioners from the EU... together with a representative of
the EU Commission. The Working Party is independent and acts in an advisory
capacity. The Working Party seeks to harmonise the application of data protection
rules throughout the EU, and publishes opinions and recommendations on various
data protection topics. It also advises the EU Commission on the adequacy of data
protection standards in non-EU countries.
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information privacy demonstrates the significance of protecting the vast
amounts of personal information submitted into cyberspace from
electronic privacy-invading threats (e-threats).
As technology advances and a greater percentage of commerce is
conducted online,4 web site visitors continually find themselves submitting
more and more information about themselves via web site forms in order
to conduct activities that recently required face-to-face encounters.' This
data--often referred to as personally identifying information (P1)-has
emerged as a valuable commodity both to individuals and organizations
attempting to legally profit from its collection, processing and
dissemination (the PH Processing Cycle).6 Problematically, however, a
shady and sophisticated underworld, consisting of technologically-savvy
e-thieves and other unsavory actors, has developed alongside these legal

Office of Ireland's Data Protection Commissioner, Article 29 Working Party, http://www.
dataprotection.ie/ViewDoc.asp?fn=/documents/european/article29.htm&CatID=3 1&m=u (last
visited July 25, 2007).
4. Shop.org, Statistics: U.S. Online Shoppers, http://www.shop.org/leam/stats-usshop_
general.asp (last visited July 25, 2007). E-commerce transactions in 2006 are projected to generate
$198 billion and $316 billion in 2010. Id.
5. The number of worldwide Internet users surpassed one billion in 2005. See Computer
Industry Almanac, Worldwide Internet Users Top 1 Billion in 2005: USA Reach Nearly 200M
Internet Users, http://www.c-i-a.com/pr006.htm (last visited July 25, 2007). Internet visitors
across America may now enter personal information on particular web sites in order to, among
other things, obtain a home mortgage, apply for a job or even hire a pet-watching service. See, e.g.,
Ameriquest Mortgage Company, Prequalify Now: Request A Loan, https://www.
ameriquestmortgage.confoan.html?ad=ameriquest.com&requestLoan--true&miniForm--true (last
visited July 25, 2007); Monster.com, Create Account, http://my.monster.com/Account/Account.
aspx?jsinter='l (last visited July 25, 2007); Camp Bowwow, Send that Doggy to Camp!,
http://data.gointranet.conm/cgi-bin/unitloc/cbw/locator.cgi?cpage=reservation.html&cu=Castle&cl=
CBW%20Castle%2ORock (last visited July 25, 2007).
6. See, e.g., DatranSettles Spam Probe, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 13, 2006, at C2 (quoting New
York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer's statement that "personal information equals marketing
dollars" when discussing a settlement with an Internet marketing company accused of sending out
millions of commercial e-mails based on PI1 obtained from different companies on violation of
company privacy policies); ChoicePoint, Overview (employing over 5,000 people in over 60
locations whose primary purpose is to collect and sell P1I), http://www.choicepoint.com/about/
overview.html (last visited July 25, 2007). ChoicePoint states on its homepage that one of its "data
products integrates ChoicePoint proprietary data with third-party data sources to provide unmatched
coverage, depth and accuracy on more than 210 million consumers"). ChoicePoint Precision
Marketing, http://www.choicepoint.com/business/direct/direct.html (last visited July 25,2007); Jay
MacDonald, How Much are Your Personal Details Worth, BANKRATE.COM, http://www.
bankrate.com/brm/news/pf/2006022 Ib1.asp (last visited July 25, 2007) (cataloging the "going
price" on 46 separate items of PII stemming from a military record worth $35 to a phone number
worth $0.25).
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uses.7 Over time, this underworld has come to dominate a section of
cyberspace by propounding technologically-advanced e-threats
specifically designed to obtain8 key pieces of PH for various criminal or
otherwise unethical purposes.
This Article identifies and categorizes the most dangerous
contemporary e-threats-based on their ability to compromise
P11-through a model entitled the Privacy Matrix. The Matrix
demonstrates how each e-threat impacts consumer privacy during the
primary stages of the PH Processing Cycle and explains how businesses,
guided by an updated and balanced regulatory privacy regime, can create
a safer e-commerce environment. I argue that e-threats targeting PH when
businesses first attempt to collect such information from visitors-through
a company's "front door"-are less invasive and less dangerous than ethreats targeting PH after its dissemination into cyberspace-through a
company's "back door." Accordingly, what is needed is a comprehensive
federal statute that is narrowly tailored to protect privacy against front
door e-threats, but drafted to morph into a more comprehensive privacy
protection regime as PH is shuttled towards a company's back door.
More specifically, the Privacy Matrix is introduced and interpreted in
Part H. Part IEI focuses on the major front door e-threats and argues that a
federal statute requiring the posting of a multilayered electronic privacy
policy is sufficient to protect consumers at this stage because the decision
to provide PH primarily rests with consumers. Part IV moves forward to
the prominent e-threats targeting PH stored and processed inside the
company and argues that the privacy policy statute must be supplemented
with a provision-structured as a regulatory ceiling prohibiting more
restrictive state laws-requiring companies to adequately protect stored
and processed PH and to notify all PH providers of major security
7. Among these legal uses occurs when companies profit by amassing a detailed "digital
dossier" containing as many pieces of P11 as possible. See DANIEL SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON
1-10 (2004). See, e.g., Jill Burcum, Hackers 'Assaults May Prod Wave of Reforms: Data-Selling
Industry Comes Under Scrutiny, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), at A-I (describing the pieces of P11
LexisNexis possessed on a certain individual such as: (1) a Social Security Number (including its
date and state of issue); (2) a current employer; (3) every address [he] had lived at over the past
twelve years ("including time spent in a California monastery"); (4) information on "past
roommates, his brother and his parents, including their ages, past addresses, Social Security
numbers and the value of their Twin Cities homes").
8. See, e.g., John Moran, Spain and the Taste of Money: How Junk E-Mailers Make
Fortunes by PushingShady Goods to Eager Dupes, S. FLA. SUN-SENTINEL, Jan. 30, 2005, at 24
(reviewing current literature on spam and the "Internet's seamy underside of bulk e-mail
advertising on everything from cut-rate mortgages to penis-enlargement pills"); Tom Zeller Jr.,
CountlessDens of Uncatchable Thieves, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3,2006, at B-3 (discussing international
thieves that sell access to U.S. bank account numbers as well as other stolen P11).
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breaches. This additional regulation is necessary to protect against the
more serious e-threats lurking at this stage-an environment where the
initial provider of the PH has less, but still some, control over the
information. Part V introduces the e-threats targeting PH at the company's
back door and argues that the privacy policy and security breach
regulations must now be supplemented by stricter provisions that are
specifically passed as regulatory floors allowing individual states room to
thoroughly experiment with back door prevention tactics. Comprehensive
regulation is necessary at this stage because PH exiting a company's back
door is virtually irretrievable by the person it identifies and can be used to
cause serious emotional and financial damage with the perpetrators, who
nearly impossible to identify. Part VI concludes by summarizing the
argument and suggesting areas for further research.
II. THE PRIVACY MATRIX

A matrix is an environment within which "something else originates,
develops or takes form," 9 or, a venue where multiple entities coexist and
develop manners of interaction. This concept is appropriate for the ecommerce world where web site visitors, businesses, and Internet scamartists all operate within an electronically-networked environment,
continually collecting, processing, storing, and disseminating PII. This
network has spawned a P11-based economy producing billions of dollars
annually through the trading of data.' ° At the same time, this emerging
market has proven susceptible to evolving e-threats and other sinister
activities that interfere with business transactions.
To effectively combat these problems, Congress must address this
national issue and enact a statute specifically designed to function within
this environment. This approach would prove much more effective than
sticking with the plethora of indirectly-related state and federal statutes
currently on the books and hoping such a band-aid approach solves the
problem." The Privacy Matrix can help shape the design of such laws by
9. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 717 (10th ed. 2000).

10. In fact, many data-broker companies such as ChoicePoint and LexisNexis profit from the
sale of PII. See, e.g., Burcum, supra note 7, at A-I (stating that "[flor years, [data brokers] have
made millions quietly selling personal information to law enforcement, corporations, attorneys,
collection agencies and the news media.").
11. This plethora of laws problem occurred primarily because both federal and state
legislators recognized the seriousness of these e-threats and rushed to enact legislation designed to
protect consumers. Some e-threats were covered while some failed to merit protection. This
patchwork approach, although undertaken with good motivations, is actually doing more harm than
good as businesses struggle to comply with varying and expensive standards and as consumers
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identifying particular e-threats while concurrently developing a regulatory
framework designed to protect PH without excessively burdening ecommerce efficiency. In doing so, the Matrix identifies eleven of today's
most prominent e-threats and then places each threat at a location where
it most directly targets P1-at the front door, inside, or at the back door
of a typical e-commerce company.
At their front doors, companies collect many different types of PIH such
as names, addresses, phone numbers, e-mails, usemames, passwords,
credit card information and, sometimes, social security numbers. At this
stage, the consumer ultimately chooses whether to visit a particular site
and whether to divulge any PH. The Privacy Matrix demonstrates that
front door e-threats-such as adware, spyware, phishing, pretexting and
active/passive PH collection-should be combated primarily by a federal
law mandating only that companies post readable electronic privacy
policies. These policies must accurately disclose company privacy
practices in understandable terms, thereby allowing individual consumers
to make more informed P1-disclosure decisions.
Protecting against e-threats from within the company, on the other
hand, lies primarily outside of the control of the consumer and requires
stronger regulatory protections. It is not that threats to PH at this stage are
more dangerous in and of themselves, rather, the lack of control over PH
struggle to understand the various ways and jurisdictions within which they are protected. See, e.g.,
Joanne McNabb, Stitching Together the Legislative Patchwork,TRUSTE.ORG, http://www.truste.
org/articles/legislative_patch.php (last visited July 25, 2007). McNabb argues that
the states are creating a patchwork of incompatible laws that impose burdens and
costs on business. California in particular has been criticized for enacting a large
number ofprivacy laws-more than 40 since 1999-some ofwhich effectively set
a national standard even though they do not preempt other state or federal laws.
In fact, the privacy quilt in the United States is even bigger and more complex. It
encompasses a number of federal sectoral laws as well as the numerous laws and
regulations of other countries.
Id.; Privacy, ARNOLD & PORTER, PRACTICES/INDUSTRIES LLP, http://www.amoldporter.com/
practice.cfin?practice-id=21 (last visited July 25, 2007). Arnold & Porter argue that
[r]apid changes in technology and rising public concern have thrust information
privacy and security to the top of the legal, regulatory, and policy agenda....
These same advances, however, pose new threats to individual privacy.
Lawmakers at the federal, state, and international levels have responded to this
problem by enacting sweeping laws to protect privacy. New privacy proposals are
being introduced and debated in Congress, state legislatures, and foreign capitals
on a regular basis.
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merits greater regulation. The Matrix identifies that once PII is processed
or stored inside a company, it is up to company officials to adequately
protect the information from data mining, internally-connected and
disconnected use violations, and external security breaches.
Finally, electronic threats to PH take on their most serious form if a
company decides to sell or otherwise transfer PII it previously collected
and processed and stored. At this point the PH is disseminated into
cyberspace where it is virtually irretrievable without any recourse
available to the individual it identifies. Privacy-enhancing regulations must
strive to protect this information while serving as a regulatory floor from
which individual states are allowed to experiment and enact stronger
legislation to prevent spam attacks, identity theft and other privacyinvading external uses at this back door stage.
The following sections hone-in on each processing stage by discussing
the relevant e-threats and identifying the proper regulatory structure, as
defined by the Privacy Matrix, to best protect against them. Part H begins
this process by covering the e-threats in existence at a company's front
door.
III. E-THREATS AT THE FRONT DOOR (PI1 COLLECTION)
E-commerce companies and e-consumers become acquainted and
initiate business transactions through a World Wide Web interface
(webpage) connected to the Internet. 2 This electronic interaction provides
the initial opportunity for the visitor to provide, and for the company to
collect, particular forms of PH.' 3 Companies need some of this
information-such as the purchaser's name, physical address, e-mail
address, and credit card number-to fully and accurately process various

12. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Homepage, http://www.amazon.com (last visited July 25, 2007)
(stating that Amazon allows its customers to create an account, utilized to purchase Amazon
products, that will open every time a customer opens Amazon's homepage on the same computer
used to create the account).
13. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Registration, https://www.amazon.com/gp/flex/sign-in/select.

html/002-6636822-1893600?%5Fencoding=UTF8&protocol=https (last visited July 25, 2007)
(stating that, upon the creation of a customer account, Amazon collects various forms of PlI such
as customer name, e-mail, birthday (submitting this PII is optional) and a newly-created (hopefully)
password). Later on in the registration process, and in order to complete online purchases, Amazon
will need to collect additional PII such as a physical address for billing, a physical address for
shipping and a credit card number for each customer. See, e.g., Amazon.com, Privacy Notice: What
Personal Information About Customers Does Amazon.com Gather? (discussing the company's PII=
collection practices), http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/display.html?ie=UTF8&nodeld
468496 (last visited Dec. 18, 2007).
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online transactions. 4 Additionally, however, many companies desire other
forms of PH-such as home and employment telephone numbers, social
security numbers, mother's maiden name, personal income, or job
field/description-merely to supplement a purchaser's database profile. 5
As mentioned previously, companies desire this information because
detailed individual profiles are valuable as internal marketing resources as
well as assets that may be sold to third parties in the future. 6
All of this activity occurs at the front door of the company or stage one
in the PH processing cycle. This data is typically collected via electronic
forms and immediately transferred to company computers where it is
processed by powerful databases.' 1 Various e-threats operating at this stage
can abuse PH by: (1) enticing visitors to voluntarily submit more PH than
necessary to complete the transaction (active PH collection),"8 (2) placing
cookies, spyware and web beacons on webpages that are able to secretly
collect PH (passive PH collection) 9 and (3) obtaining information via the
placing of deceptive phone calls/e-mails either by the company itself or by
unrelated entities posing as legitimate businesses (pretexting).2 °

14. As mentioned above, Amazon would be unable to complete a purchase of a constitutional
law textbook without some form of payment information and without some physical address to ship
the textbook to. Submitting this information online is one of the major benefits to e-commerce
(because textbooks may be rush-ordered at 1:00 am in the comfort of the home) and one of its
downfalls (now Amazon has at least six pieces of my PII stored on its computers).
15. See, e.g., ElectronicEdition Registration,DENV. POST, https://www.post-newscustomer
care.com/electronicedition/olivestepl .asp?pub=DP&bhcp=l (last visited July 25, 2007) (showing
that this electronic form is intended for people wishing to subscribe to the electronic version of the
Denver Post. However, this form requires unnecessary additional PII such as a physical address to
complete the subscription).
16. See, e.g., Burcum, supra note 7, at A-I (discussing the sale of PII).
17. American business spent over $15 billion in 2003 merely computerizing information
collected on paper-based forms and are now competing to make their information gathering more
efficient and more electronic. See David Becker, Software Makers Look for Profits in E-Forms,
CNET NEWS.COM, Oct. 13, 2003, http://news.com.com/2100-1012-5089536.html. While large
companies staff entire Information Technology Departments, smaller companies may outsource
their electronic form creation and integration to companies like Logiforms.com; Logiforms.com
creates an electronic form for a small business and any data provided via the form is stored in a
"secured web-based database and can be accessed from anywhere." Logiforms.com, Data
Management: Submissions Management, http://www.logiforms.com/index.lf/method/
featuredetails/parent/data (last visited July 25, 2007).
18. See supra text accompanying note 15 (discussing the idea that the DenverPostElectronic
Edition required an individual's physical address in order to subscribe).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 21-52 (detailing description and further resources on
the e-threats of adware/spyware, cookie technology, and web beacons).
20. See infratext accompanying notes 53-64 (detailing description and further resources on
the e-threat of pretexting).
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Both active and passive PH collection are activities generally initiated
and conducted by employees and independent contractors of the company
collecting the information and can be classified as internally-created ethreats. On the other hand, pretexting is generally initiated by noncompany-related individuals pretending to be associated with the company
and is more properly classified as an externally-created e-threat. The
following section describes each of these three e-threats in more detail
beginning with the internally-created threats and then moving to the
externally-created threats. This part concludes with the argument that a
new federal law requiring all e-commerce businesses collecting,
processing or disseminating PH in interstate commerce to post a
standardized electronic privacy policy is the most efficient way to
minimize the effectiveness of each kind of front-door e-threat.
A. Internally-Created"FrontDoor" E-Threats
E-commerce web sites collect PH in two ways: (1) actively and (2)
passively. 21Companies actively collect PH by requiring consumers to enter
information through web site forms or by replying to e-mail registration
messages. 22 During this active collection process, customers must
"volunteer" all different types of information in order for the web site to
process a transaction or create an account. The failure to enter PH into a
21. See, e.g., MICRO-TEL, Privacy Policy, http://www. microcall.com/privacy.html (last
visited July 25, 2007). MICRO-TEL discusses active and passive PH1 collection as follows:
Active Personal Information Collection
This Website collects your Personal Information using active collection methods,
such as feedback forms, e-mail response mechanisms, or other forms where you
are asked to provide Personal Information. This Web site will inform you at such
information collection points as to what information is required to obtain the
requested services and what information is optional.
Passive Information Collection
In addition to the active collection methods described above, this Website also
passively collects other information from and about you using various
technologies such as IP addresses, cookies, or GIFs, as those are discussed in this
section.
Id. (disclosing in its privacy policy that the company conducts both types of collection).
22. See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson Pharmaceutical Research and Development, PrivacyPolicy,
http://www.jnjpharmarnd.com/privacy.html (last visited July 25, 2007) (discussing the fact that
Johnson and Johnson actively collects PII from web site visitors in the form ofe-mail, electronic
forms provided to conduct transactions, promotions and sweepstakes, and chat rooms).

20071
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required field will delay or end the web session causing consumers to miss
the opportunity they went online to obtain in the first place. Active PH
collection is generally benign and necessary to conduct online transactions.
The threats to privacy occur when companies require the submission of
unnecessary information to complete a transaction.
Passive PH collection, on the other hand, occurs when web sites collect
PH via covert programs without the knowledge or consent of the visitor.
Despite the mysterious nature of these collection instruments, e-commerce
operations commonly utilize passive PH collection and are able to collect
much more PH from consumers than a similar brick-and-mortar business
could obtain.23 Passive PH collection most commonly occurs through
cookies, web beacons, spyware, and adware. Problematically, if a user
chooses to disable cookies or monitor the source code of web sites only
choosing those locations without web beacons, spyware, or adware, most
of the World Wide Web becomes off-limits.24 While active collection is
obvious to all parties, the instruments of passive PH collection are nearly
invisible and deserve more analysis.
A cookie is:
A message given to a Web browser by a Web server. The browser
stores the message in a text file. The message is then sent back to
23. See, e.g., id. (laying out how the company collects information-via cookies, web
beacons and other "navigational data"--without web site visitors purposefully submitting any PII);
Rachel Zimmerman, Note: The Way the Cookies Crumble: InternetPrivacyand Data Protection
in the Twenty-First Century, 4 N.Y.U. J. LEGIS. & PUB. POL'Y 439, 442 (2001) (stating that "when
people log on to the Internet and visit Web sites, a great deal of personal information is collected
through both active user participation and passive collection techniques"); Andrew Shen,
Symposium: Online Activities and their Impact on the Legal Profession: The Current State of
OnlinePrivacy, 16 ST. JOHN'S J.L. CoMM. 621, 621-622 (2002) (stating that the architecture of the
Internet allows much more information to be collected passively than currently occurs in the offline
world).
24. Techsoup.org, Cookies: You are Never Alone on the Internet: Tiny Text Files on Your
HardDrivecan be Revealing, http://www.techsoup.org/learningcenter/internet/page5051 .cfrn (last
visited May 28, 2006). Techsoup.org discusses cookies and the idea a web surfer is likely to be
frustrated with the results of disabling cookies:
You can disable cookies entirely, but that is probably not a good idea, as many
sites depend on cookies to function properly. If you use a Web-based e-mail
program, you must have cookies enabled. Any site where you have to register to
use its content needs cookies. You can set the browser to warn you or ask
permission to send cookies, but that can be intrusive, and you may be driven to
distraction by the number of times you are asked to accept a cookie before a site
will serve up a page.

256
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the server each time the browser requests a page from the
server .... The main purpose of cookies is to identify users and
possibly prepare customized Web pages for them. When you enter
a Web site using cookies, you may be asked to fill out a form
providing such information as your name and interests. This
information is packaged into a cookie and sent to your Web
browser which stores it for later use. The next time you go to the
same Web site, your browser will send the cookie to the Web
server. The server can use this information to present you with
custom Web pages.25
There are two types of cookies: (1) persistent cookies and (2) session
cookies.26 Persistent cookies are stored on a web site visitor's computer
and are not deleted when the browser session is closed. 7 Because the text
file remains on the user's computer, it may be used to identify the user on
return visits to the web site and return the browser to the format the web
site was in when the user last visited.28 This customization effect allows
for a more user-friendly experience, but it also presents a threat as it
allows companies to track user behavior over long periods of time. 9
25. Webopedia.com, Cookie, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/c/cookie.html (last visited
July 25, 2007). Cookies were developed in 1995 by Netscape Communications Corporation and
are allegedly named after a programming term called a "magic cookie"-a "piece of information
shared between co-operating software." Aboutcookies.org, Cookies: FrequentlyAsked Questions,
http://www.aboutcookies.org/Default.aspx?page=5 (last visited July 25, 2007). Cookies are stored
on a web site visitor's hard drive as .txt or text files. Id.
26. See Michael Siebecker, Cookies and the Common Law: Are Internet Advertisers
Trespassingon Our Computers?,76 S. CAL. L. REV. 893, 897 (defining the terms session cookies
and persistent cookies and discussing how cookies operate and are placed on a web site visitor's
hard drive).
27. See Aboutcookies.com, supra note 25 (discussing the fact that persistent cookies are
designed to track individual users for long periods of time---"in some cases many years into the
future").
28. Id. (stating that persistent cookies provide cumulative data which maybe used to analyze
the user's behavior while surfing the particular web site).
29. Cookies allow web sites to track individual as well as overall visitor behavior. For
instance, companies utilize databases and cookies to track individual visitors in the following
manner:
The first time a visitor arrives, the site creates a new ID in the database and sends
the ID as a cookie. The next time the user comes back, the site can increment a
counter associated with that ID in the database and know how many times that
visitor returns.
Marshall Brain, How Internet Cookies Work, HowSTuFFWoRKS.coM, http://computer.
howstuffworks.com/cookie3.htm (last visited July 25, 2007). As for tracking overall web site
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Session cookies, on the other hand, are stored in the computer's memory
and are deleted when the browser session is closed.30 Session cookies also
track user information, but only for brief periods of time. Additionally,
technology exists that allows digital advertising companies such as
DoubleClick 31 to place a cookie on hard drives in order to monitor websurfing over numerous web sites and thereby create a larger profile of an
individual's Internet activities. 32 In fact, DoubleClick recently caused a
privacy firestorm when it announced that it would link these rich profiles
to names and addresses through a business transaction with a marketing
company called Abacus Direct.33
visitation, the implementation of cookies allows a company to trace the overall number of visitors
of a specific period of time. Web sites can
accurately determine how many people actually visit the site. It turns out that...
the only way for a site to accurately count visitors is to set a cookie with a unique
ID for each visitor. Using cookies, sites can determine: [h]ow many visitors arrive;
[h]ow many are new vs. repeat visitors; [and how] often a visitor has visited.
Id.
30. See Aboutcookies.com, supra note 25 (discussing that session cookies are particularly
helpful on web sites containing a shopping cart that will keep track of selected items until the
check-out process is completed).
31.
DoubleClick places advertisements on Web sites belonging to the DoubleClick
network. DoubleClick then tracks the Internet users who receive the ads at the
various Web sites and assigns the user a unique number. DoubleClick records the
number in a cookie file. Advertisers then can use the cookie file to target specific
users.
FTC Ends DoubleClick Investigation, CONSUMER FIN.
[hereinafter DoubleClick Investigation].
32. See Brain, supra note 29. Brain states that

SERVICES

L. REP., Feb. 20, 2001, at 15

[t]here are certain infrastructure providers that can actually create cookies that are
visible on multiple sites. DoubleClick is the most famous example of this. Many
companies use DoubleClick to serve banner ads on their sites. DoubleClick can
place small (lxl pixels) GIF files on the site that allow DoubleClick to load
cookies on your machine. DoubleClick can then track your movements across
multiple sites. It can potentially see the search strings that you type into search
engines (due more to the way some search engines implement their systems, not
because anything sinister is intended). Because it can gather so much information
about you from multiple sites, DoubleClick can form very rich profiles.
Id.
33. See Company News: DoubleClick to Buy RetailingDataBase Keeper, N.Y. TIMES, June
15, 1999, at C-4 (discussing DoubleClick's plans in 1999 to acquire Abacus Direct Corp., a
company that manages data on items people purchase, in an effort to utilize Abacus's database "of
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Functionally, cookies are not particularly dangerous34 and can actually
create a more efficient Web-surfing experience as users are not required
to continually enter usemames and passwords and click back through to
their desired webpage during new sessions. However, the covert collection
of information and the potential dissemination to third parties is
problematic because web sites can covertly collect more information from
an individual than a brick-and-mortar establishment executing a traditional
transaction.35 This excessive collection of PII may lead to more
information being sold in the open market to willing buyers, which may
include e-thieves.3 6 Although users can disable cookies via a browser tool
if they are uninterested in the benefits, web sites also should bear some
responsibility for clearly disclosing the fact that cookies are used to
passively collect PH. 37
consumer behavior to better direct advertising to consumers"). Upon announcement of the deal
shares, DoubleClick's stock "fell $18.0625, to $70.75, and shares of Abacus were down $7.0625,
to $67.50." Id. As for the outrage, see, e.g., PrivacyGroups See Dangerin a Merger, N.Y. TIMES,
June 22, 1999, at C-6. This New York Times article states that
[l]eading privacy advocates . . .blasted the $1 billion merger of the Internet
advertising firm Doubleclick Inc. with the Abacus Direct Corporation, a consumer
data collector, arguing that the combination would collect far too much personal
information about consumers. The nonprofit Electronic Privacy Information
Center and the privacy-oriented Web site Junkbusters .. . said they would
probably ask regulators to block the deal if the companies proceeded.
Id. Later, the FTC commenced, and subsequently dropped, an investigation into whether these
actions by DoubleClick violated its privacy policy that claimed that PII collected by DoubleClick
would remain confidential. See DoubleClick Investigation, supra note 31 (stating that the FTC
claimed that it ended its investigation because the evidence demonstrated that DoubleClick did not
violate its privacy policy or the FTC Act which prohibits deceptive commercial practices).
34. See Aboutcookies.com, supra note 25 (discussing the idea that cookies are merely text
files that cannot be used to scan a user's hard drive or to transmit viruses and may be shut down
by the user through a browser function).
35. See, e.g., Brain, supra note 29. Brain states that,
[o]n a Web site, the site can track not only your purchases, but also the pages that
you read, the ads that you click on, etc. Ifyou then purchase something and enter
your name and address, the site potentially knows much more about you than a
traditional mail order company does. This makes targeting much more precise,
and that makes a lot of people uncomfortable.
Id.
36. See id. (arguing that e-commerce companies sell PII obtained via cookies in the
marketplace in a similar manner as traditional collectors of information); Shen, supranote 23.
37. See discussion infra Part III.C. A few states have sued companies alleging that covert
collection of PII constituted an invasion of privacy. See, e.g., Aaron Chambers, Web Ventures
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A web beacon can be described as follows:38
Used in combination with cookies, a Web beacon is an oftentransparent graphic image, usually no larger than 1 pixel x 1 pixel,
that is placed on a Web site or in an e-mail that is used to monitor
the behavior of the user visiting the Web site or sending the e-mail.
When the HTML code for the Web beacon points to a site to
retrieve the image, at the same time it can pass along information
such as the IPaddress of the computer that retrieved the image, the
time the Web beacon was viewed and for how long, the type of
browser that retrieved the image and previously set cookie values.3 9
Web beacons are relatively simple to create and are generally embedded
inconspicuously into a webpage.4 ° Therefore, when web site visitors
Accused of Cookie Fraud,CHI. DAILY LAW BULL., Dec. 12, 2000, at 1 (discussing a lawsuit
initiated by the state's attorney's office in Cook County Illinois against DoubleClick, Inc. and
ClearStation Inc. "for violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act
by misleading Internet users about their practice of sending small bits of data-called cookies-to
the user's computer when the user visits ClearStation's Web site."). But see Court DismissesSuit
Against Internet AdvertisingFirm DoubleClick,CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES L. REP., May 14,2001,
at 21 (discussing the dismissal of a class action lawsuit filed by individuals who claimed that
DoubleClick's accessing of cookies on their computer hard drives violated, inter alia, the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act); Attorneys General Reach Agreement with Internet
Company to Protect Consumer Privacy, NAAG AG BULL., Aug. 2002 (discussing a settlement
between the attorneys general of nine states (Arizona, California, Connecticut, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Vermont, and Washington) and DoubleClick
whereby the company promised not to use certain pieces of PII obtained from cookies in placing
web-based advertisements).
38. Web beacons are also commonly referred to as web bugs, clear gifs, and pixel tags. See,
e.g., Thomas Fitzgerald, Microsoft Swats atStealthy Web Bugs, N.Y. TIMES, June 12,2003, at G-4.
39. Webopedia.com, Web Beacon [hereinafter Web Beacon], http://www.webopedia.com/
TERM/W/Web beacon.html (last visited July 25, 2007).
Many Web bugs work in tandem with cookies, which are different creatures. Web
bugs are usually invisible images on a Web page; cookies are text files that Web
sites place on our computers to identify us. Marketers use Web bugs to signal to
sites other than the ones you're visiting to put a cookie on your computer.
Leslie Walker, Bugs that Go Through Computer Screens, WASH. POST, Mar. 15, 2001, at E- 1. A
recent search for the number of web beacons in existence on the Web (researched through an
examination of fifty-one million webpages) discovered that "seventy-four percent had bugs that
tracked visitors from third-party Web sites." Id.
40. Web Beacon, supra note 39. Web beacons are easily detectable by someone with a
computer science background and "can be detected by viewing the source code of a Web page and
looking for any IMG tags that load from a different server than the rest of the site." Id."Turning
off the browser's cookies will prevent Web beacons from tracking the user's activity. The Web
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browse the webpage, certain pieces of personal information are collected
without notification. 4' These bits of data may later be aggregated with PH
actively collected, or PH obtained from another passive collection
technique, to form a more complete picture of the visitor that may be sold
in the data marketplace.42 Web beacons present a threat because PII is
being collected covertly and for purposes unrelated to the transaction or
webpage viewing at hand.
Spyware is:
[S]oftware that covertly gathers user information through the user's
Internet connection without his or her knowledge, usually for
advertising purposes. Spyware applications are typically bundled as
a hidden component of freeware or shareware programs that can be
downloaded from the Internet ...Once installed, the spyware
monitors user activity on the Internet and transmits that information
in the background to someone else. Spyware can also gather
information about e-mail addresses and even passwords and credit
card numbers.43
Spyware possesses the capability to, among other things, monitor
keystrokes, scan hard drive and other program files, install other spyware
beacon will still account for an anonymous visit, but the user's unique information will not be
recorded." Id.
41. See, e.g., David Lazarus, Now Taxes Can Really Bug You, S.F. CHRoN., Apr. 13, 2005,
at C- 1 (quoting a representative from an Internet company charged with monitoring data collected
by this technology who was discussing web bugs and who stated: "We could capture your name,
your Social Security number or any other information that you willingly pass to a Web site [through
a web bug]"). This collection is serious as a reporter from the Washington Post who claimed:
I picked up the bug by visiting [an Internet company's web site containing web
beacons], and it managed to slip past the 'fire wall' and anti-virus software that
is supposed to protect both of my machines. During the test, the bug sent copies
of two personal files back to [the company] and left behind a hidden file on my
hard drive.
Walker, supra note 39 (discussing the idea that these web beacons can collect PII).
42. See, e.g., David Lazarus, Web Bugs May Break State Law, S.F. CHRoN., Apr. 20, 2005,
at C-I (discussing the placement of web beacons onto webpages where people conduct online tax
preparation and the idea that outside disclosure of PII gained from a tax return, or from the
preparation of a tax return, may violate the California Business and Professions Code unless
consented-to by the customer).
43. Webopedia.com, Spyware, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/spyware.html (last
visited July 25, 2007).
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programs and read cookie files.44 Adware is "a form of spyware that
collects information about the user in order to display advertisements in
the Web browser based on the information it collects from the user's
' Adware is often programmed to go out of control and
browsing patterns."45
display endless advertisements. This barrage of pop-ups often connect a
browser to a particular homepage instead of the homepage the user desires
typically when the "home" button is clicked the user is automatically taken
to the new homepage even though she desires her selected homepage. 46 At
its worst, adware hinders an Internet user from conducting any business
whatsoever online.
These two programs are threats to e-commerce because of their ability
to covertly monitor an individual's web activities and collect and store
47
valuable PII such as usernames, passwords, and credit card information.
On the other hand, it is important to keep in mind that spyware and
adware, like cookies, are not always privacy-invasive technologies.48 Many
companies bundle adware with software they distribute for free and
disclose this fact on their web sites. 49 Therefore, if a user is fully aware of
an adware program on a computer and chooses to install free software,
such user has consented to the web monitoring and may even appreciate
the targeted advertisements generated in return for the free software.
Businesses often install their own, or allow third parties to install,
separate spyware on customers' computers when such individuals
download a program or visit a web site-in other words, at the front
44. See, e.g., Webopedia.com, The Difference Between Adware & Spyware, http://www.
webopedia.com/DidYouKnow/Intemet/2004/spyware.asp (last visited July 25, 2007) [hereinafter
Difference Between Adware & Spyware] (describing all of the malicious activities that spyware
may conduct).
45. Webopedia.com, Adware, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/a/adware.html (last visited
July 25, 2007).

46. Cliff Joseph, Spyware Under the Microscope, VNUNET.COM, Sept. 26, 2005.
47. Id. (comparing the threat of spyware to the threat of computer viruses). The fact that
spyware is a threat is why it has also been given the name "malware" which stands for "malicious
software." Id.
48. For a recap of the difference between adware and spyware, see supratext accompanying
43-47 (describing adware as a "legitimate alternative offered to consumers who do not want to pay
for software"). Properly functioning adware should disable itself when the software program is
closed. Id.
49. See, e.g., Eudora.com, Three Modes: Choose the Eudora That's Best for You,
http://www.eudora.com/email/modes/ (last visited July 25, 2007) (distributing an e-mail software
program in three ways, two of which allow users to download and use the software for free in return
for the installation of adware containing an advertisement window and up to three sponsored
toolbar links); Google, About Gmail, http://mail.google.com/mail/help/intl/en/about.html (last
visited July 25, 2007) (demonstrating that this free e-mail service offered by Google places small
text advertisements on e-mail correspondence based on the content of user e-mails which can be
considered a form of adware).
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door." In fact, many End User License Agreements (EULA) state that the
company providing the software or the download at issue are free to also
pass on "third party software" to the visitor's computer." Often, this third
party software is some form of spyware or adware.52 Therefore, bundling
of spyware with downloaded software may produce a treasuretrove of
valuable information by which the company may then target its marketing
efforts or sell to third parties.
While these company-initiated e-threats may seem innocuous at first,
it is important to keep in mind that, when combined together, these ethreats can lead to a complete digital profile of web site visitors. These
profiles allow companies to tailor targeted marketing packages at specific
individuals. These profiles are also valuable commodities that can be sold
on the open market. If such profiles fall into malicious hands, serious
invasions of privacy loom on the horizon.
B. Externally-Created "FrontDoor" E-Threats
Pretexting is the practice of collecting PH utilizing false pretenses and
is a much more serious threat than active or passive PH collection.
According to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), pretexters use a
variety of tactics to get your personal information:

50. See CIBC.com, Spyware: What is Spyware, http://www.cibc.com/ca/legal/spywareinfo.html (last visited July 25, 2007) (stating that spyware "has become a leading security problem
for Internet users and is now more widespread than spain or virus infections").
51. See, e.g., Google Labs, PicasaEnd User License Agreement, http://picasa.google.com/
linux/eula.html (last visited July 25, 2007). Google Labs discusses the issue of third party software
in the EULA for Picasa's photo management software:
Thank you for trying out the Picasa software! By using this software, including
certain third party software made available in conjunction with this software but
not including software provided in source form and expressly licensed under other
terms as set forth at http://code.google.com... you agree to accept a license under
and be bound by the following terms and conditions of this agreement ...with
Picasa LLC and Google Inc....
Id.
52. See, e.g., Jeffrey Benner, Spyware, In a Galaxy Near You, Wired.com, Jan. 24, 2002,
http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,49960-0.html (discussing a third party software spyware
program covertly bundled with a popular screensaver download); Peter Rojas, Kazaa Lite: No
Spyware Aftertaste, WIRED.CoM, Apr. 18, 2002, http://www.wired.com/news/mp3/
0,1285,51916,00.html (reporting that users of Kazaa's Media Desktop--a file-sharing program for
electronic entertainment files-had unknowingly downloaded third party spyware along with the
Media Desktop software).

2007]
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For example, a pretexter may call, claim he's from a survey firm,
and ask you a few questions. When the pretexter has the
information he wants, he uses it to call your financial institution. He
pretends to be you or someone with authorized access to your
account. He might claim that he's forgotten his checkbook and
needs information about his account. In this way, the pretexter may
be able to obtain personal information about you such as your SSN,
bank and credit card account numbers, information in your credit
report, and the existence and size of your savings and investment
portfolios.53
Pretexting may come in the form of a phone call where the caller pretends
to be someone else, or in the form of an e-mail whereby the sender appears
to represent someone else. Legitimate businesses will not utilize deceptive
practices to obtain additional customer PH; however, pretexters are
successful because individuals or businesses possessing PII are not fully
aware of this fact and often believe that the party contacting them is
legitimate.54 Pretexting violates at least two federal laws: (1) The Federal
Trade Commission Act (FTCA)55 and the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act
(GLBA).56 The FTC is actively pursuing violations of these statutes from
pretexting, especially as it pertains to the fraudulent collection of financial
PH, and has brought several high profile pretexting-related enforcement
actions beginning in 1999."7
53. FTC, Facts for Consumers: Pretexting: Your Personal Information Revealed [hereinafter
FTC, Facts for Consumers], http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/credit/pretext.htm (last visited
July 25, 2007).
54. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. Information Search, Inc & David Kacala, Complaintfor
Injunctive and OtherEquitable Relief, Civil Action No. AMD-01-1 121 (D. Md. N.D.), Apr. 18,
2001, 3-4 (demonstrating that, in this civil lawsuit that ended in a negotiated settlement, the FTC
claimed that an information data broker utilized pretexting techniques such as false pretenses,
fraudulent statements and impersonations to successfully obtain and later sell confidential financial
information in the form of bank account statements and balances).
55. 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(l)(B) (2000).
56. Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338 (Nov. 12, 1999) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 and 15 U.S.C.).
57. See, e.g., Fed. Trade Comm'n v. James Rapp & Touch Tone Information, Inc., Complaint
for Injunction and Other Equitable Relief, Civil Action No. 99-WM-783 (D. CO), Apr. 21, 1999
[hereinafter Touch Tone], available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/04/touchtonecomplaint.htm
(demonstrating that, in a case that later settled, the FTC complained that Touch Tone Information
violated § 5 of the FTCA by utilizing pretexting in the form of false statements to employees of
financial institutions in various attempts to obtain financial account information that the company
would later sell); Fed. Trade Comm'n v. 30 Minute Mortgage, Inc., Civil Action No. 03-60021
(S.D. FL.), Complaint for Injunctive and Other Equitable Relief, Jan. 8, 2003, 3-5, [hereinafter 30
Minute Mortgage],availableat http ://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/03/30mincmp.pdf (demonstrating that,
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To see why pretexting can constitute a serious e-threat, one must only
consider the tragic story of Amy Boyer. A former junior high school
classmate of Boyer hired a private investigation service, Docusearch.com,59
8
in an effort to determine her current whereabouts. For $150,
Docusearch searched various public records databases and obtained pieces
of PH concerning Boyer, including her social security number, but failed
to locate her employment address. In order to obtain this information,
someone from the investigative service placed a phone call to Boyer
pretending to be from her insurance company-a classic form of
pretexting. 6 Boyer, believing that the caller was legitimate, responded
with the desired information that was transmitted to her
in a case that would later settle, the FTC complained that 30 Minute Mortgage engaged in
pretexting and violated, among other statutes, § 5 of the FTCA when the company sent out e-mails
pretending to be a national mortgage lender when, in fact, the company merely collected PIH in the
form of addresses, phone numbers, social security numbers. Income and mortgage information and
bank account types and balances and then sold this information to actual mortgage lending
companies). Additionally, in January 2001, the FTC announced the kick-off of its "Operation
Detect Pretext." Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Kicks Off "OperationDetect Pretext," Jan. 31, 2001,
available at http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2001/01/pretexting.htm. In this effort, aimed at actively
looking for companies selling financially-related PII online and advising such companies that
pretexting is illegal under the GLBA, the FTC looked at over 1,000 web sites and 500 print
advertisements and sent over 200 letters advising these firms of their obligations under the GLBA.
Id.
58. See Robin Washington, Online Trail to Murder: Slain Girl's Kin Sue Internet Co. for
Selling Datato Killer, BOSTON HERALD, Apr. 28, 2000, at 5 (stating that Boyer's family sued the
data trading company for wrongful death for providing "the private information he used to track
her down and kill her."). This lawsuit was eventually settled for 85,000. See Holly Ramer, Mother
of Slain Woman Settles Lawsuit Against Info-Broker, USA TODAY, Mar. 10, 2004,
http ://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2004-03- I 0-boyer-suit-settled x.htm
(discussing that, in the case, Docusearch.com claimed that none of the information it sold on Boyer
was private).
59. See Holly Ramer, Mother of Slain Woman Settles Lawsuit Against Info-Broker, USA
TODAY.COM (Mar. 10, 2004) (discussing the fact that the killer paid $150 to obtain this
information), http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/internetprivacy/2004-03- 10-boyer-suit-settled_
x.htm.
60. See Electronic Privacy Information Center.org, Amy Boyer Case, Resinburg v.
Docusearch, http://www.epic.org/privacy/boyer/ (last visited July 25, 2007).
Docusearch obtained Boyer's work address by having a subcontractor, Michelle
Gambino, place a "pretext" call to Boyer. Gambino lied about who she was and
the purpose of her call in order to convince Boyer to reveal her employment
information-Gambino pretended to be affiliated with Boyer's insurance
company, and requested "verification" of Boyer's work address in order to
facilitate an overpayment refund. Docusearch charged [Ms. Boyer's murderer]
$109 for this information.

THE PRIVACY MATRIX

stalker/Docusearch's client and used to track her down at work where she
was subsequently shot and killed.61
Boyer's parents filed a civil lawsuit against Docusearch for wrongful
death and invasion of privacy among other claims. 62 Four years later, the
New Hampshire Supreme Court ruled that information brokers such as
Docusearch.com must exercise "reasonable care in disclosing a third
person's personal information to a client."63 Although the case of Amy
Boyer clearly represents an extreme situation ofpretexting gone bad, many
other cases of pretexting have led to cases of identity theft and have caused
much more PH to exist in cyberspace.' Pretexting has fast become a
serious e-threat.
C. U.S. Law Operatingat the FrontDoor
A company's front door is the only stage of the PH processing cycle
where web site visitors maintain primary control over submission of their
PH into cyberspace. At the front door, no individual is forced to conduct
an online transaction and every web-surfer has the option of leaving a web
site before entering personal information.65 In a perfect online world,
consumers would rationally make this decision after being accurately
informed of the kinds of PII collected, the uses the information may be put
61. The killer then turned the gun on himself and committed suicide. Id. (stating that the
killer even wrote the following on a web site dedicated to his obsession with Boyer: "I found an
internet site to do that, and to my surprize [sic] everything else under the Sun. Most importantly:
her current employment. It's accually obsene [sic] what you can find out about a person on the
internet." See Washington, supranote 58).
62. See, e.g., id. (stating that the wrongful death claim against Docusearch alleged that the
company owed a duty to Boyer to not reveal her PI to a client for non-legitimate purposes and the
invasion of privacy claims alleged an intrusion upon seclusion and a commercial appropriation of
private information).
63. Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d 1001, 1009 (N.H. 2003) (discussing the court's
statement that "this is especially true when ... the investigator does not know the client or the
client's purpose in seeking the information.").
64. See, e.g., FTC, Facts for Consumers, supra note 53 (stating that the FTC has dedicated
an entire webpage to the issue of pretexting offering tips on how to avoid becoming a victim and
providing contact information for complaints).
65. Remember, passive PI collection may occur from the first instance a webpage is loaded
onto the visitor's computer screen through cookies, web beacons, spyware, and adware. However,
these programs alone cannot collect the massive amounts of information that active collection can
and users exiting a web site without volunteering any information will generally avoid major
pitfalls. This could all change, however, as passive PI collection devices become more
sophisticated and able to collect more PII. See Thomas A. Hemphill, Identity Theft: A Cost of
Business? 106 Bus. & Soc'y REV. 1, 53 (2001) (discussing identity theft-a prominent ethreat-and stating that "protecting personal identifying information from public consumption is
initially the responsibility of the consumer.").
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to, and other important privacy aspects of the e-commerce relationship.
Unfortunately, the contemporary online environment is far from perfect.
Today, many web site visitors do not understand the privacy implications
of entering their information online and have little idea how web sites plan
to use this information. Compounding this problem is the fact that
company privacy policies-a company's primary, and sometimes only,
vehicle for relaying its privacy practices to the general public-are often
inconspicuously linked at the bottom of homepages, written in small print
and filled with legalese. These attributes make the terms and conditions of
such policies very difficult to read and interpret. In order for e-consumers
to take responsibility for their actions on the Web-a situation that
policymakers should encourage-fair information practices should require
standardized and readable e-commerce privacy policies. The current
United States information privacy regulatory regime does not require these
types of privacy polices and, subsequently, is not fostering an environment
where e-consumers can legitimately make educated decisions concerning
their PH at the front door stage.
To help remedy this problem, this Article argues that the U.S. Congress
should enact a statute focused only on protecting PH from the various
types of e-threats that threaten such information throughout the PII
processing cycle.6 6 The front door section of this regulation should require
that all companies conducting business online and operating in interstate
commerce (covered companies) post a link to a standardized, multilayered
and readable privacy policy on their web site homepage. Although covered
companies should not be required to adopt particular privacy-enhancing
policy terms at this early stage, every aspect of their actual privacy policy,
even if privacy-invasive and potentially unpopular, must be described
accurately. Granting businesses greater flexibility to choose their own
privacy terms at the front door is appropriate because consumers retain
control over their PH at this stage and bear some of the responsibility for
protecting it. This section of the law will encourage consumer diligence as
web site visitors, armed with the information they obtain from reading and
understanding the basics of the simplified policy, will be able to make
more informed decisions as to whether the company's policies warrant the
disclosure of any PH. At the same time, businesses will retain the freedom
66. Any statute that is to effectively target these dangerous e-threats must be drafted
specifically for this purpose. Today's patchwork regulatory scheme that indirectly targets these
threats is insufficient--especially as the threats grow more technologically advanced. As mentioned
previously, the statute proposed in this Article will consist of three primary parts: (I) regulation
targeting front door e-threats; (II) regulation targeting inside the company e-threats; and (III)
regulation targeting back door e-threats. Its sole purpose will be to mitigate or eliminate the various
e-threats at each stage of the PII processing cycle.
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to structure their privacy policies free from excessive regulation. At this
early stage in the PH processing cycle, both sides should be satisfied with
this compromise approach.
To bring this vision to fruition, the proposed law should require that all
covered companies post electronic privacy policies that: (1) are
standardized and multilayered, (2) contain specific sections but not
specific language, and (3) are understandable to the typical web site
visitor. Finally, the law must be structured as a regulatory ceiling to allow
for maximum effectiveness at this early stage.
1. Privacy Policies Must be Standardized and Multilayered
Multilayered privacy policies represent the future of online privacy
disclosure.67 This is an encouraging trend because such policies are easier
67. See, e.g., Marty Abrams & Malcolm Crompton, Multi-LayeredPrivacyPolicies:A Better
Way, PRIVACY L. BULL., May/June 2005, at 1. Abrams & Crompton state that:

Privacy notices are the windows to how organisations collect, use, share and
protect the information that pertains to individuals. As information processes have
become more complex, privacy notices have become very long, mirroring this
complexity. The effect has been to obscure the content that individuals need to
know when making judgments about with whom they will do business. The lack
of clarity has been an impediment to online commerce.
Id. This Article describes a framework for assuring that notices are easy both to understand and
follow as well as to complete. These objectives are achieved by layering up to three documents as
part of a notices package. This approach, supported by an ad hoc group of civic, business, and
government participants, has been adopted by the European Union's Art 29 working party in
Opinion WP 100, issued in 2004.). The Center for Information Policy Leadership has taken the lead
in the United States to promote the usage of multilayered privacy policies. See, e.g., Multi-Layered
Notices Explained, Center for Information Policy Leadership White Paper, Feb. 2005,
http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/1303/CIPL-APECNoticesWhite_
Paper.pdf (describing the problems with contemporary privacy policies and the process of creating
a multilayered privacy policy); Ten Steps to Develop a MultilayeredPrivacy Notice, Center For
Information Privacy Leadership, Feb. 16, 2006 [hereinafter Ten Steps], http://www.hunton.com/
files/tbls47Details/FileUpload265/1405/TenStepswhitepaper.pdf. Additionally, the concept of
a multilayered privacy policy is becoming standard-fare for government webpages. See, e.g.,
Melanie Goldwater, Privacy CommissionerReleases New Multi-Layered Privacy Policyfor Her
Office, Minter Ellison, Aug. 31, 2006, http://www.minterellison.com/public/connect/Intemet/
Home/Legal+Insights/Newsletters/Previous+Newsletters/A-E-Privacy+Commissioner+releases+
new+multi-layered+privacy+policy+for+her+Office. Goldwater states that
The Privacy Commissioner [of Australia], Karen Curtis has announced that her
Office will adopt a multi-layered privacy policy. The new format includes two
versions of the organisation's privacy policy: a condensed "snapshot" of the
Office's practices; and a full version of its privacy policy, which contains detailed
information about the Office's legal obligations. Ms Curtis has indicated that the
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to understand and present a far more standardized privacy picture than
their contemporary counterparts. Web site visitors viewing a multilayered
policy are better able to evaluate the actual privacy practices of the ecommerce web sites they visit. Additionally, the creation of such policies
is inexpensive and relatively simple. A multilayered privacy policy
consists of three versions (layers) specifically tailored to the environment
where the policy will be posted. The process of tailoring the policy format
to the viewing environment is designed to promote the visibility of privacy
terms and to encourage people who notice the policy terms to actually read
them.
Companies that desire to create a compliant multilayered privacy
policy should start by drafting a comprehensive policy before creating any
subsequent layers. This version of the privacy policy will be the most
lengthy of the three and must contain seven specific headings designed to
cover subjects such as a summary of the major pieces of PH collected, the
utilization of such information, and a short discussion of other relevant
privacy information.68 This document is referred to as the third layer in this
tripartite format and should be linked to the company's homepage. There
is no length requirement for this third layer, although companies must
draft the policy so that it can be read and understood by the average web
site visitor.69 As mentioned previously, the proposed federal law should
not require companies to adopt any specific privacy practices at this early
stage in the PH processing cycle, only that they post a multilayered policy
that accurately discloses actual privacy practices.
The second layer consists of a condensed version of a company's third
layer privacy policy. It should contain only a summary of the privacy
terms located under the seven required headings in the comprehensive
policy.70 This second layer is intended to supply the major attributes of the
policy without overburdening the reader with excessive information. 7' The
idea is that this second layer will be the layer that the vast majority of
online visitors will actually take the time to read. Therefore, the summary
multi-layered approach should serve as a model for other agencies and
organisations. "Research has shown that individuals find privacy notices long and
difficult to read and most do not read them at all," Ms Curtis said.
Id.
68. See infra Part III.C.2 (describing these seven privacy policy headings in detail).
69. See infra Part III.C.3 (describing the readability and understandability aspects of
compliant privacy policies).
70. The second layer should also be required to contain each of the seven headings contained
in the third layer policy. See infra Part III.C.2.
71. A hypothetical second layer privacy policy is reprinted at the end of this Article as
Exhibit 3.
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it includes must provide the essence of the comprehensive policy. The
second layer should be posted in areas with more screen space than an
automated teller machine or a cellular phone where placement of the
comprehensive policy is not feasible. For example, companies can place
their second layer privacy policy in its entirety on their homepage or in
correspondence with customers and account holders. It should also be
acceptable under the proposed regulation for a company to place a clear
and conspicuous hyperlink to its second layer policy on its homepage.72
Finally, the first layer of a multilayered privacy policy is created
specifically for small screen viewing areas such as automated teller
machines and cellular phones. This first-layer policy must be very
short-between one and four lines-and merely make viewers aware that
the company they are transacting with collects PH and that the full policy
can be viewed at a particular webpage.73 The first layer, in and of itself, is
not sufficient under the statute proposed in this Article and companies
should be required to at least create and post a second and a third layer
policy.74
Today, even without any specific legal provisions requiring them to do
so, companies are beginning to buy into this multilayered privacy policy
approach.75 The proposed federal law can validate this buy-in by requiring
72. The terms clear and conspicuous for the purposes of this legislation should mean that the
link is located on the company's homepage in a manner where it is set apart from other links and
where visitors can clearly understand that the privacy policy is located by clicking on it. The second
layer privacy policy can then link to the third layer, comprehensive policy or a company can link
to both the second and third payer policies from its homepage. As long as visitors can easily
navigate to the comprehensive privacy policy, then a company should be considered compliant.
73. A hypothetical first layer privacy policy is reprinted at the end of this Article as Exhibit 2.
74. In fact, a covered company is only required to create and post a first-layer privacy policy
when it transacts business in small screen environments such as on automated teller machines or
cellular phones. All covered companies, however, should be required to create and post a secondand third-layer policy regardless of the environment where they conduct business.
75. See, e.g., IBM.com, Privacy:IBMPrivacy Practiceson the Web, http://www.ibm.com/
privacy/us/ (last visited July 25, 2007) (demonstrating that IBM placed its second-layer privacy
policy on a separate webpage linked directly from the bottom of its homepage); Ten Steps, supra
note 67, at 1 (discussing that consumers need clear, comprehensible, short yet comprehensive
privacy policies and that multilayered privacy policies are becoming a popular way of satisfying
these seemingly mutually-exclusive objectives:
Experts agree that good privacy begins with effective transparency. Transparency
requires privacy notices that are easy to understand, facilitate comparison, and are
actionable. Privacy notices must also comply with legal requirements that may
differ from country to country, and jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Research on how
people learn has shown that for notices to be easy to read and understand, they
must be short, use plain language, and be presented in a common format.
Complete notices tend to be longer and more complex, so it is impossible to have
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covered companies to create at least a second- and third-layer of a
multilayered privacy policy and then post a link to these layers on their
homepages. This requirement will standardize privacy policy formats
across e-commerce companies. Over time, web site visitors will become
more comfortable locating the policy itself, scanning its second or third
layer and understanding the implications of key privacy terms and
conditions. A standardized privacy policy, in and of itself, is not enough
to provide visitors with the information they need to combat the e-threats
that face them at a company's front door. These multilayered privacy
policies also must be standardized and readable to maximize their
effectiveness.
2. Privacy Policies Must Contain Specific Sections But Not
Specific Language
The multilayered privacy policies that companies are required to create
under this proposed federal law should be standardized to facilitate
consumer understanding and familiarity. The type of standardization
required is similar to the federal nutritional labeling requirements required
by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Under the proposed
federal law, legally-sufficient privacy policies must provide information
pertaining to the following subheadings:
1) Types of Personal Information Collected;
2) Personal Information Uses;
3) Your Consent Options;
4) Personal Information Security,
5) Accessing/Changing/Removing Personal Information;
6) Privacy Policy Changes; and 7 6
7) Other Important Information.
both sets of requirements in one document. A multilayered notice is made up of
a condensed notice that contains all the key factors in a way that is easy to
understand and is actionable, and a complete notice with all the legal
requirements. A growing number of privacy officials and experts agree that
multilayered notices meet the transparency objective. Corporate and government
sponsored research shows that multilayered notices build both trust and
compliance. The work of the European Article 29 Working Party gives us
confidence that layering a privacy notice is legally complaint [sic].
Id.
76. It is important that every privacy policy covered under this proposed statute utilize the
exact same title names for these seven subheadings so that consumers become accustomed to
finding the same types of information in the same place from privacy policy to privacy policy.

THE PRIVACY MATRIX

The continual use of these same headings will lead to a privacy policy
template similar to the "Nutritional Facts" template as required under the
Nutrition Labeling and Education Act." For example, by law, the vast
majority of food products must contain a "Nutrition Facts" label that states
the total calories, total calories from fat, total fat, saturated fat, cholesterol,
sodium, total carbohydrates, dietary fiber, sugars, protein, Vitamin A,
Vitamin C, calcium and iron.78 These standardized headings-always
placed in the same order on the nutritional label-help consumers
understand the nutritional implications of the foods they consume.79
Without the standardized labels, consumers would face a plethora of
nutritional descriptions or none at all; they would be hard-pressed to
understand the nutritional implications of the food they are about to
consume. Research into why consumers understand and appreciate the
nutritional facts template demonstrates that any information given to the
public must be concise (cover no more than seven topics), use common
language and appeal to the consumer's short- and long-term memories at
77. Nutrition Labeling and Education Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-535, 104 Stat. 2353
(codified at 21 U.S.C. 343 (2000) [hereinafter NLEA]. Before enactment of the NLEA, the
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act ("FDCA") expanded the regulatory scope of the
[Food and Drug Administration] FDA by granting it the power to protect foods
from adulteration or misbranding. Congress first created optional standards for
nutritional labels on foods in 1973, putting the FDA in charge of implementing
and enforcing them. Under these rules, only producers who chose to make
affirmative health and nutritional claims had to put nutritional information on their
packaging.
Rebecca S. Fribush, Note: Putting Calorie and Fat Counts on the Table: Should Mandatory
DisclosureLaws Apply to RestaurantFoods?, 73 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 377, 379 (2005) (internal
citations omitted).
78. 21 C.F.R. § 101.9 (2002). There are also some voluntary nutritional information that are
often included such as: calories from saturated fat, polyunsaturated fat, monounsaturated fat,
potassium, soluble fiber, insoluble fiber, sugar alcohol, other carbohydrate, percent of vitamin A
present as beta-carotene, other essential vitamins and minerals. See U.S. Food and Drug
Administration, The Food Label, May 1999, http://www.fda.gov/opacom/backgrounders/food
label/newlabel.html (stating that, "[i]f a claim is made about any of the optional components, or if
a food is fortified or enriched with any of them, nutrition information for these components
becomes mandatory."). Additionally, "these mandatory and voluntary components are the only ones
allowed on the Nutrition Facts panel. The listing of single amino acids, maltodextrin, calories from
polyunsaturated fat, and calories from carbohydrates, for example, may not appear as part of the
Nutrition Facts on the label." Id. (demonstrating that this limitation is important because it helps
with the standardization of nutritional labeling).
79. Nutrition and Diet Services, Sample Nutrition Labels, http://www.nutritiondietservices.com/samlabel.html (last visited July 30, 2007) (complying with governmental
standards so the label is familiar to the vast majority of Americans).
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the same time ("the notice seen yesterday must help consumers understand
the notice they see today").,0
The same logic holds true in the world of electronic privacy policies.8"
The short aspect of effective privacy policies is covered by the
multilayered approach described above. The common language aspect of
effective privacy policies is discussed in the plain English section below
and the short- and long-term memory aspect of effective privacy policies
are covered by the seven standardized headings covered in this section.
The first section (Types of Personal Information Collected) must state
exactly what types of PH the web site collects-both actively and
passively. The type of information collected (such as name, address, social
security number) and the collection method (such as via web forms,
cookies, or web beacons) must be addressed in this section. Although the
operation and terminology surrounding some prominent data collection
techniques, such as cookies, is sometimes complicated and dense,
companies should be required to describe these techniques clearly and
concisely.2 Similarly, descriptions of cookies and web beacons that make
a reader more confused after reading them are contrary to the intent of this
legislation and must be avoided. If the web site does not collect any forms
of PH, this fact must be disclosed under this first section heading and the
heading cannot be omitted from the privacy policy.
The second section (Personal Information Uses) must state how the
company plans to utilize the PH that it collects. For instance, a company
planning to sell specific pieces of data to unrelated third parties must
disclose this fact in this section. The most common PH uses that will be
disclosed are transaction processing, account creation and maintenance,
storage, internal marketing purposes, dissemination to related entities, and
dissemination to unrelated entities or individuals. Any changes to the
utilization of PH that a company has previously disclosed in its privacy
policy (as might occur when a company changes its business plan and
subsequently decides to sell information that it promised not to sell in this
section) must be reflected by an amended privacy policy.83 Over time, web
site visitors should become more accustomed to reading and understanding
the terms as they are laid out in this section in order to determine if the
company's practices meet their privacy expectations.
The third section (Your Consent Options) deals with a web site
visitor's options as to how the information collector can use the PH.
80. Id.
81. See, e.g., Abrams & Crompton, supra note 67, at 2 (drawing the analogy between
electronic privacy policies and nutritional facts food labels).
82. See discussion, infra Part III.C.3.
83. The sixth required heading, to be discussed below, deals with amending a privacy policy.
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Companies may require a customer to affirmatively contact them to
request that PH not be utilized for any purpose aside from the transaction
it was obtained to consummate (a secondary use). These are referred to as
"opt-out" provisions and are not considered strong privacy protectors as
evidence demonstrates that many customers choose not to take the time to
opt-out even if such an option is their privacy preference. The alternative
to an opt-out policy is an opt-in policy. Under an opt-in policy, companies
may be forced to request affirmative customer consent to utilize PH for
any or all secondary uses. Recall that under the law proposed in this
Article, neither an opt-out nor an opt-in is required because the
relationship is still at the front door stage and consumers disliking the
company's chosen approach need not submit their PH and may take their
business elsewhere. Under the proposed law, the heading along with the
accurate disclosure of the company's consent options are of primary
importance.
The fourth section (Personal Information Security) must detail how the
company will secure any PH once it is collected, processed, or stored in
company databases. As will be demonstrated in subsequent parts of this
Article, information security breaches are serious threats and can occur
internally-from rouge or careless employees--or externally-from
remotely-located database hackers.84 Customers submitting their PH
deserve to understand the security practices companies implement before
they choose to submit any information. This section of the privacy policy
will aid in this process by requiring a clear and accurate description of
such practices. As with passive PH collection techniques, the task of
accurately describing information security practices can become very
complicated and companies must strive to keep this section understandable
and free of tech-speak.
The fifth section (Accessing/Changing/Removing
Personal
Information) must cover the visitor's ability or inability to access, change,
or remove PH from company databases once it has been submitted. A
customer may wish to access stored PH to make sure it is accurate, change
PH to reflect a move, or remove PH due to a change in privacy
preferences. Companies must detail how they deal with these issues in this
section of their privacy policy and then adhere closely to these terms
unless the policy is amended. For instance, it would be an unfair practice
under the proposed statute if a company states that it allows customers to
delete their PII at any time and then makes the process unbearably
complicated or more limited than previously disclosed to discourage such
removal.
84. See infra Parts IV.A.2 & IV.B.2 (discussing both internal and external securitybreaches).
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The sixth section (Privacy Policy Changes) should detail exactly how
a company will notify its customers of changes to its privacy policy, as
well as how such changes will retroactively affect PH previously
submitted. This becomes a serious issue when PH collected under an initial
privacy policy is dealt with in a markedly different manner under the terms
of a subsequent policy. For example, a company may state that it will not
sell any collected PH as an asset in bankruptcy and then amend this policy
a year later to allow such sales. Nothing in the proposed law will prevent
this change in strategy, and businesses must be able to flexibly change
their business strategies when they choose. However, the law should
require that customers who entered data based on the previous terms be
notified as to how their information will be affected by such changes." To
make this notification more effective, companies will be required to notify
all existing customers of such changes and also clearly identify the
differences between the two policies.
The final section (Other Important Information) is a catch-all category
designed for unique privacy policy terms that do not fit comfortably under
the other six headings. For example, this is the best place for a company
to disclose that it belongs to a privacy webseal program86 and to place the

85. Companies choosing to sell information under the terms of an amended privacy policy
that formerly restricted such sales are acting in a privacy-invading manner. Although this proposed
law will do nothing to stop this type of practice aside from mandating its accurate disclosure, the
public scrutiny that will arise when word spreads of this practice will discourage companies from
implementing such a strategy.
86. Privacy webseal programs are designed to build consumer trust in a company's PHI
privacy practices. Companies voluntarily submit to following certain privacy protocols in order to
receive permission to display the webseal on their homepages. Webseal providers conduct audits
of company privacy policies to ensure that the seal privacy requirements are met. One of the major
players in the webseal market is TRUST-e, which describes its webseal program as follows:
The seal marks companies that adhere to TRUSTe's strict privacy principles, and
comply with the TRUSTe Watchdog dispute resolution process. Principles
include:
1.
2.
3.

Creating a privacy policy to be reviewed by TRUSTe
Posting notice and disclosure of collection and use practices of personally
identifiable information
Giving users choice and consent over how their information is used and
shared

TRUST-e.com, What's the Difference Between You and Your Competition,http://www.truste.org/
businesses/web_privacyseal.php (last visited July 20, 2007).
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link to the other layers of its privacy policy.87 A company need not provide
information in this section if it feels that all of its privacy policies are
adequately disclosed in the remainder of the policy.
3. Privacy Policies Must be Understandable to the Typical Visitor
Finally, the proposed statute should require that all covered companies
produce privacy policies that are understandable to the average web site
visitor or at least to the average web site visitor who makes a good faith
effort to understand such policies.88 The best way to accomplish this
objective is to require all covered privacy policies to be written in plain
English. This concept, recognizable from federal securities regulation,89
urges document drafters to write clearly, use concise sentences, place only
one issue per sentence and avoid legalese whenever possible.9" This
87. A link to the third-layer of the privacy policy must be conspicuously placed on a
company's homepage as well as on any copy of its second-layer privacy policy. The Other
Important Information section is a good place to include this link.
88. See, e.g., Carlos Jensen & Colin Potts, PrivacyPoliciesExamined: FairWarning or Fair
Game?, GEORGIA INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY GVU TECHNICAL REPORT-03-04, 2 (2003),
http://hdl.handle.net/1853/3215.
89. The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires some prospectus documents
that must be distributed to potential investors by public companies and mutual funds to possess
certain sections drafted in plain English. See, e.g., SEC Release 33-7497 (and SEC Releases 3439593 and IC-2301 1), availableathttp://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-7497.txt. Seealso SEC, Plain
English Disclosure, 17 C.F.R. Pts. 228, 229, 230, 239 and 274, 1998.
The [plain English] rule requires issuers to write the cover page, summary, and
risk factors section of prospectuses in plain English.... We are also giving issuers
more specific guidance on how to make the entire prospectus clear, concise, and
understandable. We believe that using plain English in prospectuses will lead to
a better informed securities market-a market in which investors can more easily
understand the disclosure required by the federal securities laws.
Id.
90. See, e.g., SEC, A Plain English Handbook: How to Create Clear SEC Disclosure
Documents, Aug. 1998, availableathttp://www.sec.gov/pdf/handbook.pdf. The SEC is notthe only
organization interested in the concept of plain English. The U.S. government created a web site
dedicated to promoting the use of plain language. PlainLanguage.gov, Homepage, http://www.
plainlanguage.gov/ (last visited July 30, 2007). The web site was started in 1995 by a group of
federal employees dedicated to crafting more readable government documents. PlainLanguage.gov
History ofPlain Languagein the UnitedStates, http://www.plainlanguage.gov/whatisPL/history/
index.cfm (last visited July 30, 2007) (stating that "many definitions of plain language exist.
Fundamentally, when we write in plain language, we present information in a way that makes it as
easy as possible for people to understand. All definitions emphasize the importance of audience,
clarity, and comprehension"). PlainLanguage.gov, Definitions of Plain Language,
http://www.plainlanguage.gov/whatisPL/definitions/index.cfn. More globally, the Plain English
Campaign (PEC) is a British organization dedicated to helping companies produce clear public
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simplified writing style is crucial whenever a document is designed to be
read by the typical web site visitor in an abbreviated period of time. Plain
English will help readers understand the complex issues that must be
disclosed in a privacy policy and generate a better understanding of the
implications of PH submissions. It is important to remember that the
average adult American reads at around an eighth- or a ninth-grade level9
while the majority of contemporary privacy policies are written at a
second-year college reading level.92 Although studies show that the typical
Internet user reads at the fourteenth-grade level (equivalent to the second
year in college), as the Internet becomes more and more mainstream, the
average reading level of its users will fade lower toward the average
literacy rate of the general population.93 This plain English requirement
will not only simplify the reading level of privacy policies but also
increase comprehension level regardless of the visitor's educational
attainment.
On the other hand, plain English is not an excuse to dumb-down a
document to the point where nothing of substance remains. Instead, the
concept merely encourages authors to express complex issues as clearly
as possible and to separate tough concepts into separate sentences. For
example, consumers reading privacy policy documents need to be aware
of the different ways their PH is collected and used. A privacy policy
information documents. See Plain English Campaign: About the Campaign, http://www.plain
english.co.uk/facts.htm (last visited July 30, 2007) (claiming that "[t]hanks to our lobbying in
Europe, it is now impossible to enforce consumer contracts that are not in 'plain, intelligible
language."'). The PEC defines plain English as "writing that the intended audience can read,
understand and act upon the first time they read it. Plain English takes into account design and
layout as well as language." Plain English Campaign, Frequently Asked Questions,
http://www.plainenglish.co.uk/faqs.htm (last visited July 30, 2007). The PEC implemented its
Crystal Mark program entice companies to draft important documents in plain English; documents
that have been "written and designed as clearly as possible" are eligible to receive the Crystal Mark.
Plain English Campaign, CrystalMark,http://www.plainenglish.co.uk/crystalmark.htm (last visited
July 30, 2007) (claiming that over 14,000 documents carry its Crystal Mark and that prominent
corporations such as AT&T, Bank One, and Fortis Group participate in the program).
91. See, e.g., Norman M. Goldfarb, How Well Does the Average U.S. Adult Read?, 9 J.
CLNIcAL RES. BEST PRACTICES 3 (2005), availableat http://firstclinical.com/journal/2005/0509_
Literacy.pdf (citing 1992 findings on American literacy and claiming that the ninth grade literacy
level may be optimistic); Frank Grazian, FrequentlyAsked Questions (FAQ) About Readability,
41 Pun. REL. Q. 19 (1996) (discussing readability and the idea that the average American reads at
the ninth grade level). See generally Irwin S. Kirsch et al., Adult Literacy in America: A FirstLook
at the Results ofthe NationalAdult Literacy Survey, U.S. DEP'T EDUC.: NAT'L CENTER FOR EDUC.
STAT. (Sept. 1993), availableat http://nces.ed.gov/pubs93/93275.pdf.
92. See, e.g., Jensen & Potts, supra note 88, at 4.
93. See, e.g., id. at 3 (stating that this reading level is higher than high school but lower than
a bachelor's degree but that, as the Internet becomes more and more mainstream, the literacy rate
of its users will decrease back towards the literacy rate of the American population in general).
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section that fails to describe the use of cookies and web beacons because
the concepts are difficult to grasp is all but useless from a privacyprotection point of view. Instead, such collection techniques should be
described in a clear and concise fashion rather than being avoided because
of their complexity.94 The following example from IBM's privacy policy
shows how plain English principles make these statements relatively easy
to read and understand:
Personal Information
In general, you can visit IBM on the Internet without telling us who
you are and without giving any personal information about yourself.
There are times, however, when we or our partners may need
information from you.
You may choose to give us personal information in a variety of
situations. For example, you may want to give us information, such
as your name and address or e-mail id, to correspond with you, to
process an order, or to provide you with a subscription. You may
give us your credit card details to buy something from us or a
description of your education and work experience in connection
with a job opening at IBM that you wish to be considered for. We
intend to let you know how we will use such information before we
collect it from you; if you tell us that you do not want us to use this
information to make further contact with you beyond fulfilling your
requests, we will respect your wishes. If you give us personal
information about somebody else, such as a spouse or work
colleague, we will assume that you have their permission to do so.95
94. See, e.g., IBM.com, IBMPrivacyPracticeson the Web [hereinafterlBMPrivacyPolicy],
http://www.ibm.con/privacy/details/us/#section-l (last visited July 30, 2007).
We collect the information we mentioned in the previous paragraphs through the
use of various technologies, including one called "cookies." A cookie is a piece
of data that a Web site can send to your browser, which may then be stored on
your computer as an anonymous tag that identifies your computer but not you.
Some IBM pages use cookies, sent by IBM or its third party vendors, or other
technologies to better serve you when you return to the Web site. You can set your
browser to notify you before you receive a cookie, giving you the chance to decide
whether to accept it. You can also set your browser to turn off cookies. If you do
so, however, some Web sites may not work properly.
Id.
95. Id.
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Please keep in mind that plain English is not a comprehensive set of
written rules that must be followed in every instance (i.e., there is no plain
English stylebook that regulators will look at to determine whether
sentences are too long or whether too many ideas are expressed in one
sentence). Rather, plain English merely requires that privacy policy
drafters attempt to make their policies as readable as possible without
compromising the integrity of the main concepts. Regulators at the FTC
will be tasked with promulgating a final rule describing the types of plain
English principles that comply with the terms of the proposed federal law.
The FTC also will be tasked with the determination as to whether or not
a company's policy complies with its final rule.96
Adopting a plain English-type standard in the United States is not a
groundbreaking proposition. In fact, in 1978, President Jimmy Carter
issued an executive order urging that "regulations should be as simple and
clear as possible."97 In 1998 President Bill Clinton drafted a memorandum
for the heads of all Executive departments and agencies requiring these
particular bodies to draft certain documents in plain English.98 This
96. Administrative agencies such as the FTC are capable of determining whether a document
complies with plain English principles. In 2003, the SEC ordered 350 of the Fortune 500 companies
to redraft some parts of their annual reports or at least promise to make such reports clearer in the
future. SEC, Summary by the Division of CorporationFinanceof SignificantIssues Addressed in
the Review of the PeriodicReports of the Fortune500 Companies, Feb. 27, 2003, available at
http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/fortune500rep.htm (stating that one of the factors that the
SEC looked at when analyzing these annual reports was the clarity of a company's disclosure).
97. Exec. Order No. 12044 (Mar. 23, 1978). This Executive Order was followed by another
in 1979 which urged that government forms "should be as short as possible and should elicit
information in a simple straightforward fashion." See Exec. Order No. 12174 (Nov. 30, 1979).
98. In an effort to make the federal government more "responsive, accessible, and
understandable in its communications with the public," President Clinton mandated that executive
department and agency heads ensure that plain language be used in all public documents where
citizens can request a benefit or service, learn how to comply with a requirement and in all
proposed and final rulemakings published in the Federal Register. Bill Clinton, PlainLanguage in
Government Writing,WHITEHOUSEMEMORANDUM, June 1, 1998, http://www.plainlanguage.gov/
whatisPL/govmandates/memo.cfm.
The Vice President and I have made reinventing the Federal Government a top
priority of my Administration. We are determined to make the Government more
responsive, accessible, and understandable in its communications with the public.
The Federal Government's writing must be in plain language. By using plain
language, we send a clear message about what the Government is doing, what it
requires, and what services it offers. Plain language saves the Government and the
private sector time, effort, and money.
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document defined plain language as "common, everyday words, except for
necessary technical terms: 'you' and other pronouns: the active voice; and
short sentences."99 Approximately ten states have laws mandating clear
language in certain public documents.'0° New York passed America's first
general plain language law that requires all residential leases and certain
commercial contracts be written in "a clear and coherent manner using
words with common and everyday meanings" and "appropriately divided
and captioned by its various sections."' 0 ' In addition, the concept of plain
Plain language requirements vary from one document to another, depending on the
intended audience. Plain language documents have logical organization, easy-toread design features, and use:
1.
2.
3.
4.

common, everyday words, except for necessary technical terms:
"you" and other pronouns:
the active voice; and
short sentences.

Id.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 11340 (Deering 2006); CAL. INS. CODE § 10291.5 (Deering
2006); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 42-152 (2007); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 627.4145 (2007); MINN. STAT. ANN.
§ 144.056 (West 2006); N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702 (Consol. 2007); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 73, §
2201 (West 2007).
101. N.Y. GEN. OBLIG. LAW § 5-702(a) (Consol. 2007).
Every written agreement entered into after November first, nineteen hundred
seventy-eight, for the lease of space to be occupied for residential purposes, for
the lease of personal property to be used primarily for personal, family or
household purposes or to which a consumer is a party and the money, property or
service which is the subject of the transaction is primarily for personal, family or
household purposes must be:
1. Written in a clear and coherent manner using words with common and every
day meanings;
2. Appropriately divided and captioned by its various sections.
Any creditor, seller or lessor who fails to comply with this subdivision shall be
liable to a consumer who is a party to a written agreement governed by this
subdivision in an amount equal to any actual damages sustained plus a penalty of
fifty dollars.... No action under this subdivision may be brought after both
parties to the agreement have fully performed their obligation under such
agreement, nor shall any creditor, seller or lessor who attempts in good faith to
comply with this subdivision be liable for such penalties.... It also shall not apply
to agreements involving amounts in excess of fifty thousand dollars nor prohibit
the use of words or phrases or forms of agreement required by state or federal law,
rule or regulation or by a governmental instrumentality.
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as company prospectuses are much
English has worked well for the0 SEC
2
easier to read and comprehend. 1
4. The Law Must be Structured as a Regulatory Ceiling
Finally, any new federal law proposing to protect PH entering a
company's front door must create an unambiguous national standard that
clearly lays out the requirements placed upon covered companies and by
requiring such companies to clearly define the privacy protections online
consumers will receive. Conflicting or more stringent state and local laws
over-regulate, confuse consumers, and increase compliance costs in this
early stage in the PH processing cycle-a stage where web site visitors can
adequately protect themselves once they understand the implications of
submitting their PH into cyberspace. One national standard can provide
web site visitors with the necessary knowledge to drastically reduce the
power of the various e-threats lurking at a company's front door. With this
in mind, the legislation proposed by this Article should be drafted as a
regulatory ceiling as opposed to a regulatory floor.
Regulatory ceilings are created when federal laws preempt more
restrictive state laws regulating the same topic. Such preemption is
particularly helpful in creating a national standard and eliminating the
chance of fifty different state laws enacted to solve the same problem.0 3
Differing state laws are problematic from both a compliance and a
consumer-understanding standpoint. First, companies struggling to comply
with varying state standards often choose the most stringent state law and
abide by its terms in every state where it operates. This allows the state
legislature of one particular state to set a de-facto national standard
without any of its members being elected nationally. A federal law, on the
other hand, originates from legislators elected from states representing the
entire country-a more proper way of setting a national standard. Second,
varying state laws will cause company privacy statements to take different
forms, include different topics and discuss privacy concepts in different
ways. This makes it even more difficult for web site visitors to understand
privacy policy terms. Under one federal standard, privacy policy templates
would begin to resemble nutritional content templates required by the FDA
under the federal Nutrition Labeling and Education Act as discussed
previously.

Id.
102. See supranote 89 (discussing the SEC and its plain English rules).
103. The number of similar laws governing one area can multiply exponentially if local
regulations are considered and not preempted by state or federal laws.
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State governments and privacy advocates correctly argue that
regulatory floors limit the ability of state and local legislatures to
experiment with creative solutions to P1-privacy problems and, thereby,
less privacy is protected. While the creative solutions of this argument is
true, a non-intrusive national standard is far more important at this point
in the PH processing cycle than state experimentation. The
experimentation-regulatory angle becomes more important as the e-threats
become more serious at the back door stage of the PH processing cycle.
This first segment of the proposed federal law provides a workable
framework to defend an individual's PH against the dangerous e-threats
lurking at the front door. As the next part will demonstrate, however,
different e-threats present serious problems as PH moves from a
company's front door to inside the company's infrastructure. At this point,
the individual the PH identifies has lost a great deal of control over the
processing, usage, and dissemination of the information. Therefore, more
comprehensive regulatory protection is necessary at this middle stage of
the cycle. Fortunately, the same statute that protects against front door ethreats also can protect against these threats from inside the company.
IV. THREATS INSIDE THE COMPANY (PII UTILIZATION)

After entering a company's front door, PH is generally stored
electronically and processed internally to complete transactions and
conduct marketing activities."° The information is now "inside the
company" from this point forward until a decision is made either to
disseminate it to unrelated entities" 5 or destroy it completely. 6 At this
104. See, e.g., Agilent Technologies, CustomerPrivacyStatement, http://www.home.agilent.
com/cgi-agilent/editorial.jspx?pmode=Privacy&cc=US&lc=eng (last visited Aug. 24, 2006)
(providing an example of a company collecting and storing PIH for both transactional and marketing
purposes. Agilent's privacy policy section on uses of PII states in part:
Agilent uses your personal information to better understand your needs and
provide you with better service. Specifically, we use your personal information
to help you complete a transaction,to communicate back to you, provide updates
on service and benefits, and to personalize our web sites and communications with
you.... From time to time, we may also use your information to contactyou for
market research or to provide you with marketing information we think would be
ofparticularinterest.
Id. (emphasis added)).
105. See, e.g., Holden Lewis, Banks are Selling your PrivateInformation, BANKRATE.COM
(Oct. 8, 1999), http://www.bankrate.com/brmI/news/bank/I9991008.asp (discussing banks and their
collection and eventual dissemination of PII for a fee by stating that:
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stage, PH is exposed to three serious e-threats: (1) data mining, (2) security
breaches (internal and external) and (3) phishing attacks. Similar to the ethreats lurking at the front door, inside-the-company e-threats are initiated
by both internal sources (data mining and internal security breaches) and
In fact, banks sell all sorts of information-including Social Security numbers and
checking and credit card account numbers-to whoever has the money to pay for
the data. The information might be provided to an affiliated brokerage selling
mutual funds (just as your certificate of deposit is about to expire) or to a
telemarketer who calls you at dinnertime to sell you a health club membership.).
Id.
106. As of June 1, 2005, a recent FTC regulation requires any businesses utilizing or deriving
information from consumer reports to dispose ofthis information in a manner that is reasonable and
appropriate to prevent unauthorized access. Fed. Trade Comm'n, Disposal of Consumer Report
Information and Records Rule, 16 C.F.R. pt. 682 (June 1, 2005) [hereinafter FTC, DisposalRule]
(this rule stems from a requirement in the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003 (15
U.S.C. § 1681(w) (2000) [hereinafter FACTA]) requiring the FTC, among other federal
governmental entities, to promulgate rules regarding the proper disposal of consumer report
information). See also FTC, Consumer Alert: Disposing of Consumer Report Information? New
Rule Tells How [hereinafter FTC, Consumer Alert], http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/pubs/alerts/
disposalalrt.shtm (last visited July 30, 2007) (summarizing the new rule and providing relevant
links). The method of disposal is left to the company to decide, however the FTC states that a few
reasonable and appropriate methods would include: (1) burning, pulverizing, or shredding paper
documents and (2) destroying or erasing digital documents. See FTC, DisposalRule, supra, §
682.3(b); FTC, ConsumerAlert,supra (stating that companies could conduct due diligence reviews
of their disposal policies and hire a "document destruction contractor" to dispose of this material).
This rule is rather broad in that it covers any business that utilizes consumer report information-a
list of companies that can include:
Consumer reporting companies, Lenders, Insurers, Employers, Landlords,
Government agencies, Mortgage brokers, Automobile dealers, Attorneys or
private investigators, Debt collectors, Individuals who obtain a credit report on
prospective nannies, contractors, or tenants [and entities] that maintain
information in consumer reports as part of their role as service providers to other
organizations covered by the [FTC Disposal] Rule.
Id. Even with such regulations in place, a recent interview with a former Department of Homeland
Security (DHS) Chief Privacy Officer (CPO) covered the knowledge level of consumer financial
firms concerning the protection of PII and concluded that although these firms tend to care about
information privacy, the official has "observed that businesses are not always completely advised
on the overlap in their civil and criminal risk liability for particular behaviors or failures in their
internal control processes [when it comes to protecting PII."]. What You Don'tKnow about Privacy
Can Hurt You, 10 CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES L. REP. 6 (2006); HackersKeen on CreditUnions, 10
CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES L. REP. 1 (2006) [hereinafter Credit Unions] (interviewing Maureen C.
Cooney-the retiring DHS CPO and former corporate attorney and FTC official). This lack of
knowledge may lead firms to take the protection of PHI less seriously than they would if they were
adequately informed of current regulations as well as the litigation risks involved with sloppy PHI
protection.

2007]

THE PRIVACY MATRIX

external sources (phishing and external security breaches). 10 7 At this
middle point in the P1I processing cycle, responsibility for protecting
against inside-the-company e-threats must slide toward the businesses
collecting PH and away from the individuals submitting it because the
information is primarily out of the hands of the individual it identifies and
primarily within the control of its collector.0 8
The following sections elaborate upon these inside the company ethreats and argue that the proposed federal law must also contain a second
substantive section specifically designed to protect PH during this stage.
Also enacted as a regulatory ceiling preempting conflicting state and local
laws, these statutory provisions should place a more significant burden on
PH utilizers to protect against these inside-the-company e-threats than was
necessary at the front-door stage.
A. Internally-Created"Inside the Company" Threats
The two major internally-created e-threats targeting PH inside the
company are data mining and internal security breaches. While the major
information security breaches over the past two years-such as Bank of
America, 0 9 LexisNexis"' and ChoicePoint"-take up much of the
107. See discussion, supra Part III.A & B (covering both internal and external front-door ethreats).
108. At this stage, companies may allow submitters of PII to amend or delete their information
from company databases but are under no legal obligation to do so. If a company does not allow
such individual control, individuals submitting information are at the mercy ofcompanies to protect
their data. This is in stark contrast to the front door where individuals made the primary decision
as to whether or not to submit any information. The silver lining at this stage is that companies are
bound to follow their stated privacy policies and may be charged with an unfair or deceptive
practice by the FTC for breaching such promise. See FTC, Privacy Initiatives: Introduction,
http://www.ftc.gov/privacy/index.html (last visited July 30,2007). The dark cloud surrounding the
silver lining, however, is that most e-commerce companies are not required to post an electronic
privacy policy in the first place. Also important is the fact that e-threats become even more
dangerous once PII is disseminated into cyberspace because, at this point, neither the submitter nor
the initial collector can protect the information from abuse. See discussion, infra Part V (discussing
e-threats occurring after PHI is disseminated through a company's back door).
109. See Bank of America Loses Customer Data (Mar. 1, 2005), http://www.msnbc.msn.
com/id/7032779/ (discussing a major security breach at Bank of America and stating that the
company "lost computer data tapes containing personal information on up to 1.2 million federal
employees, including some members of the U.S. Senate. The lost data includes Social Security
numbers and account information that could make customers of a federal government charge card
program vulnerable to identity theft").
110. See Heather Timmons, Security Breach at LexisNexis Now Appears Larger,N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 13, 2005, at C-7 (discussing the theft of the social security numbers, driver's license numbers,
and addresses of over 310,000 people when hackers compromised a database at Seisint's-a unit
of LexisNexis-utilizing a computer virus and stolen passwords). Lexis first claimed that 32,000
individuals had their PII compromised and then revised the estimate to the current 310,000. See
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data mining also can be a powerful threat

1. Data Mining
Data mining is:
A class of database applications that look for hidden patterns in a
group of data that can be used to predict future behavior. For
example, data mining software can help retail companies find
customers with common interests. The term is commonly misused
to describe software that presents data in new ways. True data
mining software doesn't just change the presentation, but actually
discovers previously unknown relationships among the data. Data
mining is popular in the science and mathematical fields but also is
utilized increasingly by3 marketers trying to distill useful consumer
data from Web sites."

Press Release, LexisNexis Concludes Review into UnauthorizedAccess to US. Databases,(Apr.
12,2005), http://www.reed-elsevier.com/index.cfin?articleid= 1319&articleaction=print&type. The
Press Release states that a comprehensive review analyzed
data search activity going back over the last two full years and concluded that
there were 59 incidents where [unauthorized], predominantly using IDs and
passwords of legitimate customers of Seisint, may have fraudulently acquired
personal identifying information from its U.S. risk management
databases. LexisNexis estimates that information on approximately 310,000 U.S.
individuals in total may have been accessed.
Id.; Malini Guha, Reed Elsevier'sEstimate of Identity-Theft Victims Jumps, FIN. TIMES (London),
Apr. 13, 2005, at21.
111. See ChoicePoint: More ID Theft Warnings, CNNMoNY.COM (Feb. 17, 2005),
http://money.cnn.com/2005/02/17/technology/personaltech/choicepoint/ (describing a situation
where ChoicePoint sold P1-in the form of names, addresses, social security numbers and credit
reports on over 144,000 individuals-to criminals posing as legitimate business operators).
112. A study by the Privacy Rights Clearinghouse found that over 90,995,000 PII records were
compromised since February 15, 2005. See A Chronologyof PrivacyBreaches, PRIVACY RIGHTS
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/ChronDataBreaches. htm (last visited July 30,
2007) (emphasis added) [hereinafter Chronology of Privacy Breaches] (labeling each major
security breach since early 2005, provides the name of the victimized company and its location,
discusses the types of breaches which occurred and totals the number of P1I records lost).
Interestingly, over 80 of the security breaches occurred at universities and were evenly spread
between 2005 and 2006 indicating that this e-threat is not confined only to e-commerce businesses.
Id.
113. Webopedia.com, DataMining,http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/d/data mining.html
(last visited July 30, 2007). According to sources in the technology industry, the demand for data
mining software is rapidly growing. See, e.g., Michelle Kessler, DataMiners Dig a Little Deeper;
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Companies engaged in data mining utilize sophisticated software
programmed to analyze and correlate scattered pieces of PHI in ways its
submitters may not fathom." 4 This combing through of collected data
results in the creation of detailed profiles forecasting an individual
customer's needs, interests, and desires." 5 These dossiers are utilized to
develop targeted marketing materials and potentially sold to interested
Companies may Know a lot More about You Than You Think-or Want, USA TODAY, July 12,
2006, at B-1; James Rosen, Big Business is OldHandat Mining PersonalData,SACRAMENTO BEE
(California), May 22, 2006, at A-10 (citing a study by a college professor finding "a 30-fold
increase in corporate data collection between 1999 and 2004. Wa-Mart... gathers and analyzes
information on about 20 million transactions-a day.").
114. See, e.g., Duane Stanford, All Our Lives are on Filefor Sale, ATLANTA-J. CONST., Mar.
21, 2004, at A-1 (describing data mining, giving examples of the practice and discussing the
interesting data mining tactics of the Internet portal Abika stating that the company conducts:
[A] media sweep of newspaper and magazine articles [and] purchases databases
from companies that offer anything from subscriber lists to club membership
rosters. .

.

. Most of the databases prohibit Abika from reselling the raw

information. Instead, Abika plugs the data into a mathematical formula.., that
compares the subject with more than 60,000 profiles that have been verified as
accurate. The program then spits out a supposed map of the subject's character.
[Abika] constantly fine-tunes the program based on feedback, and... admits the
profiles can be wrong or incomplete.
Id. E-commerce companies are also utilizing an older direct marketing approach in scanning
customer information-abbreviated as RFM or receny/frequency/monetary value-in their data
mining applications. See Simon Pohlen, DataMiningfor the Profitable Veins of Gold, DOMINION
POST (New Zealand), Aug. 9, 2004, at 2. The article describes the following terms as follows:
"Recency" is the time since you last saw the customer; "frequency" applies to how
often you see them; and "monetary value" applies to the amount they generate for
your business-revenue or profit. The way this is applied will vary between
industries but the data that is collected serves the same purpose-it helps drive
value in the business.
Id. These categories are then combined with specific pieces of PII to form a picture of customer
needs and interests.
115. See, e.g., Stanford, supranote 114.
[E]very time you visit an Internet site, apply for credit or send in a product
registration card, you leave behind bread crumbs of information that are swept up,
compiled and stored by people you don't know. And it's all for sale to someone.
Hundreds of companies are selling and swapping information--everything from
your phone number to what you buy at the supermarket-and storing it in
databases to be cross-referenced again and again.
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third parties. Today, data mining presents an opportunity for companies to
mine electronic gold from their cache of stored P1." 6
A hypothetical example readily illustrates the power of data mining
technology. Assume a registered Yahoo! customer living in an uppermiddle class neighborhood in Westminster, Colorado" 7 frequently
searches the Yahoo! search engine for the newest BMW sports car models.
Utilizing data mining software, Yahoo! can instantly aggregate these
separate pieces of information and place a specifically targeted banner
advertisement for the new BMW 650 as well as automobile financing
options the next time the user checks the Dow Jones Industrial Average on
the Yahoo! Finance homepage. "' Without a data mining program to
quickly correlate this information and the technology to automatically
place the appropriately-tailored advertisement, Yahoo! would have a
difficult time correlating this customer's interests with its advertiser's
products. Therefore, effectively utilizing data mining technology increases
a company's chances of generating more banner advertisement revenue.
Or, to put it differently:
Somewhere in America, powerful computers ingest crumbs of data
about your personal life. Your income level. The kind of car you
drive. Your home address. Your credit rating. All input, assimilated
and analyzed at lightning speed. The result: A piece ofpaper arrives
in your mailbox offering you 10 percent off an oil change at your
local service station. 19
As with some of the other potential e-threats mentioned previously-such
as cookies and adware-data mining technology contains advantageous
features. For instance, data mining allows individuals to receive targeted
advertisements more closely tailored to their interests as opposed to
annoying advertisements for products and services they would never
consider purchasing. On the flip side, however, data mining technologies
116. See, e.g., Pohlen, supranote 114 (discussing the tendencies of businesses to mine the PII
of their customers).
117. Westminster, Colorado is a quaint, upper middle class city north-west of Denver that was
named the twenty-fourth best small city in America by Money Magazine. Best Places to Live:
Westminster, CO, CNNMONEY.COM (2006), available at http://money.cnn.com/magazines/
moneymag/bplive/2006/snapshots/PLO883835.html.
118. See Kessler, supra note 113. A different Yahoo! customer that has never searched for
sports cars on the Yahoo! search engine will likely see a banner advertisement targeted more
towards his interests on his next trip to the Yahoo! Finance homepage.
119. Matthew B. Stannard, US. Phone-CallDatabaseIgnites Privacy Uproar:Data Mining
Commonly Used in Business to FindPatterns,It Rarely Focuses on Individuals, S.F. CHRON., May
12, 2006, at A-1.
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can be privacy-invading depending upon the mining company's utilization
of its created profiles. 20 If detailed profiles containing many different
pieces of PH are created, mined for trends and then sold on the open
market, more PH than is necessary to commit identity theft or other forms
of fraud will linger in cyberspace outside of the control of the individual
it identifies.' 2 '
2. Internal Security Breaches
Security breaches are the most widespread e-threats targeting PH at the
inside-the-company stage.' 22 An internal security breach occurs when
stored PH is accessed or distributed inappropriately by rouge employees
or through some form of human error.123 While rogue employees definitely
cause damage, 124 the cases concerning human error garner the most
120. See, e.g., Brad Daisley, Electronic "Data Mining:" Privacy Concerns Trigger
Legislation, LAW. WKLY., June 25, 1999, at 8 (stating that "new electronic data mining techniques
have led to a worldwide concern for privacy and new legislation from several countries restricting
the sale and transfer of personal data.").
121. See Daisley, supranote 120. Daisley states that:
data can be collected from almost any source, such as telephone records or credit
card transactions, and sold to any number of organizations without the individual
knowing... It can also be processed into very specific databases... [in fact,] one
American direct marketing company is advertising mail listings based on
everything from age and sex to ethnicity.
Id.
122. See ChronologyofPrivacyBreaches, supra note 112 (discussing a study by the Privacy
Rights Clearinghouse finding that over 90,995,000 PII records have been compromised since
February 15, 2005).
123. Human error encompasses instances of careless treatment of PII. Oftentimes, such
careless treatment of PII is found when the data is accidentally disseminated by an internal source;
these situations occur when an employee leaves a file cabinet/office unlocked, a laptop in an
automobile or a hotel room, or leaves a computer terminal and database application without
password protection enabled. Although this accidental-dissemination occurs more infrequently than
hacker attacks, such dissemination can be "disruptive, hurt the organization's morale and public
relations, and take a lot of time and money to repair." How HR is Coping with Employee Data
Privacy, HRFocus, (July 2006), at 7 [hereinafter How HR is Coping] (discussing the many types
of PII possessed by a typical HR department such as: "Social Security numbers, home addresses
and telephone numbers, bank accounts for payroll direct deposits, garnishments, investment
information for 401(k) plans, and personnel reviews and disciplinary records" and instances of
accidental dissemination). Although instances ofaccidental dissemination ofemployee PII are more
heralded in the press, the accidental dissemination ofcustomer PII can bejust as disruptive because,
in both instances, an individual's PHI is compromised.
124. See, e.g., Michael Krauss, Tech-Security Legal Guru Expects Growth ofFraud,CHI. SUN
TIMES, May 22, 2006, at 64. Krauss quotes San Francisco lawyers discussing situations where
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prominent press coverage. A recent example of human error occurred
when a laptop computer containing the "name, Social Security Number
and birth date of every living veteran since 1975"--over 26.5 million
United States individuals-was stolen in a random burglary of the home
of a Department of Veterans Affairs staffer who brought the computer
home from work. 125 With this information compromised and subject to
misuse, 26.5 million people stood at a greater risk of fraud than they had
before the laptop was stolen. 2 6 Skeptics, referencing the woes of
governmental bureaucracy in general, should understand that security
breaches caused by human error are not merely a bureaucratic
phenomenon. In fact, over the past two years, the private sector has
provided more than its fair share of security breaches. 27 Once the data is
compromised by a security breach, it is vulnerable to dissemination
outside the company through the back door and exposed to the serious ethreats facing PH at that stage. 128
angry employees hack computer systems to steal the identity of a disliked senior
exec to defame him... [or where a rouge] employee read his bosses' e-mails to
find company secrets, and pass them along. There was even a group of IT execs
who tried to hold their company hostage to avoid an outsourcing deal.
Id.; Peter H. Lewis, Threat to CorporateComputers is Often the Enemy Within, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
2, 1998, at D-1 (discussing the story of a "computer supervisor at a Midwestern engine
manufacturing company [who] approached his bosses ... and made them an offer they could not
refuse. Either they gave him a big raise immediately and agreed to a list of other job demands, or
he would shut the company down"); ComputerSecurity Breaches:the Enemy is Within, Bus. TIMES
(Singapore), Aug. 4, 1997, at 10 (stating that "outgoing employees, before leaving a company, may
sabotage the company in various ways . . . [including] stealing the company's digital assets,
intellectual property, databases and financial information.").
125. See David Lazarus, Where is the Securityfor OurPersonalData, S.F. CHRON., May 24,
2006, at C-1.
126. The Department of Veterans Affairs claimed that the laptop was recovered and that the
data was not accessed inappropriately. See, e.g., Christopher Lee & Zachary A. Goldfarb, Computer
with Missing Vet Data Found,WASH. POST, June 30, 2006, at A- 1.
127. See Chronology of Privacy Breaches, supra note 112 (providing examples of both
internal and external security breaches at American corporations, educational institutions and
governmental agencies since Feb. 15, 2005); supra text accompanying notes 69-71 (providing
background information on three prominent security breaches recently occurring at major American
corporations). In one of the most recent cases involving human error, professional services firm
Ernst & Young lost sensitive P11 when a laptop containing social security numbers was stolen from
an employee's car. See Carrie Kirby, Another Security Breach Reported: Stolen Laptop Had
Client's PrivateData, Says Ernst & Young, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 25, 2006, at C- I (discussing a
security breach at Deloitte & Touche, a competitor of Ernst & Young, when a compact disc was
left in an airplane seat-pocket by an auditor; the disc contained, among other pieces of data, 9,000
names and social security numbers of McAfee employees collected for a McAfee audit).
128. See discussion, infra Part V.
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Over time, the FTC began to take notice of the danger caused by
internal security breaches and acted rather quickly to protect stored PH.
Over the past few years, the FTC has brought thirteen enforcement actions
against companies alleging poor P11-protection practices.129 In its most
recent case, the FTC filed a complaint against a large real estate title
company, Nations Title Agency (Nations), with operations in forty-four
states. 130 The complaint alleged that Nations collected pieces of PH
necessary to complete real estate financing deals,13 ' but then breached a
privacy policy promise to safeguard PH. The FTC claimed that Nations
breached its protection promise by, among other things, discarding old
mortgage applications containing sensitive PII into an open trash dumpster
behind the building and failing to implement adequate computer network
security procedures. 132 The FTC alleged that these practices failed to
reasonably protect PII and, thereby, violated the Federal Trade
Commission Act (FTC Act), the FTC's Privacy Rule, 133 as well as the
129. See, e.g., FTC, In the Matter of Nations Title Agency, Inc., Nations Holding Company
and Christopher M. Likens, Complaint, Docket No. C-4161 (June 19, 2006) [hereinafter Nations
Title] (alleging, in the most recent FTC enforcement action, that the practice of placing customer
home loan applications into an open dumpster violated its promise to utilize "physical, electronic
and procedural safeguards" to protect confidential financial information). See also Rules and
Regulations: FTC Closes Lid on Title Company, 10 CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES L. REP. 1, May 31,
2006) (describing the FTC action against Nations Holding Company as the thirteenth "case that the
FTC has brought challenging faulty data security practices.").
130. Nations Title, supra note 129.
131. This information included: "Consumer names, Social Security numbers, bank and credit
card account numbers, mortgage information, loan applications, purchase contracts, refinancing
agreements, income histories, and credit histories." Nations Title, supra note 129, at 2.
132. See id. at 2. The discarded documents contained intact pieces of PIl and were found by
a Kansas City news crew in an unsecured dumpster. Id. at 3. The complaint also alleged that the
company failed to adequately protect its computer network from hacker attacks because a hacker
was able to use a common web site attack to gain unauthorized access to Nations' computer
network. Id. at 2. This is an interesting case where a company falls victim to both an internal and
external security breach at the same time.
133. FTC, Privacy of CustomerFinanciallnformationRule, 16 C.F.R., pt. 313 (effective July
1, 2001) [hereinafter Privacy Rule] (stating that the FTC's Privacy Rule requires financial
institutions to provide customers-at the point when the customer relationship is formed and then
annually thereafter-with a "clear and conspicuous" statement that "accurately reflects" the
institution's privacy policies.). The Privacy Rule also was promulgated under the authority of the
GLBA. GLBA §§ 6801-6809. The complaint alleged that Nations' privacy policy did not accurately
describe the actual handling of PI and, therefore, violated the PrivacyRule. See Nations Title,
supra note 129, at 4. Nations' privacy policy contained the statement that the company "at all
times, strives to maintain the confidentiality and integrity of the personal information in its
possession and has instituted measures to guard against its unauthorized access. We maintain
physical, electronic and procedural safeguards in compliance with federal standards to protect the
information." Id. at 4.
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FTC's Safeguards Rule. 34
Buoyed by the many occurrences of internal security breaches making
national news, professional studies also suggest that internal security
breaches are much more common than external security breaches.' 35 With
this in mind, the vast amount of money companies pour into protecting
against external attacks-to create sophisticated firewalls,-becomes less
meaningful in preventing an internal security breach.' 36 With over 165
134. FTC, Standardsfor SafeguardingCustomerInformation Rule, 16 C.F.R., pt. 314 (May
23, 2002) [hereinafter Safeguards Rule]. This rule was promulgated by the FTC to implement a
provision in the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act (GLBA) and requires financial institutions to protect the
security, integrity, and confidentiality of customer PII by devising a comprehensive written
information security program that contains reasonable administrative, technical, and physical
safeguards. Id. at 3. See also 15 U.S.C. § 680 1(b) (2000) (Section 680 1(b) required the FTC to
promulgate the SafeguardsRule).
135. See Maija Pesola, Hackers at Bay as Defences Improve, FIN. TIMES (London), June 22,
2005, at 8 (citing a Deloitte study of the world's top 100 financial institutions finding that internal
security breaches are more common today than external hacking attacks), Peter H. Lewis, Threats
to Corporate Computers is Often the Enemy Within, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 1998.
According to an informal survey conducted by the Computer Security Institute...
computer attacks by insiders were more common [in 1997] than external Internetbased attacks. More than 87 percent of the corporate, financial, government and
university information security managers polled by the survey said disgruntled
employees were the most likely cause of data security incidents, ranging from
sabotage, fraud and theft of proprietary information to unauthorized snooping in
a colleague's E-mail or the storing ofdigital pornography on a company computer.
See also discussion, infra Part V.B.2 (discussing external security breaches); Zachary Wilson,
Hacking: The Basics, SANS INSTITUTE (updated June 27, 2006), http://www.sans.org/reading_
room/whitepapers/hackers/955.php (SANS stands for SysAdmin, Audit, Network, and Security).
The SANS Institute is
the most trusted and by far the largest source for information security training and
certification in the world. It... develops, maintains, and makes available at no
cost, the largest collection of research documents about various aspects of
information security, and it operates the Internet's early warning system-Internet
Storm Center.
SANS Institute, About SANS, http://www.sans.org/about/sans.php (last visited July 30, 2007). A
recent SANS report recounted a statistic that "insiders [motivated generally by either greed or
revenge] commit 80% of security breaches." Wilson, supra, at 1.
136. See Li Yuan, CompaniesFace System Attacksfrom Inside, Too, WALLST. J. ABSTRACTS,
June 1, 2005, at B-1.
While companies spend billions of dollars a year to protect their computer systems
from outside attack, many of those defenses can be rendered useless by internal
abuse from employees and contractors; a January survey ... found that 23% of
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million PH records compromised over the past two years,'3 7 clearly the
self-regulatory structure governing most PH storage needs some
assistance.
B. Externally-Created"Inside the Company" Threats
Similar to one of the primary e-threats lying in wait at a company's
front door (such as pretexting), two externally-initiated threats target PH
at the inside-the-company stage. While data mining and internal security
breaches stem from actions initiated by sources located within a company,
both phishing and external security breaches stem from actions initiated
by outside bad actors seeking stored PII for nefarious purposes.
1. Phishing
Phishing is:
The act of sending an e-mail to a user falsely claiming to be an
established legitimate enterprise in an attempt to scam the user into
surrendering private information that will be used for identity theft.
The e-mail directs the user to visit a Web site where they are asked
to update personal information, such as passwords and credit card,
social security, and bank account numbers, that the legitimate
organization already has. The Web site, however, is bogus and set
up only to steal the user's information.138
229 U.S. organizations with 1,000 or more employees had at least one internal
security breach in 2004.
Id. To alleviate some of the costs of internal security breaches, companies are buying insurance
against such instances. See Erika Gonzalez, Latest Insurance Protects Businesses from Web
Problems, DENV. ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Feb. 10, 2000, at B-5 (discussing a new insurance
product-"Internet insurance"--that covers businesses against various Internet dangers including
security breaches).
137. See ChronologyofPrivacyBreaches,supranote 112; discussion infra Part V.C (detailing
a proposed solution, in the form of a federal law, placing regulations on companies storing PII in
interstate commerce).
138. Webopedia.com, Phishing, http://www.webopedia.com/fERM/ p/phishing.html (last
visited July 30, 2007). In January 2006, "a record 17,877 phishing sites were reported... up 17%
from [December 2005], according to a new report from the Anti-Phishing Working Group." Phyllis
Furman, Don't Get Hooked by PhishingScam, DAILY NEWS (New York), Mar. 30, 2006, at B-42.
According to a recent survey, Americans lost nearly $1 billion from participating in phishing scams
in 2005. Id. A related concept called pharming occurs when software programs and viruses are used
to detour Internet users to dummy sites. Howard Pankratz, Suthers Warns of E-mail, Web Scams,
DENV. POST, Feb. 7, 2006, at B-4. See also Gregory M. Lamb, New Twist on "Phishing"
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Today's e-thieves send out random phishing e-mails and "take a shotgun
approach, scattering bogus e-mails everywhere and to everyone. They're
counting on fooling only a few because it costs next to nothing to massblast these phony communiques to millions of people-and it takes only
a handful of suckers to make it worth their while."' 39 Even more
problematic, contemporary phishing e-mails are becoming more
sophisticated, personalized and enticing.14 These updated e-mails might
cause even the most privacy-conscious web-surfer to at least pause,
especially if the message slithers through the spam filter and is personally
addressed to the e-mail account owner, and consider responding."' These
more personalized and directly-targeted attacks are referred to as
"spearphising" and are becoming more common as regular e-mail users
become wise to the old fashioned, generic phishing scams of a few years
ago. 4 2 Regardless of the form the attack takes-phishing or
Scam-"Pharming,"CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, May 5,2005, at 13 (discussing the details of some
types of pharming attacks).
139. Don Oldenburg, Hook, Line and Sucker: PersonalizedPhishingScams Use Customers'
Names to Attract Attention, WASH. POST, Apr. 2, 2006, at F-5.
140. Some recent phishing e-mails offer a cash reward for taking a brief survey when the
volunteer is asked to enter different forms of PII. See, e.g., Furman,supra note 138 (discussing a
phishing scam allegedly from Chase that offers its customers a chance to take a brief survey for a
cash reward of $20).
141. See Oldenburg, supranote 139 (discussing a personalized phishing e-mail that requests
the recipient dispute a fraudulent transaction and, in the process, attempts to collect the individual's
"name, birth date, mother's maiden name, driver's license number and state, and credit card
info-just about anything your average criminal needs for identity theft." The e-mail was generated
from a web site in Russia and routed through Amsterdam before arriving in the reporter's inbox).
142. Id. Oldenburg describes spearphishing as:
such narrowly targeted fraud, called "spearphishing," has previously focused more
on employees from particular corporations or on faculty members at
universities-but not on specific individuals. [One expert] speculates that the
crooks probably "scraped" random names accompanied by e-mail addresses
somewhere online or hacked a database, then sent out tens of thousands of the
tailored [phishing e-mails allegedly from the company PayPal] figuring to hit a
decent percentage of actual PayPal customers.
Id.; see also Jon Swartz, PhishingScants Aim to Bilk Smaller Prey, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 2006,
at B-I. Swartz states that
[a] surge in phishing e-mail scams targeting regional credit unions and local banks
is the latest sign fraudsters are shifting to narrow attacks. Smaller is better,
security experts say, because the scams escape the attention of law enforcement
and because a smaller company's cyberdefenses often aren't as imposing as those
of a major corporation.
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spearphishing-web site customers should be on the lookout for e-mails
requesting immediate action in lieu of account closure, requests to update
or enter more information to "update" an account, or requests to follow a
link within the e-mail to be taken to an account update page. Even if a
customer does not "fall for" the phishing scam by submitting the
additional PH, merely opening up a phishing e-mail may lead to spyware
and adware being transferred to the recipient's computer.'43
While legitimate businesses are currently conducting more and more
of their activities online,'" policies at these same businesses frown upon
sending e-mails requesting that customers transmit PH via e-mail.145
Problematically, although many businesses make efforts to prevent
phishing attacks, they are concurrently failing to make such efforts clear
to their customers. 4 6 This fact, combined with customer feelings that (1)
they will be penalized by the company for not responding, (2) their
accounts will be closed, (3) electronic information was required to create
an account in the first place, and, therefore, subsequently entering further
information electronically is no big deal, and (4) the mock web sites linked
to the spain look eerily similar to the official company web site, 147 serve
Swartz, supra.
143. See Furman,supra note 138 (stating that "Just by clicking on to a criminal Web site, you
could become vulnerable to spyware infecting your computer that will track your key strokes").
144. See, e.g., U.S. Census Bureau, E-Stats: Estimated Quarterly U.S. Retail Sales (last
revised Nov. 17, 2006), http://www.census.gov/mrts/www/data/html/06Q3.html (showing that the
amount of retail sales conducted via e-commerce have increased from $5.3 billion in the fourth
quarter of 1999 to over $27.5 billion in the third quarter of 2006).
145. See e.g., Oldenburg, supra note 139 (reporting that "[c]ustomers should keep in mind
[that] PayPal (and any legitimate financial service) will not ask you to follow a link to enter
personal, financial or account information. You should always open a new Web browser or call the
company directly to confirm or dispute a transaction"). In fact, major targets of phishing attacks,
like PayPal, have created their own webpages warning customers of the e-threat and informing
them on how to deal with such e-mails. See, e.g., PayPal, ProtectYourselffrom FraudulentEmails,
PAYPAL.COM, https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_vdc-security-spoof-outside (last
visited July 30, 2007) (this page warns customers to watch out for generic greetings, a false sense
of urgency and fake links when reading e-mails alleging to come from PayPal).
146. See, e.g., Providian, Your Security: E-mailScams: Phishing, http://www.providian.com/
home/your security.htm (describing how Providian makes an effort to describe phishing and to
educate its customers on how to avoid such attacks. However, this warning is buried as the twentyninth item in its privacy policy).
147. The following is a phishing e-mail I received recently:
We recently have determined that different computers have logged into your
PayPal account, and multiple password failures were present before the login. One
of our Customer Service employees has already tryed [sic] to telephonically reach
you. As our employee did not manage to reach you, this email has been sent to
your notice.
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as the primary reasons why web users consistently fall for phishing
tactics.' 48 All ofthese factors combine to make phishing America's "fastest
growing form of consumer theft...,, 49
Therefore your account has been temporary suspended. We need you to confirm
your identity in order to regain full privileges of your account. If this is not
completed by December 9, 2005, we reserve the right to terminate all privileges
of your account indefinitely [sic), as it may have been used for fraudulent
purposes. We thank you for your cooperation in this manner. To confirm your
identity please follow the link below:
https://www.paypal.com/cgi-bin/webscr?cmd=_login-run.Thank you for your
patience in this matter.
PayPal-Customer Service
Please do not reply to this e-mail as this is only a notification. Mail sent to this
address cannot be answered.
E-mail to the author, received on Dec. 5, 2005 (emphasis in original).
148. See Oldenburg, supranote 139. Oldenburg argues that
there isn't a day my span filter isn't filthy with pesky e-mails that pretend to
come from eBay, PayPal, Chase and other legitimate businesses warning that my
account has been compromised, defrauded or whatever. From urgent warnings
(verify your information or your account will be suspended within 24 hours!) to
look-alike Web sites and logos, most phishing spams are a study in crude social
engineering. They're designed to convince the naive, gullible or unthinking to do
one thing-click that link and give up a password or other confidential info.
Id. Other reasons people fall for phishing attacks are: (1) failing to look at the address bar or
security features in the fake webpages linked to the phishing e-mails, (2) failing to understand the
syntax of domain names (believing that "www.ebay-members-security.com belongs to
www.ebay.com") and (3) a failure to distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate e-mails. Will
Sturgeon, The Secret ofPhishers'Success,CNETNEWS.COM, Apr. 3, 2006, http://news.com.com/
2102-7349_3-6057000.html?tag=st.util.print (citing Rachna Dhamija et al., Why PhishingWorks,
PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIGCHI CONFERENCE ON HUMAN FACTORS IN COMPUTING SYsTEMs (2006),

http://people.seas.harvard.edu/-rachna/papers/why_ phishingworks.pdf(detailing the reasons why
people fall for phishing attacks years after warnings to avoid such e-mails first appeared).
149. Matt Hines, Phishingis Fastest GrowingForm of Computer Theft, SIUCON.COM, June
16, 2004, http://software. silicon.com/malware/0,3800003100,39121396,00.htm (stating that
phishing attacks "accounted for a staggering $2.4bn in fraud, or an average of $1,200 per victim,
during the last 12 months [2004]"). See also Jason Turcotte, New Yahoo Shield May Dry Up the
PhishingWell, APPLICATION DEV. TRENDS, Aug. 24, 2006, http://www.adtmag.com/article.aspx?
id=19114 (stating that "Phishing is one of the fastest growing security threats today"); Walter S.
Mossberg, Some Safety Tips to Help You AvoidLatest Scams, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, July 27,
2006, http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/06208/709074-96.stm. Mossberg states that
the fastest-growing computer-security problem isn't viruses or other traditional
malicious programs, and it can't be entirely defeated by using security software
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2. External Security Breaches
An external security breach is "an unauthorized acquisition of
computerized data [initiated by someone unrelated to the company] that
compromises the security, confidentiality, or integrity of personal
information maintained by the ...business."'"5 Many external security
breaches are committed by hackers 151 utilizing computers to practice their
trade from locations across the globe.'52 These break-in attempts seek to
compromise a company's network security via:
(1) physical intrusions, (2)
53
system intrusions, or (3) remote intrusions.1
A physical intrusion occurs when individuals are physically present in
front of a computer and use the keyboard or physically remove the disk
drive in order to gain access to the system.' 54 A system intrusion occurs
when an individual already has some access to a computer system and
utilizes that access to fraudulently gain access to more comprehensive
or by buying a Mac. It's called "social engineering," and it consists of tactics that
try to fool users into giving up sensitive financial data that criminals can use to
steal their money and even their identities. Social engineering is a broad term that
includes "phishing," the practice by which crooks create emails and Web sites that
look just like legitimate messages and sites from real banks and other financial
companies.
Id.
150. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(d) (West 2006); California Department of Consumer Affairs,
Recommended Practiceson Notice of Security Breach Involving PersonalInformation (Rev. Feb.
2007), availableat http://www.privacy.ca.gov/recommendations/secbreach.pdf.
151. A hacker is a person who attempts to gain access to a computer network or system. See,
e.g., Wilson, supra note 135, at 1. There are two types of hackers: (1)benign hackers (who attempt
only to access into their own computer systems) and (2) malicious hackers (who attempt to access
other people's computer systems). Id.at 1.
152. See, e.g., Steve Liewer, Sub Base Hacking Suspect Arrested, Student, 18, Caught in
Southern Spain, SAN DIEGO UNION TRIB., Jan. 26, 2006, at B (discussing the arrest of a hacker
operating in Spain who broke into the computer system of a U.S. Navy submarine base located in
San Diego); HackerFacing U.S. Extradition,PITTSBURG POST-GAZETrE (Pennsylvania), May 11,
2006, at A-4 (discussing attempts by the U.S. government to have a hacker jailed in Britain
extradited to the United States where he is accused of hacking into federal government computers).
See also Credit Unions, supra note 106 (citing a study by SecureWorks-a network manager for
over 1000 credit unions and banks-demonstrating that credit unions are attacked 67% more often
than banks. SecureWorks claims that it blocks over 760 daily hacker attacks on each credit union
it represents).
153. See LinuxSecurity.com, FAQ: Network Instrusion Deteciton Systems, at 1.3 (discussing
the primary ways in which an intruder can break into a computer network), http://www.
linuxsecurity.com/resource-files/intrustion-detection/network-intrusion-detection.html (last visited
Dec. 18, 2007).
154. Id.(stating that a stolen disk drive can then be read on another machine).
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privileges.' 55 Finally, remote intrusions occur when unauthorized access
is attempted from afar-basically,
from a remote location physically
156
unassociated from the company.

Each form of these attacks is made possible primarily because of
software vulnerabilities'57 and the acquisition of passwords.' 58 Although
software programming is much better today than in the past, there will
always be vulnerabilities-such as situations where hackers overload an
input field with extra characters or otherwise try to crash the software
program in order to gain access.' 59 Additionally, because
people-including system administrations-do not take the process of
password creation seriously, hackers are able to access sensitive data
merely by guessing simple passwords such as "admin.', 16 1 Once inside a
company's network, hackers most often: (1) commit reconnaissance (i.e.,
browse through data files searching for valuable PH), (2) deface web pages
with web-graffiti, (3) establish a foothold on the network allowing for easy
future access, 161 and (4) otherwise exploit the network through denial-of62
service attacks or by using the network to institute future attacks.
Aside from hackers accessing company systems to gain P11, other
security breaches occur when thieves unassociated with a company con
employees into giving out PH (a practice referred to as social engineering),
pose as legitimate entities and request the data (a form of social
engineering called pretexting), 163 or actually break into a physical location
155.

Because system intrusions generally indicate at least some form of access they are more

appropriately categorized as internal security breaches and are listed under the external breach
section merely because they are a form of hacking.
156. Wilson, supra note 135, at 2.
157. Id. (stating that "[s] oftware always has bugs. System administrators and programmers can
never track down and eliminate all possible software vulnerabilities, and attackers have only to find
one hole in order to break in").
158. Id. at 2-4 (stating that "passwords are possibly the single weakest link in the security
chain").
159. Id.at 3 (stating that situations where hackers try and overload a program by entering more
characters than the program can take are called "buffer attacks.").
160. Id. at 4 (stating that a "surprising number of machines are configured with an empty or
easy-to-guess root/administrator password" and that one "of the first things an attacker will do on
a network is to scan all machines for empty or commonly used passwords").
161. Wilson, supra note 135, at 7 (discussing the idea that, at this point, hackers attempt to
cover up their tracks by altering log files and audit trails while, at the same time, making sure that
future access is obtainable).
162. Id. at 8 (stating that a denial-of-service attack occurs when a hacker attempts to prevent
proper use of a computer, network, or web site by implementing tactics meant to temporarily crash
the system).
163. See, e.g., Rodney Gedda, HackerMitnick PreachesSocial EngineeringAwareness, CIO,

July 26,2005, http://www.cio-asia.com/ShowPage.aspx?pagetype=2&articleid=2141 &pubid=5&
issueid=55. Famous hacker, turned security consultant, Kevin Mitnick and states
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to steal computer equipment containing PH records."6 At the end of the
day, regardless of the kind of external security breach perpetrated, stored
PH should never be considered completely secure. 165 Company networks
always will have holes, uninformed and negligent employees will
constantly be tempted to give out sensitive information to unauthorized
parties posing as legitimate entities and diligent e-thieves will generally
find ways to infiltrate digital and physical structures to obtain information.

"Social engineering attacks [of which pretexting is one type] can be simple or
complex and take from minutes to years," [Mitnik] said, adding that surveys have
revealed that nine out of 10 people will give their password in exchange for a
chocolate Easter egg. Mitnick spoke of how social engineering has been used to
extract millions of dollars from banks and how he used the technique to siphon
source code for a mobile phone out of Motorola by posing as an employee in its
own R&D department. Mitnick also mentioned how he is not immune to the social
engineering scourge and was sent an e-mail "phishing" for information from his
PayPal account earlier this year.
Id.; see also discussion, supra Part III.B. 1 (discussing pretexting as a front-door e-threat).
164. See, e.g., Bill Brenner, Data Theft Roundup: More Laptops Stolen, Roughly 300,000 at
Risk, SEARCHSECURITY.COM, June 5, 2006, http://searchsecurity.techtarget.com/originalContent/
0,289142,sid 14_gci 119224 1,00.html (stating that "instead of hacking into company databases,
thieves are making off with personal data on hundreds of thousands of people the old-fashioned
way-by stealing machines from cargo holds, cars and offices").
165. See, e.g., Wes Miller, Reduce Your Risk: 10 Security Rules to Live By, TECHNET MAG.,
May/June 2006, http://www.microsoft.com/technet/technetmag/issues/2006/05/ReduceRisk/
default.aspx (explaining that computer data will never be 100% secure: "1. Because people are
involved. 2. Because users make mistakes. 3. Because administrators also make mistakes. 4.
Because systems don't always get updated when they should. 5. Because software itself is never
completely secure"). See also Michael W. Hawkins, Guidelines for Building a Secure IT
Infrastructure,informit.com, Jan. 25, 2002, http://www.informit.com/articles/article.asp?p=25065
&seqNum=3&rl= I. Hawkins states that:
It's impossible for any organization to completely eliminate all security risks. An
organization can never be completely secure because all security technologies
have weaknesses and limitations. While many organizations may acknowledge
this fact, they often fail to manage the corresponding risks. For example, wellknown penetration systems fail to explore many security technology issues, and
completely disregard policies, processes, and facilities, among others. Virusprotection programs are always out of date. Firewalls are directed at outsiders, but
do nothing to protect against malicious inside attacks. Most companies still rely
on simple user ID and password controls that are ineffective for sensitive systems.
And of course all security technologies are subject to human error, failure, and
disaster.
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Today's popular press is filled with stories reporting the types external
security breaches just described.' 66 Ironically, one of the most infamous
recent external security breaches occurred at ChoicePoint-a prominent
member of the data broker community conducting business by compiling
and selling vast amounts of PH for a profit. 167 Through this breach,
166. See, e.g.. Ellen Nakashima, AT&T Sues, Alleging Fraudulent Access to Consumer
Accounts, WASH. POST, Aug. 24, 2006, at D-3. Nakashima discusses a recent social engineering
attack on AT&T Corp. whereby twenty-five people:
[A]llegedly posed as customers to gain unauthorized online access to private
phone records. Some 2,500 customers' records were stolen [and the] individuals
gained access to the records by "pretexting" or fooling AT&T's computer or
interactive voice response phone system into believing they were real customers.
This was done by providing the customer's telephone number and the last four
digits of the customer's Social Security number or the three-digit customer code
associated with the customer's account... The [pretexters] also sometimes used
"spoofing" software to make it appear that they were calling from the customer's
telephone.
Id.; see also Hackers Hit AT&T's OnlineStore, SAN ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Aug. 30, 2006, at
E-6 (discussing a recent instance of a remote intrusion through which hackers broker into AT&T
Corp.'s computer system and stole over 19,000 pieces of P11 collected from customers who
purchased products from the company's online store). Aside from companies, even American
colleges are experiencing a rash of external security breaches. See, e.g., Mary Beth Marklein,
Colleges are Textbook Cases of Cybersecurity Breaches, USA TODAY, Aug. 2, 2006, at A-I
(discussing over a dozen external security breaches occurring during the summer of 2006).
Additionally, a different type of external security breach-loss of P11 by an unrelated delivery
service-is frequently reported in the popular press. See e.g., Susan E. Peterson, Borrowers Warned
ofPossibleSecurity Breach, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 1,2006, at D-2 (discussing a security
breach that occurred when the U.S. Postal Service lost tapes containing the PII (including social
security numbers, names, and student loan account numbers) of 188,000 individuals); Lazarus,
supra note 125 (discussing a data tape containing PII on over 300,000 certified public accountants
that was lost in transit by FedEx).
167. See, e.g., David Litterick, Thousands Hit by US. Identity Theft, DAILY TELEGRAPH
(London), Feb. 24, 2005, at 35. Litterick details the ChoicePoint security breach in the following
manner:
ChoicePoint, a data warehousing company, is facing a raft of lawsuits after it
admitted that thieves, apparently using identities already stolen, created what
appeared to be legitimate debt-collecting and cheque-cashing businesses seeking
ChoicePoint's services. They then opened 50 accounts and received volumes of
data on consumers, including names, addresses, social security numbers and credit
reports.
Id. ChoicePoint is a data broker, "founded in 1997 as part of a spin-off of Equifax Inc. [that] has
19 billion public records in its database, including motor-vehicle registrations, license and deed
transfers, military records, names, addresses, credit records and Social Security numbers."
ChoicePoint Breach Worse than First Reported, CONSUMERAFFAIRS.COM, Feb. 22, 2005,
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ChoicePoint lost control of the driver's license and social security numbers
of more than 145,000 individuals nationwide as e-thieves, posing as small
business owners, requested and obtained this information directly from the
company. 6 ' Aside from the headline cases such as ChoicePoint, many
smaller instances of external security breaches are common and each
passing year is lamented as being more dangerous for e-commerce
participants than the previous twelve month period.' 69
C. U.S. Law OperatingInside the Company
The U.S. legal system is trying to catch up to the e-threats targeting PH
at the inside-the-company stage. For instance, some states prohibit
phishing"7° while others require companies to promptly notify affected
http://www.consumeraffairs.com/news04/2005/choicepointworse. html. See also PressRelease:
ChoicePoint Reports Revenue of$241 Millionfor the Second QuarterReflecting Continued Strong
CustomerDemand, ChoicePoint.com, July 20,2006, http://www.choicepointasia.com/choicepoint/
news.nsf/printview/920949876e82da3f85257 1a70077ec8a?Open Document. Press Release reports
that:
Legal expenses and other professional fees related to the previously disclosed
fraudulent data access of S1.0 million ($0.6 million net of taxes) were incurred by
the Company during the second quarter of 2006. The Company continues to
estimate a total pretax expense of between $2 and $4 million for the full year
2006, exclusive of any potential settlements.
Id.
168. See Bill Husted, ChoicePoint's Recovery, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 12, 2006, at QI
(discussing the security breach and the remedies implemented by ChoicePoint after the breach).
169. See, e.g., Jon Swartz, 2005 Worst YearforBreaches of ComputerSecurity, USATODAY,
Dec. 29, 2005 (stating that "[a]t least 130 reported breaches have exposed more than 55 million
Americans to potential ID theft [in 2005]. Security experts warn that wayward personal data, such
as Social Security and credit card numbers, could end up in the hands of criminals and feed a
growing problem").
170. See, e.g., New York Anti-Phishing Act of 2006, N.Y. CLS Gen. Bus. § 390-b(3) (2007)
(prohibiting e-mails that deceptively solicit PIH from New York residents). See alsoN. Y Laws Turn
Privacy Triple Play, CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES L. REP., June 28, 2006, at 3 (discussing three
consumer privacy laws enacted by the New York state legislature, including the Anti-Phishing Act
of 2006). Additionally, some Internet Service Providers are suing people operating phishing web
sites on their networks. See, e.g., AOL, Cyota Partner in Anti-Phishing Campaign, Globes
(online)--Israel's Business Area, Apr. 20, 2005.
America Online today announced a major new initiative to combat
"phishing"--the practice of using fraudulent e-mail and fake web sites to solicit
sensitive personal information from users. As part of the campaign, America
Online has partnered with Cytoa to help identify and block access to suspected
phishing sites through a 24-hour-a-day, 7-day-a-week monitoring process. AOL
and Cytoa are also working to evaluate and deploy other joint technologies and
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residents when such companies experience serious security breaches. 7 '
Little synergy stems from these regulations, however, as most are
narrowly-targeted at individual e-threats and provide gaping holes through
which different e-threats can cause problems. Although some of these
holes are filled with industry self-regulation efforts and other industry
initiatives, other gaps remain uncovered allowing companies to ignore the
e-threats if protecting against them becomes too expensive or too tedious.
Unsurprisingly, because they are not forced to do so, contemporary ecommerce companies are not rapidly jumping on the self-regulatory
bandwagon or drafting comprehensive security policies to protect PHI they
obtain, process and store. Finally, the provisions contained in the laws that
do exist vary widely from state to state. This patchwork regulatory
framework makes it more difficult for companies to comply with the law
and for the public to frilly understand the implication of these regulations
on their PH once they have submitted such information online.
This current regulatory framework governing inside the company ethreats can be improved by creating a national standard via a federal
statute directly targeting each of the major e-threats at this stage. To make
this happen, the federal law introduced in Part III of this Article should be
drafted to contain a second substantive section designed to protect valuable
PH once it is out of the hands of the individuals it identifies and into the
hands of its collectors-at the inside of the company stage. Requiring the
mandatory posting of an electronic, multilayered, standardized, and
readable privacy policy is a fair compromise between businesses'
commercial interests and an individual's information privacy interests
when PIH has yet to be submitted into cyberspace. However, a privacy
policy requirement, in and of itself, is insufficient to protect PH once it
changes hands and travels into a company's databases. Once inside the
share information in order to better detect and respond to phishing attacks....
AOL stated that it is also working internally and with other partners to identify
and block phishing sites.
Id.
171. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Breach ofPersonal Information Notification Act, PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 712 (2005) (requiring companies to notify Pennsylvania residents if their PII has been lost or
stolen). As for PII security policies, the law does not require companies to create any type of
security policy. In fact, "[tjhe vast majority of companies issue a security policy only because their
lawyers tell them to... It typically gets buried in an employee handbook and is never seen again."
See Lazarus, supranote 125 (quoting a Silicon Valley privacy consultant). It took the Department
of Veterans Affairs three weeks from the date of the laptop theft to disclose the security breach to
the public. Id. To combat this trend, current laws in thirty-four states require companies and public
institutions to report on security breaches. See Marklein, supranote 166 (stating that "[b]usinesses,
non-profits and public institutions in 34 states are required to notify consumers when personal data
have been compromised.").
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company, even the most diligent consumer cannot control whether the
company experiences a security snafu or a rouge company employee
stealing and selling PII on the open market. Therefore, this second section
of the proposed federal law needs to be more comprehensive and require
more of covered companies than the section dealing with front door ethreats.
The additional provisions that are necessary at this stage should be
specifically designed to protect against the e-threats of data mining,
security breaches (both internally- and externally-created), and phishing.
Similar to the front door regulatory policy, all regulations in this section
must be designed as regulatory ceilings. This preemption of state and local
laws will create a needed national standard that eliminates state-by-state
variations, helps e-commerce companies comply, and increases the
chances that the American public can better understand the law and its
privacy implications.
At this stage, a regulatory ceiling is a fair compromise between ecommerce efficiency and information privacy because PH is partially
within the control of the person it identifies (submitters may have the
opportunity to opt-out, amend, or delete their PII from company databases)
and partially in the hands of the company (submitters have their PII stored
in inaccessible company databases that are subject to use and sale).
Therefore, individuals are able to take a bit of personal responsibility over
their Internet activities if they feel that a company is mishandling their PII.
On the other hand, individuals can only exercise this responsibility if the
company allows them to opt-out or amend and delete their PH before it is
sold on the open market or otherwise distributed. Therefore, effective
regulations at this stage of the PH processing cycle must require more than
the mere posting of a compliant, multilayered, standardized and readable
privacy policy. More specifically, this section of the proposed law will
deal with the inside-the-company e-threats, in the following manner.
1. Data Mining & Phishing
This sub-section of the proposed law will require companies to disclose
two things in their privacy policies and on all customer account
registration pages: (1) whether they will ever seek to obtain account or
personal information electronically and (2) their data mining practices.
Therefore, web site visitors will have two places to familiarize themselves
with such practices and these notifications will help users understand the
implications of submitting their PH as well as combat the effectiveness of
phishing attacks because of this increased consumer awareness.
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More specifically, companies should be required to state whether they
will ask a visitor to add or amend PH through an e-mail correspondence
and, if so, what visitors should look for to ensure that the request is
authentic. They also should be required to detail the data mining
procedures they utilize and how the end results of such data mining are
implemented into their business strategy. If a company elicits P11 via
electronic correspondence or if a company conducts data mining then it
must accurately disclose this information in the PERSONAL INFORMATION
SECURITY (phishing policies) PERSONAL INFORMATION USES (data mining
policies) required heading in its privacy policy.
2. Security Breaches
On the security breach front, this section of the proposed law will set
a national standard requiring companies experiencing a major security
breach to notify affected customers within a certain period of time. Under
these provisions, companies will be required to notify any visitor who had
PII compromised through an internal or external security breach that
specific pieces of PH were compromised and how the visitor can begin to
rectify the situation. Today, residents in thirty-four states 7 2 are required
to receive such notifications while residents in non-covered states remain
unprotected. Some states require the compromise of the specific
information to put the individual it identifies at some sort of risk before
notification is mandatory,' 73 while others require notification upon breach
alone, regardless of the risk presented by the breach. 74
' Risk-based statutes
protect less privacy but also allow companies some ability to remedy the
problem before spending financial and political capital on a breach
notification. However, a national standard will remedy this problem and
172. See StatePIRG Summary ofState SecurityFreeze andSecurityBreach NotificationLaws,
(last
visited July 30, 2007) (demonstrating that thirty-four states had enacted security beach notification
legislation as of July 18, 2006).
173. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105(d) (2006) (requiring notification only after a
reasonable investigation and determination that no "reasonable likelihood of harm" is posed to
customers whose PII was compromised).
174. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 12-B-102 (2006). Companies conducting business in
Delaware and owning or licensing PII
STATE PIRG CONSUMER PROTECTION, http://www.pirg.org/consumer/credit/statelaws.htm

shall give notice to a resident of Delaware of any breach of the security of the
system immediately following the discovery of a breach in the security ofpersonal
information of the Delaware resident whose unencrypted personal information
was, or is reasonably believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorized person.
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make it easier for companies to comply-there being only one regulation
on this area instead of thirty-four. E-consumers also will benefit from
these provisions because a national standard, and the corresponding
consistency, will make it easier for all Americans to understand the events
that will occur once a security breach occurs-rather than just the
consumers in the states where notification laws exist. Additionally,
customers will be able to rest assured that the company will take their
information privacy more seriously than it has in the past.175

175. The following are suggestions companies can implement to better protect against security
breaches, according to Mark Melodia, an attorney working in the area of information privacy:
1.

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Review customer and investor communications and don't overpromise on
privacy. Businesses that promise too much are setting themselves up for a
breach of contract lawsuit;
Inventory the personal information you keep and share;
Assign responsibility for data security to the highest levels. Make data
security a priority for the board and senior management;
Consider the widest practical use of encryption. State security breach laws
don't require disclosure of stolen data if it is encrypted;
Destroy documents with no remaining business use;
Train and certify employees on data security;
Restrict access to personal information, especially Social Security numbers;
secure electronic devices;
Implement an incident response plan. If someone loses a company laptop,
who takes action?;
Audit compliance regularly; and
Review security breach insurance coverage.

Patricia Sabatini, New State Law Will Require Companies to Notify Customers of Data Security
Breaches, PITTSBURG POST-GAZETTE, June 13, 2006, at D-1 (discussing the advisement of
companies on dealing with the new Pennsylvania security breach notification law. This advice
would also be applicable to similar federal security breach legislation). With this federal security
breach notification law in place companies will be encouraged to take PH1 protection more seriously
to avoid the unpleasant notification requirements. In fact, protection lessons may be gleaned from
the practices of company HR departments which are undertaking effective measures to protect the
PHI of their employees. Some of these tactics encompass the: (1) creation of a PII-protection policy,
(2) limitation on the amount of people with access to PII (3) creation of an environment with PIH
is physically protected by a locked file cabinet or a password-protected database, (4) encryption of
PHI when it is stored and transmitted either internally or externally and (5) limitation of the amount
of PHI on company documents (i.e., truncate a social security number on a customer invoice or
marketing list). See, e.g., How HR is Coping, supranote 123 (citing a HRfocus Employee Privacy
survey finding that over 96% percent of the companies surveyed limited the number of people with
access to employees' PIH and also locked file cabinets and office doors where such information is
stored, but only half of the respondents had a formal PI1-protection policy and just over 30%
encrypted stored data).
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More specifically, companies experiencing an internal or external
security breach where any piece of PH is compromised-lost or
stolen-and cannot be recovered within a 48-hour period must notify the
affected customer(s) via e-mail or postal mail if the company has a
reasonable belief that customers will experience a financial loss or
injury.'7 6 This notification must occur within fifteen business days from
the date the security breach was discovered and detail exactly what pieces
of PH were compromised and how the customer should protect against
various e-threats such as identity theft.'77
Specifically excluded are any requirements for a company to
implement any type of security policy. 7 8 However, companies will pay,
both from a financial and a goodwill standpoint, by choosing to ignore this
type of policy implementation. Additionally, companies will not be
required to provide credit monitoring services to affected customers
because the very early notification requirements-fifteen business days
from the date of breach discovery-will give individuals enough time to
monitor their accounts.
In addition to the thirty-four state security breach notification laws,
numerous security breach laws have been floating around the U.S. Capitol,
but none has materialized into a serious candidate to become a
successfully-enacted bill. 79 Five Congressional committees-two in the
House of Representatives and three in the Senate-have recently discussed

176. If more than 100,000 people are affected or if the notification would cost more than
$100,000, then all notifications may occur via e-mail and the posting of the breach on the
company's homepage for thirty days and announced in the national media periodically over the
same period. If the breach affects more than 500 people, the company would also have to notify the
national credit bureaus. This type of notice is referred to as substitute notice and is common in state
security breach notification laws. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-105(e)(3)(A) (2006)
(providing for substitute notice if notification costs exceed $250,000, over 500,000 individuals
would need to be notified or the company does not possess sufficient contact information).
177. Companies will not be forced to provide credit monitoring services to affected customers
in notification situations as the early notification requirements (fifteen days from the date of breach
discovery) will give the customers enough time to monitor their account activities.
178. Contrary to the federal law proposed in this Article, Arkansas requires companies to
implement and maintain "reasonable security procedures and practices appropriate to the nature of
the information to protect the personal information from unauthorized access, destruction, use,
modification, or disclosure." ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-104(b) (2005).
179. See, e.g., Washington Wire, WALL ST. J. ABSTRACTS, Aug. 12, 2005, at A-4 (stating that

the "Senate Commerce Committee approved bill before recess requiring companies to inform
consumers of security breaches, but Senate Banking and Judiciary Committees are also vying for
jurisdiction over identity-theft legislation.").
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such legislation"' ° and approximately twenty bills were introduced with
none coming to a floor vote.' 81 The four most prominent bills would all
preempt conflicting state laws 182 but differ in their definitions of what
constitutes a security breach, 183 which customers must 1be
notified,' 84 the
86
18
timing of such notice ' and their enforcement options.
The third substantive section of this proposed federal law will deal with
the serious e-threats attacking PH at a company's back door. Before
delving into these final provisions, however, the beginning sections of Part
V will identify both the internally- and externally-created e-threats at this
final stage of the PH processing cycle.
V. E-THREATS AT THE BACK DOOR (P11 DISSEMINATION)

Companies that obtained PH for the purpose of executing transactions
and creating internal marketing profiles recently have discovered the value

180. See, e.g., Kirk Nahra, Federal Security Breach Legislation Progresses (But Slowly),
AND FIELDING, LLP: NEWSLETTERS, Nov. 2005, http://www.wileyrein.com/
publication newsletters.cfm?id= 0&publicationID=12393.
181. See Financial Data Protection Act, H.R. 3997, 109th Cong. (lst Sess. 2005) [hereinafter
H.R. 3997], Data Accountability and Trust Act, H.R. 4127, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005)
[hereinafter H.R. 4127], Identity Theft Protection Act, S. 1408, 109th Cong. (1st Sess. 2005)
[hereinafter S. 1408]; Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005, S. 1789, 109th Cong. (1 st
Sess. 2005) [hereinafter S. 1789]. See also Satish M. Kini & James T. Shreve, Notice
Requirements: Common Themes and Differences in the Regulatory andLegislative Responses to
Data Security Breaches, 10 N.C. BANKING INST. 87, 103 (Mar. 2006) (discussing each of these
bills).
182. H.R. 3997, supra note 181, § 2, H.R. 4127,supranote 181, § 6, S. 1408, supranote 181,
§ 7; S. 1789, supranote 181, § 404.
183. For example, the Financial Data Protection Act of 2005 considers a security breach to
have occurred when personal information has been acquired and can be used to commit a financial
fraud. H.R. 3997, supra note 181, § 2. However, the Data Accountability and Trust Act defines as
security breach as an unauthorized acquisition of personal information providing a "reasonable
basis to conclude that there is a significant risk of identity theft to the individual to whom the
personal information relates." H.R. 4127, supra note 181, § 5(1).
184. For example, the Financial Data Protection Act of 2005 requires that the Secret Service
be notified in addition to the affected customers. H.R. 3997, supra note 181, § 2. The Identity Theft
Protection Act, on the other hand, requires notice to affected customers, the FTC and the most
prominent consumer reporting agencies (as long as over 1,000 customers are affected). S. 1408,
supra note 181, § 3(a)(1) & 3(b).
185. The Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005 requires some forms of notice to be
made within thirty days. S. 1789, supra note 181, § 421(d)(2).
186. The Data Accountability and Trust Act assigns the FTC as the major enforcer of its
provisions while the Personal Data Privacy and Security Act of 2005 assigns this role to the U.S.
Attorney General. H.R. 4127, supra note 181, § 4; S. 1789, supra note 181, § 428.
WILEY REIN
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of this information on the open market.' 87 In fact, the PH data trade has
spawned entire industries comprised of commercial data brokers devoted
to the compilation and fee-based dissemination of PH. 88 For under $50,
virtually anyone can buy a comprehensive and accurate PH profile
pertaining to virtually anyone else. The typical purchasers of this
information range from business entities to individuals such as private
investigators to governmental agencies.' 89 Surrounded by this flourishing
personal data economy, today's e-commerce companies are faced with a
serious operational dilemma. They can either: (1) destroy P11, (2) retain PH
for internal purposes only and risk the loss of a cutting-edge profit stream
and raising the ire of shareholders seeking higher earnings, or (3)
disseminate the PH records into the marketplace for a fee, generate
revenue and lose control of valuable information entrusted to the company
by its customers. 190
187. See, e.g., Jeanne Sahadi, Your Identity... For Sale: From Credit Bureaus to Grocers to
Unscrupulous Brokers, There's a Healthy Trade in Your Good Name, CNNMONEY.COM, May 9,
2005, http://money.cnn.com/2005/05/09/pf/security info_profit/index.htm (stating that the data
trade is a multi-billion-dollar industry and that "there's a lot of money to be made off of your good
name").
188. Some of the largest commercial data brokers are: ChoicePoint, http://www.choicepoint.
com (last visited May 28,2006), Acxiom, http://www.acxiom.com (last visited May 28,2006) and
Lexis/Nexis, http://www.lexisnexis.com (last visited May 28, 2006). To show the profit potential
of the major commercial data brokers, Acxiom earned $44.6 million of off revenue of $344 million.
Acxiom, Acxiom Reports Fourth-Quarter, Fiscal-YearResults, May 17, 2006, http://www.acxiom.
com/default.aspx?ID=2946.
189. See, e.g., Nancy Libin, Perspective: The Anxious New Dawn of Cybersnooping, CNET
NEWS.COM, May 3,2006, http://news.com.com/The+anxious+new+dawn+of+cybersnooping/20101028 3-6067598.html?tag=item (stating that federal government agencies, such as the Social
Security Administration, the Justice Department, the Department of Homeland Security and the
State Department, have collectively purchased over $30 million worth of PII on American citizens
that was collected by private entities). These agencies have found a loophole in the Privacy Act of
1974 that requires governmental agencies to follow strict protocols when collecting and storing PII
on American citizens but not if they merely purchase this same information from private entities.
Id.
190. See, e.g., Robert Gellman, Privacy: Finding a BalancedApproach to Consumer Options,
Center for Democracy & Technology, http://www.cdt.org/privacy/ccp/consentchoice4.shtml (last
visited July 30, 2007) (discussing the importance of finding the appropriate balance between
record-keepers and record-subjects whereby certain circumstances-such as "law enforcement,
national security, public health and economic growth"-record-keepers to put PII to secondary uses
regardless of consumer consent while other circumstances require record-subjects to control
dissemination of PHI for secondary uses), Pricilla Regan, The Role of Consent in Information
Privacy Protection, CENTER FOR DEMOCRACY AND TECHNOLOGY, http://www.cdt.org/
privacy/ccp/consentchoice2.pdf(last visited July 31,2007) (arguing that secondary uses of PII have
created a slippery slope where PII is now used for purposes close enough to the original purpose
of its collection and this practice is inconsistent with fair information practice principles) and Larry
Ponemon, The Seven Deadly Sins ofldentity Management, COMPUTERWORLD.COM, May 20, 2005,
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If a company chooses the dissemination option--exchanging PH for
money through its back door-it has two primary alternatives. First, PII
may be disseminated to third parties with restrictions on its future use and
its further dissemination. 1 ' This arrangement may, for instance, allow for
the purchaser to utilize the P11 to market to the person the PI1 identifies but
not to sell the information to anyone else. The second alternative would
allow for the purchased PII to be disseminated to third parties unrelated to
the initial purchaser and with no restrictions on any future use and further
dissemination of the information. Under this second option, the PII is
released into a digital environment where it becomes virtually
irretrievable.' 92
Today, state and federal law does not restrict companies from
disseminating the PH they have collected. The law is also silent as to
whether companies must restrict the future uses of the PII if they choose
dissemination. This silence strengthens e-threats targeting PII at the back
door as companies set their own dissemination policies that may or may
not revolve around P1I security. 193 As may be expected, the most serious
e-threats arise when PII is released without restrictions and to unrelated
entities. At this point, the data is outside of the control of the individual it
identifies as well as the company that likely promised to protect it.
Available now to anyone armed with only a modem, computer (or a
computerized device such as a cellular phone) and a small amount of cash,
this information may be snatched up and utilized for sinister purposes such
as criminal acts, identity theft and/or spain. Because the law does not
adequately protect consumers from these back door e-threats, people find
http://www.computerworld.corn/securitytopics/security/story/ 0,10801,101893,00.html?source=x73
(arguing that companies face a dilemma between the desire to collect vast amounts of PlI and the
expectations that customers do not expect that their information will be put to secondary purposes).
191. See, e.g., Editorial, Wells Fargo and Privacy, S.F. CHRoN., Dec. 23, 2002, at A-20
(stating that the Chairman and CEO of Wells Fargo "would support legislation to offer consumers
more control over the secondary use of their personal financial information" as long as the
legislation is made on the federal, rather than the state, level).
192. See, e.g., SoccerTutor.com, Terms and Conditions-Does Soccertutor.com, Ltd. Sell my
Personal Information to Other Companies, http://www.soccertutor.com/termsandconditions.asp
(last visited July 31, 2007) (stating, in the privacy policy for this company, that PII collected may
be used for secondary uses such as marketing conducted by unrelated third parties unless the
consumer affirmatively opts-out of such secondary uses).
193. Electronic Privacy Information Center, In the Matter of Intelligent e-Commerce, Inc.,
Complaint and Request for Injunction, -Investigation and for Other Relief, http://www.epic.org/
privacy/iei/ftccomplaint.html (last visited July 31, 2007) (stating that "the release of [PII] without
a consumer's knowledge can lead to devastating results, including identity theft and fraud." This
statement was made in a complaint against Intelligent E-Commerce, Inc. (an Internet investigative
service/PII provider) that was filed with the FTC by the Electronic Privacy Information Center or
EPIC).
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themselves trying to restore their identity and protect their personal
information after an attack has occurred. Although the media plays down
this restoration process as a mere annoyance where the credit card
companies take on most of the risk, in actuality, adequate recovery from
the ill effects of back door e-threats often becomes a major hardship and
costs precious money and time.
This part discusses three primary e-threats targeting PH at this back
door stage: (1) unverified information requests, (2) identity theft, and (3)
spam. It argues that the federal law proposed previously must be
supplemented by a third substantive section. This third section must be
designed as a regulatory floor instead of a regulatory ceiling, and it must
place tight restrictions on the dissemination of PII via a company's back
door. As with the other two categories of e-threats, some of the most
prominent back door threats are created internally while others are created
externally.
A. Internally-Created"Back Door" Threats
Unless stored PH is compromised and disseminated by criminals during
a network hack or other form of security breach, 94 companies are the
disseminators ofpersonal information into cyberspace. This is problematic
because companies across the United States possess hundreds of millions
of pieces of personal information in powerful customer and marketing
databases. These databases allow for the efficient and simple transfer of
such information to third parties. These third parties can then download the
information directly into their powerful databases in an instant.
Although companies may not realize it at the time of sale (or may not
care in the first place), disseminated PH is extremely vulnerable as the
information is irretrievable and can be instantaneously transferred to
anyone, anywhere across the globe. Although the initial purchaser may
intend to use the information legally, a secondary or tertiary purchaser may
utilize this information for malicious purposes. All the while, the person
the PH identifies will have no idea that her PH is even in circulation. Such
uninhibited dissemination also allows a wide variety of entities and
individuals to create digital dossiers on the vast majority of the public.
These dossiers are then sold on the open market and more information
surfaces in cyberspace. To help protect against such vulnerabilities,
companies must be required to guard against back door e-threats targeting
information that they disseminate; the most prominent e-threat of this
nature occurs in the form of backdoor pretexting.
194. See supra Parts IV.A.2, IV.B.2 (discussing both internal and security threats occurring
at the inside-the-company stage).
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Back-door pretexting occurs when a company official or employee,
either negligently or knowingly, disseminates PH to someone assuming an
identity or otherwise seeking to obtain the information for improper
purposes. Back-door pretexting is similar to front-door pretexting in the
sense that an individual utilizes fraudulent means to obtain PH.' 9 5 The
difference is that with front-door pretexting the thief obtains the
information from the consumer while back-door pretexting involves
obtaining the information from a company that has collected and stored
such information. Back-door pretexters are looking to obtain pieces of P11
in order to complete an investigation, serve a summons or locate an
individual. The problem is that the pretexter does not reveal his true
identity or the true reasons for such information requests. Back door
pretexting is a bit different from identity theft because an individual's
identity is not stolen by the pretexter; rather, pretexters look to obtain a
key piece of PH for some specific reason unrelated to identity theft. An
easy way to remember this distinction is that pretexters generally lie to
obtain PH to complete a pre-assigned task more often than they steal such
information for their own aggrandizement while identity thieves generally
steal PH for their own aggrandizement more often than they lie to obtain
such information to complete a pre-assigned task.
An infamous example of back-door pretexting occurred in the Rebecca
Schaeffer murder case. Schaeffer, a twenty-one year old actress, was shot
several times at her apartment by a stalker who located her home address
by retaining a private investigator. The investigator obtained her address
by paying a fee to California's motor vehicles agency-an organization
that did not make an effort to determine why the information was being
requested.196 Regardless, the information was obtained for an improper
purpose and should not have been released in the first place. In response
to this back-door pretexting, Congress passed the Driver's Privacy
Protection Act (DPPA).' 97 The DPPA subsequently was challenged on
federalism grounds based on the idea that individual states have the
195. Back-door pretexting is similar to front-door pretexting in the sense that an individual
utilizes fraudulent means to obtain PII. The difference is that with front-door pretexting the thief
obtains the information from the consumer while back-door pretexting involves obtaining the
information from a company that has collected and stored the information. See supra Part III.B.1
(discussing the e-threat of front-door pretexting).
196. See Steve Lash, Court Upholds Law that Protects Privacy of Driver's License Data,
HOUSTON CHRON., Jan. 13, 2000, at A-6 (reporting that states were selling PIH to the public before
the enactment of the Driver's Privacy Protection Act).
197. DRIVER'S PRIVACY PROTECTION ACT OF 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (2000) [hereinafter
DPPA]. The law forbids a state to disclose driver's information such as a name, address, telephone
number, or photograph although states may still disclose accident information and other driving
history.
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authority to regulate issues intrastate commerce such as state driving
licenses.'98 The U.S. Supreme Court, however, unanimously upheld the
law and it is still in force today. 99 Unfortunately, the protections of the
DPPA only apply to state motor vehicle agencies and not to private entities
disseminating PII, leaving the major source of PH dissemination
unregulated.0 0
As demonstrated above, this internally created e-threat of disseminating
PII for improper uses can be deadly serious. Although the real bad actors
are the people requesting the information by posing as someone else or by
disguising their proper purpose, companies are at fault for not at least
verifying the identity of such requestors. Once this information is
purposefully disseminated outside of its control, the company has
subjected an individual's sense of security-both financial security and
personal security-to potential problems. The next section will discuss
externally-created e-threats that stem directly from the dissemination of
PH through a company's back door.
B. Externally-Created"Back Door" Threats
It is important to note that the two major externally-created ethreats-identity theft and spam-primarily occur only after a company
disseminates PH into the open market. If companies chose not to
disseminate PH for a fee then the primary way that such information would
be available to identity thieves and spammers would be from some type of
internal or external security breach. For better or worse, companies today
do disseminate PII into cyberspace making the discussion of these two
external back door e-threats very important.
1. Identity Theft
Identity theft occurs when PH is obtained and utilized for unlawful
purposes without permission from the individual the information
identifies. 20 ' These unlawful purposes can range between applying for a
198. See Reno v. Condon, 528 U.S. 141 (2000) (arguing, in the unanimous decision written
by Chief Justice Rehnquist, that the law was constitutional in that it only required state employees
to refrain from selling PI and not to participate in a large federal program). See also Lash, supra
note 196 (reiterating the argument of the states that the federal government could not
constitutionally require state employees "to participate in a federal privacy program.").
199. See Reno, 528 U.S. at 141 (stating that the DPPA was upheld over a state federalism
challenge).
200. 18 U.S.C. § 2721 (a) (limiting coverage to "a State department ofmotor vehicles, and any
officer, employee, or contractor thereof.").
201. FTC, About Identity Theft, http://ftc.gov/hcp/edu/ microsites/idthefi/consumers/aboutidentity-theft.html [hereinafter FTC, Identity Theft Web Site] (last visited July 31, 2007) (defining
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credit card under an assumed identity to posing as someone else to gain an
employment opportunity.2 "2 The idea is that another person's identity
allows the thief easy access to money or to a clean police record. The
fallout from these activities may cause the identity theft victim to incur a
monetary loss, negative credit reputation and, potentially, criminal
record.2"3 Although this e-threat preceded the Internet in offline forms such
identity theft and providing comprehensive information intended to keep consumers from becoming
victimized by identity theft). Other definitions of identity theft are expressed a bit differently; for
instance, the e-threat has been defined as "the appropriation of someone else's personal or financial
identity to commit fraud or theft." George R. Milne et al., Consumers 'Protection of OnlinePrivacy
and Identity, 38 J. CONSUMER AFF. 2, 217 (2004). This definition is incomplete, in my opinion,
because it omits the concept of the identity being compromised without the permission of the
person the information identifies; this knowledge aspect is crucial to the definition because
complicity in the identity theft would omit the victimization aspect of the crime. Sometimes P1I is
stolen offline by fraudulently obtaining paper records (pretexting) or household mail, through an
electronic phishing attach, via a fraudulent scanning device attached to an ATM machine
(skimming) or in the trash (dumpster diving). FTC, Identity Theft Web Site, About Identity Theft,
http://www.consumer.gov/idtheft/conabout. htm (last visited May 29, 2006). This is in contrast
to identity fraud which includes identity theft as defined above as well as cases where a fictitious
identity is created to commit unlawful activities. See, e.g., David Lacey & Suresh Cuganesan, The
Role of Organizationsin Identity Theft Response: The Organization-IndividualVictim Dynamic,
38 J. CONSUMERAFF. 2,245 (2004) (demonstrating that customers are injured only by identity theft
while companies can be injured by both identity theft and identity fraud). Therefore, "identity theft
is a narrower subset of identity fraud." Id.
202. See FTC, Consumer Fraud and Identity Theft Complaint Data: January-December
2005, 3 (Jan. 2006) [hereinafter Consumer FraudandIdentity Theft Complaint Data].According
to FTC data from 2005,
[c]redit card fraud (26%) was the most common form of reported identity theft
followed by phone or utilities fraud (18%), bank fraud (17%) [generally in the
form of an electronic funds transfer to a fraudulent account], and employment
fraud (12%). Other significant categories of identity theft reported by victims were
government documents/benefits fraud (9%) and loan fraud (5%).
Id.
203. See, e.g., Lacey & Cuganesan, supra note 201, at 244. Lacey & Cuganesan argue that
other consequences are the
ability to secure employment, obtain goods and services on credit, travel freely,
and participate in the wider society in a generally unencumbered fashion. In fact,
merely seeking to reestablish an identity can result in ongoing denial of services
for the victim, such as access to existing accounts and execution of existing
contracts.
Id.Many of these negative consequences occur when the identity thief fails to pay for the charges
incurred under the false identity and the creditors send the accounts to collections where collection
agencies then notify credit agencies. See, e.g., George R. Milne, How Well Do Consumers Protect
Themselves from Identity Theft?, 37 J. CONSUMER AFF.2, 388 (2003) (stating that "[t]he billing
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as "opening new credit card accounts, taking out loans in the victim's
name, and stealing funds from existing checking, savings, or investment
accounts.., the latest vehicle for perpetrating identity theft can be found
2 In 2005, more than 250,000 complaints
on the 'Information Highway. ,,,
of Identity Theft were logged by the FTC's Consumer Sentinel database,
a number only slightly higher than the nearly 247,000 complaints received
in 2004 205-leading some commentators to discredit identity theft as a true
threat.20 6 Complaints filed with the FTC alone, however, may not paint a
statement is often diverted to another billing address so that the victim is not aware charges have
been made and payment is overdue, which results in a bad credit rating."). Identity thieves have
been known to utilize the stolen identity during an arrest and, subsequently miss the court date,
causing an arrest warrant to be issued in the victim's name. See FTC, ID Theft: What It 'sAllAbout,
4 (June 2005) [hereinafter What It's All About].
204. Hemphill, supranote 65, at 51. Hemphill quotes the chief executive officer of an institute
studying economic crime stating that the Internet has
allowed the identity thief to obtain personal identifiers of multiple persons
quicker; to access higher quality fake identification tools (driver's licenses, birth
certificates, Social Security cards, etc.) and, through e-commerce, to render the
credit transaction completely impersonal. The potential harm caused by an identity
thief using the Internet is exponential.
Id.; see alsoMilne et al., supranote 20 1, at 219 (stating that "[w]hile identity theft has traditionally
occurred through offline methods, online data collection of stolen identities can be easier and more
efficient for thieves, with new approaches and scams being created and implemented under the
cloak of electronic anonymity.") (internal citations omitted).
205. See FTC, Identity Theft Victim Complaint Data: Figures and Trends 1, Dec. 31, 2005
[hereinafter FTC, Identity Theft Data 2005], http://ftc.gov/bcp/edu/microsites/idtheft/downloads/
clearinghouse 2005.pdf (presenting detailed figures and statistics on the number and type of
identity theft complaints received as well as a state-by-state analysis from January 1 through
December 31, 2005); Consumer Fraudand Identity Theft Complaint Data,supra note 202, at 3
(reporting that the FTC received "over 685,000 ...complaints during calendar year 2005--63%
[or 431,550] represented [general online or offline] fraud and 37% [or 253,450] were identity theft
complaints."). In 2005, "[c]onsumers reported losses from [general fraud and identity theft] of more
than $680 million." Id. at 2. This data is stored with and correlated by the Consumer Sentinel-a
complaint database that is "developed and maintained by the FTC" that collects consumer fraud
and identity theft from the FTC and 150 other organizations and "makes it available to law
enforcement partners across the nation and throughout the world for use in their investigations."
Id. Complaints to the FTC can be anonymously filed either online (at http://www.ftc.gov) or via
a toll-free phone number (1-877-FTC-HELP). Press Release, FTC, Press Release: FTC Releases
Top 10 Consumer Fraud Complaint Categories (Jan. 25, 2006). The online complaint form is five
pages in length and allows victims to describe their complaint, including a chance to describe the
identity thief! FTC, ID Theft Complaint Input Form, https://rn.ftc.gov/pls/dod/widtpubl$
.startup?ZORGCODE=PU03.
206. See Lacey & Cuganesan, supranote 201, at 244 (lamenting that "evidence indicates that
identity theft is becoming increasingly attractive for perpetrators vis-A-vis other forms of crime. In
the United States, for example, identity theft is described as growing at a rate of 30% per year, with
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complete picture of identity theft as a 2003 FTC report found that more
than 9.9 million people were victims of identity theft in a twelve-month
period.2 °7 Other sources claim that more than 7 million people became
victims of identity theft between July 2002 and July 2003.208 If accurate,
a victim's list hovering near 10 million people would place identity theft
into the category of a serious e-threat.2 °9
In the twenty-first-century Internet environment, identity thieves have
a much easier time-oftentimes operating online from the comfort of their
own homes across the globe-piecing together false identities because of
the easy access to PH from data broker entities,2 10 companies selling such
its losses estimated at reaching $8 billion by 2005 [according to a report issued by the Florida
Supreme Court (see Statewide GrandJury Report: Identity Theft in Florida,FirstInterim Report
of the 16th Statewide GrandJury, Case No.: SC 01-1095 (2002)].").
207. FTC, Identity Theft Survey Report, 2003, http://www.ftc.gov/os/2003/09/
synovatereport.pdf [hereinafter Identity Theft Survey] (finding, in a report by Synovate that was
commissioned by the FTC, that the loss to consumers from these 9.9 million cases of identity theft
was estimated around five billion dollars).
208. See National Online Consumer Protection Association, Identity Theft: Fact [sic] and
Statistics,http://www.nocpa.org/identitytheft/facts.html (last visited July 31,2007) (citing a Gartner
Research and Harris Interactive study on identity theft and claims that, as of July 2003, identity
theft was occurring 19,178 times per day, 799 times per hour, and 13.3 times per minute).
209. See, e.g., Jeff Sovem, Stopping Identity Theft, 38 J. CONSUMER AFF. 2, 233-43 (2004)
(stating that "Identity theft ...is a serious consumer problem."), Milne et al., supra note 201, at
217 (stating that "[I]dentity theft.., is one of the fastest growing crimes in the United States and
is increasingly affecting customers' online transactions.") (internal citations omitted); Milne, supra
note 203, at 388 (citing StealingPeople is Wrong; White-CollarCrime; the ldentity-Theft Industry,
Economist, Mar. 8, 2001, at 28-29 (stating that "identity theft ...is one of the fastest-growing
white-collar crimes in the United States.").
210. The identity thief would need only the victim's first and last name, physical address, and
social security number in order to run a background check through a commercial data broker with
such reports revealing even more PII such as the victim's: (1) employment information, (2) credit
accounts listing creditor and account balances, (3) criminal record, and (4) motor vehicle record
including driver's license number. See, e.g., ChoicePoint: ScreenNow: Combined Report,
http://www.employment.screennow.com/hdocs/sample-combined.html (last visited May 29, 2006).
Names are easily obtainable either online or offline through dumpster diving or stealing of mail.
Physical addresses are also easily obtained online through web sites such as www.secret-info.com
where an individual's name and state of residence is enough information to locate address
information. See Secret-Info.com, Property Ownership Information, http://www.secret-info.com/
searchcosts.html (last visited May 29,2006). Additionally, social security numbers maybe obtained
online through web sites such as www.secret-info.com (this site offers to "locate a social security
number" for $20-45 if the seeker provides merely a name or address). Secret-info.com, Locate a
Social Security Number, http://www.secret-info.com/searchcosts.html (last visited May 29,2006).
See also Social Security Numbers are for Sale Online, NEWSMAX.COM WIRES, Apr. 5, 2005,
http://archive.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2005/4/4/155759.shtml (discussing the idea that
social security numbers are still easily obtainable and relatively inexpensive to purchase even after
the security breaches of such information at major commercial data brokers over the past few
years); Milne et al., supranote 201, at 217 (stating that "[b]ecause of its ability to accumulate and
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information, as well as the lax application standards in a world of instant
credit and account approval.2" Companies collecting PH1 substantially
increase the amount of information available to identity thieves when they
disseminate this information into cyberspace."' While credit card
companies and other financial institutions bear most of the financial brunt
from identity theft, l3 victimized consumers spend, on average, thirty hours
"trying to resolve the consequences associated with the theft" 2 4 and some
victims deal with fallout of a much more serious nature.21 5

disseminate vast amounts of information electronically, the Internet may make theft of personal or
financial identity easier.").
211. In fact, customers resent having to show many forms of identification when applying for
credit and companies, not wanting to lose the business, concede, and continue the application
process making identity theft even easier. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 209, at 237.
212. Aside from the dissemination of PII through a company's back door, there are three other
primary ways in which the PII of an online consumer may be obtained by identity thieves: (1) PII
on consumers' personal computers is vulnerable to various e-threats and may be compromised, (2)
the collection of PII by e-commerce companies may be compromised in transit, and (3) PII stored
by companies after collection may be compromised by various e-threats. See Milne et al., supra
note 201, at 219. See infra Part V.C (discussing a way to increase the accountability of businesses
to people about whom they collect PII).
213. See, e.g., Sovem, supranote 209, at 234 (stating that "lenders may suffer losses because
they cannot recover the amounts loaned to thieves. The credit industry seems willing to absorb
these losses, however, because of the benefits that flow from easily available credit.").
214. See Marla Royne Stafford, EditorialPrelude:Identity Theft: Laws, Crimes, and Victims,
38 J. CONSUMER AFF. 2, 202 (2004).
215. See, e.g., Identity Theft Survey, supranote 207. See also Milne, supra note 203, at 388
(stating that "reclaiming one's identity is a lengthy and costly experience."). The story of Stacy
Sullivan reveals the travails of an identity theft victim. See Stacy Sullivan, How I Lost My Good
Name, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17,2000, at A-19. In 1996 a male identity thief utilized Sullivan's Social
Security number to obtain phone service in her name in a city where she had never even visited and
subsequently racked-up thousands of dollars in phone bills. Id. The bills went unpaid and the phone
company sent the account to collections where the collection agency informed the three major
credit bureaus of the delinquency. Id. The resulting negative credit history emerged in a credit
check run on an apartment lease application and Sullivan was turned away. Id. Four years later, in
2000, the negative credit items still appeared in her credit report further hindering her efforts to rent
an apartment. Id. (quoting Sullivan who subsequently stated that "[t]he most maddening aspect of
all this is that it could have been prevented had the phone companies simply checked the identity
of the person who established phone service in my name."). Other ways in which victims of identity
theft are harmed include: "(1) having their privacy invaded, (2) suffering the psychological trauma
of having their reputation ruined.., and (4) undergoing tremendous transaction costs to restore
their names." Milne, supranote 203, at 392. The FTC's identity theft online complaint form allows
a victim to detail any problems with companies, credit bureaus, or organizations in remedying the
problems caused by the theft. See FTC, ID Theft Complaint Input Form, supra note 205.
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Identity theft was first criminalized in 1998 when Congress passed the
Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act (the ITADA).216 This Act
labels identity theft as a federal offense with a maximum sentence of
fifteen years in addition to a potential fine of up to $250,000 and the
"forfeiture... of [A]ny personal property used or intended to be used to
commit the offense ... ,,2 for anyone who "knowingly transfers ... or
uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person
with the intent to commit, or to aid or abet.., any unlawful activity that
constitutes a violation of Federal law, or that constitutes a felony under
any applicable State or local law., 2 8 The ITADA also created a mandate
for the FTC to become the primary clearinghouse for identity theft
prevention in the United States.21 9 More recently, in 2003, Congress passed
the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act (FACTA) at least partially
designed to remedy identity theft as companies are required to truncate
social security numbers and names of individuals, through a system of
nationwide fraud alerts, granting a greater ability to detect identity theft
and prevent some of its repercussions. Under the Fair Credit Reporting Act
22
(FCRA), 220 individuals also may obtain a free annual credit report. 1
216. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (2000). See also Stafford, supranote 214, at 201 (discussing identity
theft and pertinent regulations designed to hinder its effectiveness) and General Accounting Office,
Identity Theft: Prevalence and Cost Appear to be Growing (2002).
217. 18 U.S.C. § 1028 (b)(5).
218. 18 U.S.C § 1028(a)(7). See also Hemphill, supranote 65, at 55. Hemphill states that the
means of identification identified under this law can come in the form of a:
[N]ame, Social Security number, date of birth, driver's license or other
government issued identification number ... employer or taxpayer identification
number, biometric data, e.g., fingerprint, voice print, retina, or iris image, unique
electronic identification number, address, or routing code, and telecommunication
identifying information or access device.
Id.

219. Id.
220. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 (2000).
221. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(j)(a). The FCRA requires each of the three major credit reporting
agencies to provide a free credit report--upon an individual's request-once during every twelve
month period. Id. See also What It's All About, supra note 203, at 6 (On September 1, 2005,
consumers nationwide were eligible to access this free report by accessing the web site http://www.
annualcreditreport.com, by calling 1-877-322-8228, or by mailing in a request as the three major
credit reporting agencies need not honor a request made directly to them). Some clever companies
created their own domain names utilizing the free report concept to entice users to request a report
that generally comes with strings attached-such as fee-based credit monitoring attached to the free
report. See FTC, Your Access to Free Credit Reports, Sept. 2005, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/
pubs/credit/freereports.htm. The danger of these imposter web sites as follows:
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Consumers also may place fraud alerts in their credit report if they feel
they are, or could become, the victim of an identity thief.222 An initial alert
is valid for ninety days while an extended alert exists on a credit report for
seven years. 22223 Any fraud alert requires a creditor to verify the identity of
Only one web site is authorized to fill orders for the free annual credit report you
are entitled to under law-annualcreditreport.com.Other web sites that claim to
offer "free credit reports," "free credit scores," or "free credit monitoring" are not
part of the legally mandated free annual credit report program. In some cases, the
"free" product comes with strings attached. For example, some sites sign you up
for a supposedly "free" service that converts to one you have to pay for after a trial
period. If you don't cancel during the trial period, you may be unwittingly
agreeing to let the company start charging fees to your credit card. Some
"imposter" sites use terms like "free report" in their names; others have URLs that
purposely misspell annualcreditreport.comin the hope that you will mistype the
name of the official site. Some of these "imposter" sites direct you to other sites
that try to sell you something or collect your personal information.
Id.A few states also allow access to free credit reports aside from the requirements of the FCRA.
See, e.g., CoLO.REV. STAT. § 12-14.3-104(2)(e) (2006). The Colorado statute states that
[e]ach consumer reporting agency shall, upon request of a consumer, provide the
consumer with one disclosure copy of his or her file per year at no charge... If
the consumer requests more than one disclosure copy of his or her file per year...
the consumer reporting agency may charge the consumer up to eight dollars for
each additional disclosure copy.
Id.; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2480b(c)(1) (2006) (stating that "[u]nder Vermont law, you are allowed
to receive one free copy of your credit report every 12 months from each credit reporting agency.").
A few other states have statutorily created a reduced price for obtaining a credit report. See, e.g.,
MINN.STAT. § 13C.01(1)(a) (2006) (stating that "[a] consumer who is the subject of a consumer
report maintained by a consumer reporting agency is entitled to request and receive by mail, for a
charge not to exceed $3, a copy of the consumer report once in any 12-month period.").
222. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 c- I (stating that individuals with a "good faith" suspicion that they have
been or are about "to become a victim of fraud or related crime, including identity theft" may
request a fraud alert be placed in their credit file). According to the FTC, placing a fraud alert is
appropriate, for instance, if a person has lost a wallet or purse or been fooled by a phishing or
pretexting scam. See What It's All About, supra note 203, at 19. Placing this alert entitles an
individual to one free credit report from each of the three major credit reporting agencies. Id.
223. 15 U.S.C. § 168 1c-l(a)(1)(A) (providing for the ninety-day initial fraud alert). See What
It's AllAbout, supra note 203, at 19. In order to file an extended report, an individual must provide
a credit reporting company with an "identity theft report" and this extended alert entitles the victim
to two free credit reports per year from the three major credit reporting agencies. 15 U.S.C. §
1681 c-i (b)(1) and (2) and What It's All About, supranote 203, at 19. An identity theft report may
consist of two parts: (1) a copy of a filed police report and (2) additional information as requested
by the credit reporting agency from which the fraud alert was requested. Id. at 20 (demonstrating
that credit reporting agencies are entitled to make this request within 15 days of the alert request
and fifteen additional days to complete the alert implementation). Additionally, the credit reporting
agency initially receiving the fraud alert request must notify the other major agencies of such
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the person requesting the credit before issuance.2 24 Finally, consumer
reporting agencies are required to block the transmission of credit
information that a consumer identifies as "information that resulted from
an alleged identity theft[.] ' '225 Willful noncompliance with the FCRA can
lead to civil penalties in favor of the injured consumer of up to $1,000, any
punitive damages "as the court may allow" and, potentially, attorney
fees.226

These laws are not working as initially planned as identity thieves are
hard to catch and nationwide fraud alerts are not necessarily stopping
thieves from accessing P11---even PII under a fraud alert!227 In fact, current
law does not allow consumers to sue a credit reporting agency for
reporting false information unless the agency acted negligently-a
situation that is difficult when the agency is accurately reporting the
negative credit information caused by identity thieves. 228 However, this
negative information will make the clean-up and move-on processes much
request. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 c-1(a)(1)(B). An "active duty alert" is a special kind of fraud alert existing
for twelve months and is designed to protect the identity of troops currently serving in the U.S.
military. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-1(c). Interestingly, a reseller of a credit report is also required to
include the fraud alert in the transaction. 15 U.S.C. § 1681c-l(f).
224. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 c-i (h). Potential credit issuers must not issue credit to a consumer with
a ninety-day fraud alert unless the issuer "utilizes reasonable policies and procedures to form a
reasonable belief that the [issuer] knows the identity of the person making the request." 15 U.S.C.
§ 1681 c-1(h)(l)(B)(i). If a consumer has an extended fraud alert, a potential issuer of credit must
contact the consumer in person "to confirm that the application for a new credit plan ...is not the
result of identity theft." Id. § 168 1c-1(h)(2). See also What It's All About, supra note 203, at 19
(stating that "[a]s part of this verification process, the business may try to contact [the person under
whose name the credit is being requested] directly. This may cause some delays [to the process].").
225. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 c-2 (this block must occur "not later than 4 business days after the date"
the agency receives: (1) appropriate proof of the consumer's identity, (2) a copy of the identity theft
report, (3) the identification of the fraudulent information by the consumer, and (4) "a statement
by the consumer that the information is not information relating to any [legitimate] transaction by
the consumer.").
226. 15 U.S.C. § 168 In (Additionally any "person who obtains a consumer report from a
consumer reporting agency under false pretenses or knowingly without a permissible purpose shall
be liable to the consumer reporting agency for actual damages" up to $1,000). Negligent violations
of the FCRA may result in actual damages being paid to the consumer-victim. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 o.
The knowing and willing obtaining of PHI on a consumer from a credit reporting agency under false
pretenses can be fined and imprisoned for up to two years. 15 U.S.C. § 1681 q. Knowing and willful
unauthorized disclosures of consumer P1I by a credit reporting agency employee or officer can also
lead to a fine and up to two years imprisonment. 15 U.S.C. § 1681r.
227. See, e.g., Sovern, supra note 209, at 233 (stating that "[c]onsumers complain that even
after they place fraud alerts in their credit files, identity thieves are still able to borrow in their
names.").
228. See id. at 234 (discussing this negligence standard and comparing it with other legal
standards in offline cases of impersonation such as forged checks).
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more difficult as injured consumers attempt to open new accounts and
lines of credit.229
2. Spam
Spam is:
Electronic junk mail or junk newsgroup postings. Some people
define spam even more generally as any unsolicited e-mail.
However, if a long-lost brother finds your e-mail address and sends
you a message, this could hardly be called spam, even though it's
unsolicited. Real spam is generally e-mail advertising for some
product sent to a mailing list or newsgroup.23 °
229. Evidence suggests that companies dealing with consumers alleging identity theft are often
non-responsive. See id at 235 (citing congressional hearings at which identity theft victims detailed
accounts of their treatment by companies-particularly lenders and credit reporting
agencies-while trying to reclaim their identities). See also Identity Theft: How to Protect and
Restore Your Good Name: HearingBefore the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, Subcomm. on
Technology, Terrorism, and Gov't Info., 106th Cong. (2000) (statement of Michelle Brown);
Identity Theft: HearingBefore the House Comm. on Banking andFin. Services, 106th Cong. (2000)
(statement of Shon Boulden). Credit reporting agencies have little incentive to be responsive to
identity theft victims because such agencies are not in business to buy or sell from these individuals
and have little financial incentive to help. Sovern, supra note 209, at 235. Sovem states that:
Credit bureaus do not appear to suffer any losses when identity thefts occur...
Moreover, credit bureaus need not fear losing business if they alienate consumers
because credit bureaus typically do not engage in transactions directly with
consumers beyond supplying consumers with their own credit reports or credit
monitoring services-products that victims of identity theft are likely to buy no
matter how angry they may be at credit bureaus. Accordingly, the only incentive
credit reporting agencies have to prevent identity theft is altruism, and that appears
not to be a sufficient motivation.
Id. Lenders also possess little incentive to notify a credit agency that a recent default was the result
of identity theft and not a result of the person identified in the report. Id. at 236.
In contrast to credit bureaus, lenders incur losses because of identity theft. They
may provide goods and services for which they are not paid.... But, because [a
lender has already suffered a loss at the time it would inform the credit agency of
the identity theft] the lender has little to gain by [such reporting] ...
Consequently, like credit reporting agencies, lenders have a chance to reduce the
damages suffered by consumer-victims of identity theft at a time when their chief
motivation for doing so is altruism.
Id. (internal citations omitted)).
230. Webopedia.com, Spam, http://www.webopedia.com/TERM/s/ spam.html (last visited July
31, 2007). Spain is no longer made up of merely text messages; today's spam is increasingly made
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Spam is one of the oldest e-threats and today, forty percent of all e-mail
sent can be classified as spam.23 ' Once a spammer locates a working email address, topics as diverse as pornography and real estate may be sent
to millions of people instantaneously, and at a cost much reduced from
other forms of direct marketing, via the click of a mouse.232 Some spam is
sent when hackers break into a computer and utilize PH stored within to
send spam without the knowledge of the computer's owner; this process
turns the computer into a "zombie" machine under the hacker's control.233
It also is possible for spammers to send spam messages to e-mail addresses
purchased from data brokers.234
Spam devotes resources from more productive tasks-such as
working-as the recipient spends time eliminating the unsolicited e-mails
and cleaning-up the computer system.2 35 Even more threatening is the fact
up of pictures as well as text in an attempt to bypass spam filters and to encourage people to interact
with the message. See Jon Swartz, Picture This: A Sneakier Kind of Span., USA TODAY, July 24,
2006, at A-I (stating that "[i]mage-based spam [now] accounts for 21% of all spam, almost double
what it was at the start of [2006][.1").
231. Don Evett, Spam Filter Review: Spam Statistics 2006, ToPTENREVIEWS.COM, http://
spam-filter-review.toptenreviews.com/spam-statistics.html (last visited July 31, 2007) (claiming
that 12.4 billion e-mails sent per day can be classified as spain and the average person receives
2,200 spam e-mail messages per year). Interestingly, the United States also leads the world as the
country relaying the most spain and is the "source of 23.2 per cent of the world's spare." U.S.
Heads Spare List, ADVERTISER (Australia), July 29, 2006, at 96 (stating that China and South Korea
are the two countries that most closely trail the United States in the relaying ofspam). Some studies
from 2004 show that span represented 65% of all e-mail. See Saul Hansell, Junk E-MailandFraud
are Focus of Crackdown, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2004, at C-1.
232. See Alex Mindlin, Seems Somebody is Clicking on that Spam, N.Y. TIMES, July 3, 2006,
at C-3 (stating that spain messages on the subject of pornography are the most successful in getting
recipients to click on them followed by pharmacy drugs and then Rolex watches). "Spam is made
possible by the architecture of email, which, while intended to make email free and accessible, has
also created a structure of costs such that there is little difference between sending a thousand
emails or one hundred million." Rebecca Bolin, Note: Opting Out ofSpam: A Domain Level DoNot-Spam Registry, 24 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 399, 400 (2006).
233. See Spam Poses Threat to Privacy, BBC NEWS WORLD EDITION, Oct. 16, 2002,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/technology/2330823.stm (discussing the idea of a "zombie" computer
and the idea that most of the world's spam is relayed in this fashion).
234. See, e.g., Rick Whiting, Data Brokers Draw Increased Scrutiny, InformationWeek.com
(July 10, 2006) (stating that "Some data brokers are getting the message that changes are needed.
ChoicePoint last year brought a spotlight to the industry's practices when it revealed it had
previously sold information on 145,000 consumers to identity thieves posing as a legitimate
business."), www.informationweek.com/management/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=1 90301136&
pgno=2&queryText.
235. See id. (claiming that 10% of the typical workday is spent dealing with spam e-mails and
that this time has the obvious impact of decreasing business productivity). "While spam has been
a nuisance since the earliest days of electronic mail, in recent years it has become a mission-critical
problem that can take down entire companies' mail servers, spread viruses, compromise systems,
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that spam e-mails may contain viruses that may harm a computer and
completely destroy a hard drive.23 6
For the purposes of this Article, the most privacy-intrusive aspect of
spam occurs when recipients respond to the messages and enter PH.237 The
process works as follows: companies employ sophisticated
software-called spam bots-that surf the Web and "harvest ' 238 e-mail
addresses. These companies then sell such PH to spammers and other
interested parties who send the spam to each of the e-mail addresses.239
Such messages request that the recipient enter PH in order to receive more
information or to purchase the product in question-which may or may not
exist in reality. Once this information is received by the spammer, it is
used to commit identity theft or sold on the open market for a quick profit.
This tactic is similar to the e-threat of phishing where e-mails which
appear authentic collect PH for improper purposes. The primary difference
is that phishing e-mails are designed to appear as if they came from an
account already created while spam e-mails are designed to entice you to
learn more about or purchase a product or service. 4 °
An example of a serious spam attack occurred when a company in
Texas sent out over 25 million unsolicited e-mails per day offering
mortgage refinancing, extensions of automobile warranties, health
and overwhelm frustrated users." Bolin, supra note 232, at 400. See also Vivek Arora, Note: The
CAN-SPAMAct: An InadequateAttempt to Deal with a GrowingProblem, 39 COLuM. J.L. & SOc.
PROBS. 299, 300 (stating that "Spam is a nuisance for e-mail users because it clogs up e-mail
inboxes, imposes costs on Internet servers that run e-mail programs, and invades people's
privacy.").
236. See Damien Henderson, Scottish HackerAmong Three Arrestedafter Virus Sent in Spam
E-Mails, HERALD (Glasgow) June 28, 2006, at 3 (discussing the arrest of a hacker "alleged to be
part of an international criminal gang that has infected thousands of computers worldwide with
viruses."). Hackers such as these often place viruses on computers in an attempt to gain control and
"target valuable personal data such as credit card and bank details." Id.
237. See, e.g., Hefty Fine on Spammers Serves as a Fair Warning, SAN ANToNIO EXPRESS
NEWS, June 9, 2006, at B-6 [hereinafter Hefty Fine] (discussing a lawsuit by the Texas Attorney
General against three companies-Leadplex, Payperaction, and Eastmark Technology, Ltd.-under
the Controlling the Assault ofNon-Solicited Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM
Act), the Texas Electronic Mail Solicitation Act and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act for
sending millions of spam messages and the subsequent $10 million judgment issued by a federal
court).
238. Harvesting is the scanning of the Internet for public e-mail addresses. See Bolin, supra,
note 232, at 419 (discussing that harvesting is not prohibited by CAN-SPAM, although the use of
a harvested address in connection with a CAN-SPAM violation may lead to harsher penalties).
239. See id. at 419 (stating that spam bot programs "quickly run through webpages looking
for email addresses to harvest. Collectors then sell the addresses to spamming operations.").
240. See, e.g., SonicWall.com, Anti-Phishing Protection (discussing the differences between
phishing and spam), http://www.sonicwallproducts.com/emea/796.html (last visited Dec. 18,2007).
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" ' In all, the "spam was sent out
insurance and burglar alarm installation.24
under 250 assumed names and set up with misleading [and individually
tailored] subject lines to give recipients the false impression the e-mails
contained information important to them., 24 2 When the recipients
responded to the spam messages, they entered PH, which was then sold on
the open market despite the fact that the messages promised privacy.243
Today, a federal law, the Controlling the Assault of Non-Solicited
Pornography and Marketing Act of 2003 (CAN-SPAM), 24 governs some
senders of spam by requiring all sexually-oriented unsolicited commercial
e-mails to be labeled, include the sender's physical address 245 and include
a way for the recipient to opt-out. 246 Because the CAN-SPAM was
intended to create a national standard governing spam, the law preempts
all state laws that require labels on unsolicited commercial e-mails or
prohibit such e-mails entirely. 247 Time has shown that this pre-emption has
many loopholes and most state spam laws have not been preempted. 248 The
25
250
FTC, 24 state attorneys general as well as Internet Service Providers, '
can all enforce CAN-SPAM's provisions.
241. See Hefty Fine,supranote 237 (stating that, before the judgment, the company charged
was believed to have been the fourth largest spam producer in the world).
242. See id.
243. See id. See also L.A. Lorek, Former Span King Seen as Good Kid Gone Astray, SAN
ANTONIO ExPREss NEWS, June 11, 2006, at A-I (stating that the spammers would sell particular
pieces of P11 for up to $28 each); Span King Hitfor $13m, AUSTRALAN (Australia), June 13, 2006,
at 5 (discussing the same case and stating that one of the "repentant" defendants recently created
an Internet security company that provides protection against spain messages).
244. 15 U.S.C. § 7701 (2003).
245. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(5) (2003).
246. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(5) (2003). Effective on January 1,2004, CAN-SPAM also prohibits
deceptive subject lines and provides for jail terms of up to five years. 15 U.S.C. § 7704(a)(2)
(discussing deceptive subject headers).
247. 15 U.S.C. § 7707(b)(1). CAN-SPAM
supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political subdivision of a
State that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send commercial
messages, except to the extent that any such statute, regulation, or rule prohibits
falsity or deception in any portion of a commercial electronic mail message or
information attached thereto.
Id.
248. See also Bolin, supranote 232, at 421-22 (stating that "Congress assessed the preemption
as 'minimal' since CAN-SPAM does not preempt most of the laws previously used against
spammers. In particular, its preemption excludes laws related to 'fraud or computer crime,' which
many states now have. In other words, most state sparn laws are still in effect.").
249. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(d) (2003).
250. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(f) (2003).
251. 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g) (2003).
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In addition to the CAN-SPAM, at least thirty-eight states have some
form of anti-spam legislation. 2 While some state laws are being upheld,
others are being invalidated as governing interstate activity rather than
purely intrastate activity. 253 Maryland's Commercial Electronic Mail Act
(MCEMA)-allowing private rights of action when receiving e-mails
containing false information-was struck down by a Maryland appeals
court while
similar laws were upheld by California and Washington state
25 4
courts.

C. U.S. Law Operatingat the Back Door
Because the e-threats located at a company's back door pose the most
serious risks to an individual's privacy, the law proposed in this Article
must contain a stand-alone section that poses strict requirements for data
dissemination. Differing from the sections covering e-threats at the front
door and inside the company-both structured as regulatory ceilings-this
252. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 45.50.479 (2003) (requiring a label at the beginning of the
subject line of any unsolicited commercial e-mail if the sender knows that the recipient is a resident
of Alaska); ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 44-1372.01 (2003) (prohibiting false routing information and
requiring a subject line label and an opt-out provision); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-601-§ 4-88-603
(2003) (stating that all commercial and sexually explicit e-mails must contain a functioning reply
e-mail address and instructions to opt out, while all unsolicited commercial and sexually explicit
e-mails must include the sender's name, physical address and domain name); CAL. Bus. & PROF.
CODE § 17529) (West 2003) (making it illegal to send unsolicited commercial e-mail from
California or to a California e-mail address); Colorado Junk Email Law, COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
6-2.5-101-103 (2003) (prohibiting, inter alia, unsolicited commercial e-mails to be sent from a
third party's domain name or Internet address without permission); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-9-101
(2005) (prohibiting, inter alia, the sending of unsolicited commercial e-mail with false or
misleading headers or that falsely represents that it is a solicited e-mail); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
325F.694 (2002) (expiring automatically when the federal CANSPAM Act became effective); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 41.730 (1997 as amended in 2003) (enacting America's first anti-spam legislation and
prohibiting, inter alia, the sending of unsolicited commercial e-mail unless it is labeled "ADV" or
"ADVERTISEMENT" at the beginning of the subject line); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§
46.003-004 (2003) (requiring, inter alia, that all unsolicited commercial e-mail messages contain
a functioning e-mail address for opt-out requests and that opt-out requests be honored).
253. See, e.g., Judge Overturns Law Against Junk E-Mail, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 15,
2004, at A-4 [hereinafter Junk E-Mail] (discussing the invalidation of Maryland's 2002
Commercial Electronic Mail Act).
254. MO. CODE ANN., COM. LAW § 14-3002 (2006) (prohibiting the sending of unsolicited
commercial e-mails containing false or misleading information about the sender, in the transmission
path or in the subject line when such e-mail was sent either from a computer located within
Maryland or to an e-mail address that the sender knew or should have known belonged to a
Maryland resident). See Junk E-Mail, supra note 253 (discussing the decisions of a California
appeals court and the Washington State Supreme Court). See also Washington v. Heckel, 24 P.3d
404,405-05,413 (Wash. 2001) (upholding the Washington anti-sparn legislation against a dormant
commerce clause attack).
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section must be designated expressly as a regulatory floor. Regulatory
floors are placed in legislation to set a minimum standard below which
state laws regulating the same area cannot fall.2 5 For instance, a federal
law drafted as a regulatory floor, which defined spam as "any unsolicited
commercial e-mail message sent to any individual," would prohibit a state
from passing legislation defining spam merely as "any unsolicited
commercial e-mail message dealing with the subject of pornography and
sent to any individual." In this example, the regulatory floor would render
the state law void because the provisions of the state are less strict than the
federal provision's broader definition of spam (it falls below the regulatory
floor).
On the other hand, regulatory floors allow states to draft regulations
that are stricter than the federal law at issue. This attribute allows states to
become players in regulating certain areas of interest to their residents.
Tougher regulations also can be beneficial when states-possessing a
better understanding of the local conditions, customs and feelings of their
residents than Congress-effectively experiment with different regulatory
formulas. Former U.S. Supreme Court Justice Louis D. Brandeis explained
this concept eloquently when he stated: "[I]t is one of the happy incidents
of the federal system that a single courageous state may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic
'
experiments without risk to the rest of the country." 256
Although regulatory floors are commonly thought of as privacyenhancing attributes of federal legislation, the downside, from a business
perspective, revolves around two related issues: (1) the expense and other
efforts surrounding compliance with as many as fifty-one 25 7 differing state
regulations (and potentially many, many more local city and town
regulations)2 58 and (2) the ability of the state with the strictest regulations
255. See Daniel Solove & Chris Jay Hooffiagle, A Model Regime ofPrivacyProtection,2006
U. ILL. L. REv. 357, 381 (2006) (referring to the concept as "floor preemption" and stating that such
preemption allows states "to innovate more comprehensive protections for individual rights.").
256. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262,311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Keep
in mind that this type of state experimentation is not permitted under regulatory ceilings, however,
as states are banned from passing regulations that are stricter than the federal law at issue. See
discussion, supra Parts III.C & IV.C.
257. The laws of Washington D.C. should be considered in this calculation as they are similar
to state laws governing residents of the fifty states.
258. See, e.g., Charity Scott, Is Too Much PrivacyBadfor Your Health?An Introduction to
the Law, Ethics, and HIPAA Rule on Medical Privacy, 17 GA. ST. U.L. REv. 481, 514 (2000)
(referring to critics' arguments by stating that "being subjected to fifty states' extensive and
inconsistent laws on privacy is costly and impractical."). The fifty-one differing regulations could
come from fifty different state laws in addition to the federal law setting the regulatory floor in the
first place.
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to set a de facto national standard. For instance, assume that California
becomes the first state in the nation to ban any company doing business
with California residents from disseminating any PH to any third party,
including a company's subsidiaries. With this strict privacy law on the
books in California, it is possible that companies incorporated across the
country, but that conduct business in California, may choose to comply
with California's law on a national scale and cease their PII dissemination
practices completely. This might cause them to cease any efforts to
disseminate any PH in such a way that it is protected from back door ethreats (i.e., dissemination with restrictions of future use and subsequent
dissemination). If this occurs, California legislators (elected only by
California residents) have created a de facto national standard which
businesses across the county feel compelled to comply with and which
residents across the country (who did not vote for these legislators) are
forced to deal with. While these consequences proved too burdensome
during the P1-collection and utilization stages, they become a bit more
acceptable at the back door stage where dissemination can cause
tremendous damage.
The three back door e-threats described above initially stem from a
company's dissemination of PH into cyberspace. For instance, back door
pretexting would be ineffective if a company representative could sniff out
the scam or refuse to give any PH over the phone without proper
verification. Identity thieves would be frustrated if companies restricted
access to the PH that they sell because less and less personal information
would be for sale on the open market or merely floating around in
cyberspace. Finally, spammers would need to find a different source of
their e-mail addresses if companies better protected the PH they collect
and store from their customers. With the source of many of these problems
in the open, the third section of the proposed law singles out dissemination
as its focus and forces companies to more carefully consider their
dissemination practices.' 9 Requiring businesses to be more careful with
the PH they collect will be much more effective than trying to stop identity
thieves and spammers located across the globe through the IDTDA and the
CAN-SPAM. Even better, these practices can drastically reduce the
instances of identity theft and spam without the identity thief and the
spammer having any say in the matter-they will find themselves cut off
from a major source of their information.
This section of the proposed law will require companies to consider the
parties it commonly sells PH to and then make an educated decision as to
which options concerning future dissemination of the PH it will provide to
259. See, e.g., Bolin, supra note 232, at 419 (stating that "CAN-SPAM has made great
progress toward actually suing and collecting damages from the worst spammers.").
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the purchaser. More specifically, under its provisions, this section will
require companies disseminating PH to unrelated parties to: (1) accurately
describe any dissemination practices and restrictions on subsequent
dissemination in its privacy policy, (2) attach its name to each piece of PH
it disseminates for a secondary use (PH tagging) and (3) verify that the
purchaser of any PH is a legitimate person or entity (legitimacy
verification) and then place a responsibility on the seeker of the
information to verify that it is being used for a proper purpose.
1. Privacy Policy Disclosure
Recall that the first section of the proposed law required all companies
collecting, utilizing, storing, or disseminating PH in interstate commerce
to post a standardized and readable e-commerce privacy policy.26° As part
of the required disclosure in such policies, companies will be forced to
specifically discuss their policies concerning PII dissemination, if any. 26'
If a company does sell or otherwise disseminate any PH to any party, this
section of the privacy policy requires a statement as to: how the PH is
disseminated, who receives the PH and for what consideration (in general
terms) and, finally, any restrictions that the company places on subsequent
sales and uses of the information. Because this proposed law requires
privacy policies to be more readable and to be conspicuously linked
to/located on homepages, customers will be more likely to read the
dissemination section of the policy and determine whether they wish to
continue on and submit PH. The idea is that: (1) better educated web site
visitors will cause companies to carefully consider whether selling such
data will lead to a loss of customers during the other two stages of the PH
processing cycle, and (2) a requirement to disclose dissemination practices
will cause companies to be more careful with the PH they collect.
2. PH Tagging
In addition to accurate disclosure in a company's privacy policy, the
proposed law will require that every piece of PH disseminated to an
unrelated third party be electronically associated-or tagged-with the
seller's name. This identification tag must then be inputted into the
purchaser's database and must remain associated with the PH for the entire
time it is stored in the system. Upon any subsequent resale to another
purchaser, the tag must be updated with the new seller's information to be
260. See discussion, supraPart III.C.
261. It is important to remember that companies will not be required to implement any
particular PHI dissemination policy, only to accurately disclose the actual policy they put in place.
See discussion, supra Part III.C.
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posted alongside the prior seller's information. This updated tag will then
be stored in the second purchaser's database and updated in a similar
fashion if ever resold.
For example, assume that Wells Fargo Home Mortgage (Wells Fargo)
collects my home phone number in my loan application and later sells this
PH to an unrelated mortgage insurance company such as Genworth
Financial (Genworth). Further assume that Genworth calls me at home and
attempts to sell me mortgage insurance. If this occurs, the caller from
Genworth must state to me before proceeding with the pitch that my phone
number was obtained from Wells Fargo. If Genworth then resells the same
information to a local landscaping company, the landscaper must identify
that it received my information from both Wells Fargo and Genworth.
Recipients of solicitations-whether via e-mail, postal mail or
telephone-finally will be informed fully as to which party disseminated
their PH and finally will be able to express their thoughts on this
dissemination directly to the seller.262 These thoughts may come in the
form of a "thank you" for passing on the information to a desired service
provider or in the form of a "how dare you" sell the information I
disclosed to you. At the end of the day, this regulation will surely add an
expense to the sale and secondary use of PH in the form of database
configuration, updating, and organization. However, this added expense
should help decrease the amount of PH floating in cyberspace vulnerable
to a back door e-threat when companies uninterested in experiencing
customer resentment from the sale of the PH choose limit their
dissemination practices. Additionally, some companies will be able to
frame the disseminations in a positive light such as on a flyer, delivered
via regular mail, stating: "Your mortgage provider, Wells Fargo, thought
you would appreciate this information about private mortgage insurance."
3. Legitimacy Verification
The final piece of the proposed law's back-door section will: (1) ban
any company or individual to attempt to acquire PH from any business or
individual via the utilization of a fraudulent identity, (2) require companies
that disseminate PH to verify the identity of each recipient, and (3) require
the recipient of such information to verify that the information is being
requested for a legal purpose. In other words, any P1-disseminator
covered by the proposed law must make an affirmative declaration that
each purchaser of the information is actually the entity it claims to be (a
"legitimate purchaser"). This declaration must be memorialized on some
262. This provision would not affect public information or situations where customers
affirmatively consent--opt-in-to the secondary use of their PII.

THE PRIVACY MATRIX

type of PH Dissemination Verification Form, signed by an authorized
corporate officer and retained for a period of five years. In addition, the
recipient of any PH from a covered company must make a written
declaration that the information is being requested for a legal purpose. This
declaration must be made on some type of PH Receipt Verification Form,
signed by an officer of the company or by any private individual receiving
the information and kept on file for five years.
These requirements may not completely stop the back door e-threats,
but it will make both disseminators and requestors of personal information
take more time to determine whether releasing or obtaining the
information is a business risk worth taking. For example, if the
investigation company involved in the Amy Boyer case had been legally
required to dig a little deeper into the reasons behind its client's request for
Ms. Boyer's employment address, it is doubtful that the company would
have provided such information to its client. Additionally, because this
section of the proposed law makes back door pretexting illegal, the
investigation company would have been deterred from deceiving Boyer
into providing the information while pretending to be from her credit card
company.
Logistically, this provision need not be excessively burdensome. Loyal
to its principles of minimal intrusion into business decisions, the law will
not specify the manner in which companies conduct verifications. In fact,
companies remain free to experiment with verification techniques to
determine which are the most effective-both from a compliance and cost
perspective. The most cost effective way to determine legitimacy would
likely occur via a webpage dedicated solely to PII requests. On this page,
all requests would be submitted through an electronic form that can be
instantaneously organized and then funneled through a company
representative charged with verification matters. This representative must
be satisfied that the requestor is part of the organization represented on the
submittal form before any PH is transferred. Another option could be a
facsimile request funneled through the same service representative. A low
cost option that would not pass muster, however, would be the releasing
of PH via a telephone request and a verbal confirmation by the requestor
that she is who she claims to be.263
Again, if this provision was on the books when the ChoicePoint data
security breach occurred, the fraud may have been caught as ChoicePoint
would have been legally incentivized to investigate the background of the
data requesters. This investigation should have led to the discovery that the
263. A telephone request could be honored if the service representative took the request,
independently verified legitimacy, and then disseminated the PII. Here, the independent verification
is the key.
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requestors were illegitimate and to the extinguishment of the data
transfer. 2" Although this requirement is more burdensome than the selfregulatory requirements in effect today, it is not overly burdensome and
the benefits of preventing further ChoicePointesque scandals are well
worth the cost.
Vl. CONCLUSION

The twenty-first-century e-commerce environment can be a scary
place. Hidden within its boundaries are technologically-sophisticated ethreats designed to compromise PII. These threats are lying in wait for
inexperienced web-surfers and actively implemented by experienced ethieves. At the same time, individuals continue to submit vast amounts of
information into cyberspace without truly understanding these lurking
dangers while, at the same time, businesses stumble to protect the
information they collect. The Privacy Matrix is a conceptual model
designed to identify the most prominent location of each major e-threat at
the three different stages of the PII processing cycle. Categorizing such ethreats into these three stages-the front door, inside the company, and the
back door-helps policy makers analyze which regulatory weapons, if
any, will most effectively combat each threat while simultaneously
minimizing the burden of such regulations on e-commerce efficiency.
The Privacy Matrix is helpful at this point in time because the U.S.
legal system-currently a mixture of industry self-regulation and a
patchwork of federal and state legislation-has proven itself unequipped
to deal with these e-threats effectively. The Matrix demonstrates that a
new federal law, with sliding-scale regulations specifically tailored to each
stage of the PII processing cycle, can serve as a privacy-enhancing firststep in removing some of the bite from these e-threats. This legislation
should serve as a regulatory ceiling at both the front door and inside the
company stages and as a regulatory floor at the back door stage. The
structure of this regulation will create an environment where individuals
remain primarily liable for decisions concerning their PII when such
information is within their control. This responsibility will shift to the
businesses that collect PHI once control of the information has shifted.
Another benefit of the proposed legislation is that, during the early stages
of the PHI processing cycle, e-commerce companies will be governed by
264. As discussed previously, this provision will also help drive down the occurrences of
pretexting. Because data sellers would be required to verify the identity of the requestor, a pretexter
pretending to be someone else or someone from a company they are not associated with will have
a more difficult time tricking a corporate representative into releasing personal information.
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one federal statute-requiring a standardized privacy policy, security
breach notification and conspicuous disclosure-and will not be forced to
comply with widely-differing state laws or with a de-facto national
standard determined by a legislative body elected by the citizens of a state.
Later in the cycle, once PII is completely outside of the control of the
person it identifies, a statutory floor will allow states to experiment with
creative solutions-such as PH tagging technology and legitimacy
verification-designed to prevent potentially dangerous dissemination of
PH through a company's back door.
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2-Sample Compliant MultilayeredElectronic PrivacyPolicy.
Layer One265

OUR PRIVACY POLICY
TYPES OF PERSONAL INFORMATION COLLECTED:

" Active Collection: We may collect your name and email address in return for website access.
* Passive Collection: We collect information regarding your visit, including your browser
tvne. once you enter to determine the oooularitv of our website and the number of visitors.
PERSONAL INFORMATION USES:

"
"
*
"
*
0

We may use your information internally to process a transaction you initiate with us.
We may give your information to our partners to process a transaction you initiate with us.
We may use your information for internal purposes unrelated to any transaction.
Your information will not be aggregated with data we collect from other visitors.
We may sell your information to unrelated companies to market worthwhile services to you.
We will not sell your information to anyone in the event of our bankruptcy.

YOUR CONSENT OPTIONS:
Once you submit your information to us through our website we may use it for any of the
purposes mentioned above without first obtaining your consent.
" You do not have the choice of opting-out, or requesting that we do not use your information,
for of any of the purposes mentioned above once you submit it to us.
"

PERSONAL INFORMATION SECURITY:

" Collection Security: All information you submit is collected through an unencrypted form.
* Transmission Security: All information you submit to us is encrypted during transmission.
* Storage Security: Your information is not encrypted once transmitted to us but is stored in a
password-protected database that is continuously monitored by our trained staff
ACCESSING/CHANGING/REMOVING PERSONAL INFORMATION:

" You cannot access any information you submit to us once submitted.
" You may request that we change/remove any information you submit to us by clicking here.
PRIVACY POLICY CHANGES:

" We may change our policy any time.
" We will email you and post all
changes online when this happens.

OTHER IMPORTANT INFORMATION:

0
0
0

View our complete privacy policy here.
We belong to TRUSTe and BBBOnline.
We abide by the US/EU Safe Harbor.

Questions/comments about your privacy - Please click here and we will respond within 24 hours.
EFFECTIVE DATE: MARCH 30,2005

265. See Corey Ciocchetti, E-Commerce and Information Privacy: Privacy Policies as
PersonalInformationProtectors, 44 AM. Bus. L.J. 55, 102 (2007).
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ElectronicPrivacyPolicy:
3-Sample Compliant Multilayered
266
Layer Two

OUR PRIVACY POLICY

We collect your information to market to you and to service your account.

You may tell us not to do so.

View our complete privacy policy by calling (800) 555-5555 or at www.ourcompany.com.

266. Id. at 103.
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